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I develop and empirically test a model of the effects of CEO regulatory focus on 
firm actions and firm reputation.  I use regulatory focus theory to unpack the differences 
in firms’ strategic actions, specifically innovation behavior, operationalized by new 
product introductions, and mistake avoidance behaviors, operationalized by product 
recalls, and the effect of CEO regulatory focus on firm reputation.  Regulatory focus 
theory has identified two motivators of behavior: promotion focus and prevention focus.  
I characterize CEO promotion focus as strategic eagerness, when CEOs influence their 
firms to execute actions in pursuit of accomplishments or successful "hits", and CEO 
prevention focus as strategic vigilance, when CEOs influence their firms to execute 
actions in order to avoid mistakes and to maintain a sense of safety.  These different 
behavior profiles are theorized to result in different levels of product innovation and 
product recalls for firms within the U.S. automobile industry.  CEO regulatory focus is 
also theorized to have direct or indirect effects on multiple aspects of firm reputation - 
specifically, firm prominence and reputation for quality.  I test these hypotheses through 
text analysis of firm letters to shareholders and further empirical study of the global 
automotive industry in the U.S. from 1996-2010.  The impact of regulatory focus on 
 vii 
product introductions and product recalls and the direct and mediated effects of strategic 
eagerness and strategic vigilance generated mixed, but encouraging, results.  This study 
extends the influence of CEO regulatory focus on strategic actions and expands the 
micro-foundational influences on firm action logics. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 Modern strategy literature has made a concerted effort to delve into the influences 
on CEO behavior (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984) and how that behavior influences firm-level actions (Carpenter, 
Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004).  The CEO - and by extension, the top management team 
- sets the agenda for firm behavior and shapes organizational design, while bringing his 
or her own influences and perspectives to the position (Lewin & Stephens, 1994; Miller 
& Toulouse, 1986).  CEO personality characteristics are "not only reflected in their 
personal preferences and behaviors but also in the strategies, structure, and performance 
of the organizations they lead" (Resick, Whitman, Weingarden, & Hiller, 2009: 1365).  
CEOs have been found to have varying degrees of influence on firm strategy and the 
factors influencing that variability stretch from CEO personality (Nadkarni & Herrmann, 
2010) to CEO discretion (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990) to board of directors influence 
(Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001) to external industry factors (Porter, 1979) , among many 
others.  The upper echelons perspective (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) attempts to delve 
into the "black box" containing the insights into influences and sources of CEO behavior, 
but remains in search of a comprehensive picture of all of the elements within that black 
box. 
 The management literature continues to call on researchers to develop a better 
understanding of the psychological and personality characteristics of CEOs and how 
these factors affect firm strategy and performance.  Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) 
explain this ongoing interest in the connection between CEO characteristics and firm 
behavior remains important because of the influence CEOs have on firm composition and 
outcomes.  The call for a deeper understanding of the connection between CEO 
personality and firm outcomes is not new.  In examining the connection between 
organizations and individuals, Staw observed that "because it is possible to identify key 
actors in important organizational decisions, psychological research can be applied to 
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these individuals in order to explain organizational actions" (1991: 812).  Finkelstein, 
Hambrick and Cannella advise that "if we wish to understand the strategic choices and 
performance of organizations . . . we must examine and understand their top executives" 
(2009: 49).  Staw asserted that "psychological theories can strengthen and add theoretical 
substance to macro models by providing the underlying rationale or missing process 
mechanism" (1991: 810-811).  Staw offered that "one could hypothesize a direct linkage 
between the personality profile of the CEO ... and the cultural profile of the organization" 
(1991: 812) and challenged researchers to find answers to "not whether psychological 
tendencies exist, but whether we can expect them to affect additively the resultant 
actions, policies, or decisions of the organization" (1991: 815). 
 My dissertation seeks to understand how different strategic orientations emerge 
(McMullen & Zahra, 2009) through the influence of CEO personality.  I investigate how 
a chief executive officer's regulatory focus leads to variability in firms' strategic actions, 
and how CEO regulatory focus may directly and indirectly affects firm reputation 
(Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005; Rindova, 
Petkova, & Kotha, 2007).  In particular, I explain how the variation in goal pursuit 
influenced by CEO regulatory focus affects firm behavior and firm reputation.  The 
strategy literature has offered a number of characterizations for firms when behaviors 
split along different lines in pursuit of opportunity, including prospector/defender (Miles 
& Snow, 1978); exploration/exploitation (March, 1991); and cost leader/differentiator 
(Porter, 1985).  However, each of these characterizations of firm strategy identifies a split 
in approaches but lacks a clear mechanism that explains the behavior. 
 In this dissertation, I draw on regulatory-focus theory (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; 
Higgins, 1997; 1998) to theorize how the CEO's regulatory focus may influence a firm's 
strategic actions.  Regulatory focus theory describes two distinct systems of behavior in 
pursuit of goals - promotion focus and prevention focus.  Promotion focus characterizes 
goals as objects of accomplishment and targets of aspirational behavior, while prevention 
focus characterizes goals as obligations that represent safety and security (Higgins, 
1998).  Importantly, regulatory focus theory asserts that entities with different regulatory 
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foci can have the same goals, but may develop distinct approaches to achieving those 
goals.  Of particular interest to strategy scholars, the two regulatory foci can "trigger 
different strategic inclinations and tactical preferences" (Higgins, 1998: 13).  Exploring 
the link between CEO-level regulatory focus and firm action logics (Bacharach, 
Bamberger, & Sonnenstuhl, 1996) may enable greater understanding of why firms take 
different approaches to competing - despite common profitability and growth goals and 
leveraging similar resources.  Two examples of high-profile CEOs with distinct 
perspective that characterize promotion and prevention focus are the words of Dell 
Computer's Michael Dell and Intel's Andy Grove.  First, Dell illustrates a decidedly 
promotion focus orientation: "Don’t spend so much time trying to choose the perfect 
opportunity, that you miss the right opportunity" (Dell & Fredman, 1999).  Conversely, 
Intel's Andy Grove seems centered on a prevention focus: “Only the paranoid survive …  
I worry about products getting screwed up, and I worry about products getting introduced 
prematurely” (Grove, 1996). 
 Firm actions motivated by CEO-level promotion focus can be characterized as 
strategic eagerness, which leads to pursuit of accomplishments of successful "hits", and 
firm actions motivated by CEO-level prevention focus as strategic vigilance, which leads 
firms to seek to avoid mistakes and meet obligations or adhere to industry norms.  I 
theorize that these different strategic approaches are theorized to result in different levels 
of innovation and mistake avoidance behavior for firms.  I then examine the mediating 
effects of these different strategic behaviors on the relationship between CEO regulatory 
focus and firm reputation - specifically, a two dimensional model of firm reputation 
encompassing prominence and a reputation for quality (Rindova et al., 2005).  New 
product introductions, reflecting strategic eagerness,  are theorized to positively influence 
a firm's prominence (Rindova et al., 2005).  Strategic vigilance, reflected in fewer 
product recalls, is theorized to positively influence a firm's reputation for product quality.  
By considering the effects of the two regulatory foci on different action logics, I am able 
to examine differing effects of strategic eagerness and vigilance, rather than simply 
proposing a dichotomous outcome of one foci.  I examine these relationships in the 
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context of the automobile industry in the U.S. through the study of new products 
introductions and product recalls from 1995-2010.  Strategic eagerness and strategic 
vigilance are derived from the analysis of the language used by the CEO in the annual 
letter to shareholders, while the reputation measures are derived from Consumer Reports 
surveys and media mentions.        
 At various levels of analysis (i.e., individual, group and firm levels) promotion 
focus is concerned with advancement, growth and accomplishment (i.e., ideals) in pursuit 
of positive outcomes, while prevention focus is concerned with protection, safety and 
responsibility (i.e., oughts) in pursuit of avoiding negative outcomes (Higgins, 1998).  
Individuals may achieve a goal whether they are promotion or prevention-focused, but 
the strategies employed to achieve that goal may differ based on their regulatory focus 
(Higgins, 1998).  Regulatory focus theory has been developed at the individual level - 
through laboratory experimentation - and subsequently extended to a group-level 
construct.  Recently, regulatory focus has emerged in the management literature primarily 
in the examination of the influence of regulatory focus on entrepreneurial behavior 
 Strategy scholars have begun to consider the influence of regulatory focus at the 
firm level.  Das and Kumar (2011) propose that firm level regulatory focus affects firm 
alliance strategy. The authors posit that a firm's regulatory focus is reflected in the 
dominant coalition, and this collective regulatory focus may shape the prevailing cultural 
orientation in the firm (Das & Kumar, 2011).  Promotion-focused firms are expected to 
be more concerned with maximizing the return in a risk-return dilemma and more 
tolerant of a partner's opportunistic behavior, while prevention focused firms are 
expected to be more concerned with minimizing the risk of a risk-return dilemma and less 
tolerant of a partner's opportunistic behavior (Das & Kumar, 2011).  However, these 
expectations have not been tested empirically. 
 Central to this study, Kark and Van Dijk (2007) examine the process by which 
CEOs can prime firms' regulatory focus through a variety of actions, words and symbols.  
The authors (Kark & Van Dijk, 2007) assert that the CEO's character and regulatory 
focus can embody the organization's identity and values, and the CEO's behavior can 
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serve as a role model for the rest of the organization to emulate.  CEO's can employ 
symbolic, verbal and performance acts aimed at the broader organization to prime an 
organization's regulatory focus.  Also, leaders can display emotions that communicate 
attributes of a promotion or prevention focus, such as happiness or dejection for 
promotion focus or anxiety or serenity for prevention focus, that can permeate the 
organization.  Finally, CEOs can prime an organization's regulatory focus by shaping the 
work context of the organization - through selection of specific group tasks, allocation of 
rewards or the composition of the task structure.  Kark and Van Dijk (2007) propose that 
CEOs can shape an innovation oriented culture by executing promotion-focused priming 
activities or a quality or efficiency-oriented culture by executing prevention-focused 
priming activities.  However, these expectations have not been tested empirically.   
 I chose the auto industry for this study because it provides an environment 
featuring large, publicly traded firms of relatively similar sizes, but with diverse product 
lines, which provided me with significant variability in strategy, market share and 
leadership styles.  While the industry is highly competitive and capital intensive, the 
majority of the firms have existed for a number of years and there have been few new 
entrants.  Within the auto industry, we have seen the influence of CEO words and images 
on priming an organization's culture with the introduction of the "Quality is Job 1" 
campaign by Ford Motor Company in the early 1980s (Banham, 2002).  Ford, facing 
increased competition from lower-priced, higher quality vehicles from Japanese 
manufacturers and a lackluster quality record within its own manufacturing processes and 
facilities, needed a new approach to improve quality and gird its employees for the 
competitive battle with the Japanese manufacturers.  Working in collaboration with the 
United Auto Workers union (UAW), Ford CEO Philip Caldwell introduced the "Quality 
is Job 1" slogan to employees and to the public through advertising campaigns and face-
to-face with Ford's employees.  Banham explains in his history of Ford that "Caldwell 
articulated the mission before all Ford workers - 'Quality is Job 1'.  [The slogan] now 
permeated the culture at Ford facilities all over the world.  'Quality is Job 1' was more 
than a popular advertising message ... " (2002: 122).  A component of the 
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communications to employees to change Ford's culture included the admission by Ford 
Executive Vice President Red Polling to the UAW that "... quality had to improve  ... 
[and] the difference between Ford and its Japanese competitors was not the quality of the 
workers but Ford's inferior management philosophy, which did not emphasize continuous 
improvements in product quality" (Banham, 2002: 122).     
 I investigate the influence of CEO regulatory focus by building on recent work by 
Gamache, McNamara, Mannor and Johnson (2013) which investigates the influence of 
CEO-level regulatory focus on firm acquisition activity.  Gamache et al. (2013) use 
letters to shareholders to operationalize CEO regulatory focus.  The authors found that 
that promotion-focused CEOs are more likely to undertake acquisitions, and that CEO 
regulatory focus is a distinct attribute that influences firm strategic choices.  My study 
extends this emerging work on the influence of CEO regulatory focus on firm actions 
both theoretically and empirically.  My theory leverages the variation in tactics and 
strategies motivated by regulatory focus theory at the CEO level, and suggests that CEO 
promotion and prevention focus manifest in different firm strategic behaviors.  New 
product introductions and firm recalls are the specific firm behaviors that I theorize CEO-
level regulatory focus will influence.  These two firm actions, new product introductions 
and product recalls, capture vital processes for firm growth and performance (Katila & 
Ahuja, 2002).  Each of these constructs could be considered extreme examples of the 
eagerness and vigilance behaviors proscribed by regulatory focus theory.  By examining 
elements at the far ends of the behavioral spectrum, I may be able to generate greater 
insight into the effects of CEO-level regulatory focus on firm actions and the influence of 
those firm actions on firm reputation.    
 I use computer-aided text analysis to capture CEO-level regulatory focus, and a 
unique dataset of product innovation data in a dynamic industry to test my hypotheses.  
As shown by Gamache et al. (2013) and other strategy literature (Abrahamson & 
Hambrick, 1997; D'Aveni & MacMillan, 1990), text analysis of letters to shareholders is 
a valuable approach to investigating difficult to measure constructs such as discretion, 
innovativeness and regulatory focus.              
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 Recently, the management literature has reaffirmed the call for connecting micro 
concepts with macro-level organization research (Chen & Miller, 2012).  Chen and Miller 
explain that the exploration of firm strategic actions represents "an unexplored but fertile 
domain for integrating ... macro and micro perspectives" (2012: 163).  This dissertation 
attempts to examine the effects of a CEO's regulatory focus (a construct that emerged 
from the micro literature) on innovation behavior and product recalls (macro level firm 
actions).  I construct a longitudinal database of new product introductions and product 
recalls to measure specific firm actions. I measure reputation for quality through the use 
of Consumer Reports automotive problem reports and prominence is measured through 
text analysis of articles in the Wall Street Journal and other major national newspapers.                
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 My study theorizes on the potential effects of CEO-level regulatory focus on 
strategic actions and firm reputation.  By empirically testing the influence of CEO 
regulatory focus on firm actions, I contribute to the continuing expansion of the upper 
echelons perspective into the psychological and behavioral influences on firm actions.  
With firms actions as a critical component of my analysis, the study also helps bridge the 
connections between upper echelons and competitive dynamics research.  By testing 
hypotheses addressing the drivers of firm actions, this study expands the understanding of 
the influences on firm actions, and can facilitate greater consideration of CEO 
characteristics when evaluating firm action logics.   
 Additionally, the study aims to expand the knowledge of the antecedents of firm 
reputation, extending work begun by Rindova and colleagues (Rindova et al., 2005; 
Rindova & Martins, 2012; Rindova, Petkova, & Kotha, 2007).  Recently, management 
scholars have begun examining the relationship between firm actions and firm reputation 
(Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova, & Derfus, 2006; Fombrun, 1996; Rindova et al., 2005; 
Rindova et al., 2007; Williams, Schnake, & Fredenberger, 2005).  My study can benefit 
from the momentum generated by these earlier studies and contribute to the ongoing 
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study of antecedents of firm reputation.  Finally, the study furthers the use of text analysis 
as a means of delving into CEO behavioral influences.   
 
STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 provides a 
literature review of the critical construct to my study,  regulatory focus.  Further, 
regulatory focus is differentiated from other firm-level constructs that may influence firm 
behavior, such as entrepreneurial orientation.  I also discuss other CEO-level influences 
on firm behavior - including hubris, core self evaluation and narcissism - that are 
prevalent in the management literature, and have been used to explore the psychological 
influences on firm action that are at the core of the upper echelons perspective.   
 Chapter 3 presents theory development regarding the influence of CEO-level 
regulatory focus on firm behaviors, and the subsequent influence of firm behavior on firm 
reputation.  The model outlines hypotheses addressing the effects of CEO-level 
regulatory focus on new product introductions and product recall behaviors.  I propose 
that firms led by a CEO with a promotion focus will differ from firms led by a CEO with 
a prevention focus in the size, diversity and conformity to industry norms of their new 
product introductions.  Further, firms led by a CEO with a prevention focus will behave 
differently from promotion-focused CEOs when executing mistake response behaviors, 
specifically issuing product recalls.  I offer hypotheses on the direct effects of CEO 
regulatory focus on multiple facets of firm reputations.  The model then predicts the 
mediating effects of the firm behaviors on the relationship between CEO regulatory focus 
and multiple facets of firm reputation, including prominence and reputation for quality.   
 Chapter 4 outlines the research sampling frame, data sources and methodology of 
the study.  Chapter 5 presents the results of my study, and Chapter 6 discusses the 
implications of my findings, the contribution of this dissertation to theory and practice, 
the limitations of the study and the opportunities for future research.  
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to develop a theory addressing how a 
regulatory focus orientation at the CEO level affects innovation and product recall 
behaviors at the firm level, and how these actions influences firm reputation.  To do this, 
the study uses the regulatory focus literature, particularly the work extending the 
literature to the influence of individual regulatory focus on groups and organizations.  
Regulatory focus should be considered a separate construct beyond the various 
psychological constructs previously examined in the management literature.  This chapter 
reviews the work on regulatory focus theory in psychology at the individual and group 
levels of analysis.  Additionally, I present a review of other psychological influences on 
CEO decision making and firm actions that have been explored in the upper echelons 
literature.   
 
CEO LEVEL INFLUENCES ON FIRM ACTIONS 
 The influence of the CEO's personality on firm outcomes is of ongoing interest to 
a broad array of management scholars.  In their examination of the potential influences 
on firm strategic actions, Finkelstein, Hambrick and Canella (2009) discuss two primary 
categories: psychological properties (i.e., values, cognitive models and other personality 
elements) and observable dimensions (i.e., CEO functional background, tenure, and 
education).  Psychological properties can provide a "potential causal link to the executive 
behaviors" and form the "basis for which the executive filters and interprets stimuli" 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009: 50).  The authors explain that "these psychological 
characteristics have substantial influence on the executives eventual construed reality 
and, in turn, on strategic choices and organizational performance" (Finkelstein et al., 
2009: 82).   
 The management literature has examined a variety of CEO-level psychological 
and personality influences on firm actions, including hubris (Tang, Li, & Yang, 2012), 
core self evaluation (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005; Simsek, Heavey, & Veiga, 2010), 
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narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007), and the Big 5 personality traits (Nadkarni & 
Herrmann, 2010).  The recent work considering the effects of the CEO's regulatory focus 
on firm action (Gamache, McNamara, Mannor, & Johnson, 2013; Kark & Van Dijk, 
2007) follows in this tradition.  Scholars have long called for strategy research to better 
integrate individual traits and their effects on firm actions and firm performance.  Kark 
and van Dijk (2007) proposed that top managers can prime the organization to adopt a 
particular regulatory focus, and Staw (1991) considered this prospect almost two decades 
earlier.   
 One of the CEO personality traits that has been studied to influence firm actions is 
hubris.  Tang, Li and Yang (2012) consider how CEO hubris, defined as an ego-driven 
and self-aggrandizing individual who overestimates the accuracy of his own predictions, 
influences firm performance and innovation.  The authors assert that hubristic CEOs will 
focus greater attention on innovative projects and direct greater resources to execute these 
projects.  The authors used two studies, including a survey of Chinese executives and a 
longitudinal study of U.S. high-tech firms patenting activity, to test their hypothesis of 
CEO hubris leading to greater innovation.  In both studies, the authors find a positive 
relationships between CEO hubris and firm innovation; using different measures of 
hubris and firm innovation adding further robustness to their findings (Tang et al., 2012). 
 Beyond hubris, scholars have examined the construct of core self evaluation 
(CSE) (Judge, Locke, & Durham, 1997), which reflects the fundamental appraisals 
individuals make about their self-worth and capabilities and encompasses the traits of self 
esteem, generalized self-efficacy, emotional stability and locus of control (Chang, Ferris, 
Johnson, Rosen, & Tan, 2012), and its influence on firm-level actions.  Hiller and 
Hambrick (2005) offer a number of propositions regarding the influence of high levels of 
CEO core self evaluation on firm behaviors.  Among the core propositions, Hiller and 
Hambrick (2005) propose that CEOs with high levels of CSE will pursue large-stakes 
initiatives, strategies deviating from industry norms and their firms will likely deliver 
extreme performance - delivering both big wins and big losses.  Simsek, Heavey and 
Veiga (2010) studied the effects of CSE on firm actions by exploring the influence of a 
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CEO's core self evaluation on a firm's entrepreneurial orientation.  The authors (2010) 
proposed that CEOs with higher core self-evaluation will be more likely to perceive the 
upside potential of entrepreneurial opportunities as a result of their belief that they can 
master their environment and their abilities will result in positive outcomes.  In a broad 
survey of approximately 130 firms in Ireland, the authors found that a CEO's CSE 
positively influenced their firm's entrepreneurial orientation, particularly in industries 
with greater environmental dynamism.    
 In addition to hubris and core self evaluation, Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) 
examine CEO narcissism and its effects on firm actions.  The authors differentiate 
narcissism from hubris and core self evaluation, with one of the critical differentiators 
being the narcissist's unending need for affirmation and applause from others, and predict 
that narcissistic CEOs will be drawn to strategic dynamism and grandiosity (Chatterjee & 
Hambrick, 2007).  Narcissistic CEOs will be impelled to take actions that defy 
convention and actions that generate drama.  As a result, these actions were predicted to 
deliver extreme and fluctuating firm performance.  Regarding specific firm actions, the 
authors confirmed their hypothesis that more narcissistic CEOs will execute larger and a 
greater number of M&A transactions than less narcissistic CEOs.   
 In their extensive examination of the influences and outcomes of strategic 
leadership, Finkelstein, Hambrick and Canella (2009) group core self-evaluation, 
narcissism, hubris and overconfidence under a common umbrella of positive self regard.  
Each of these personality factors appears to exert influence on CEO behavior and, 
ultimately, on firm actions.  However, regulatory focus theory appears to present novel 
influences on CEO behavior that are not accounted for in the factors previously examined 
in the management literature.  Regulatory focus orientation does not incorporate an 
individual's self evaluation - which is at the core of the self regard personality 
characteristics previously explored in the management literature - and seeks to unlock a 
more fundamental driver of behavior that is resident in individuals no matter the 
individual's self regard.  Regulatory focus theory may provide strategy scholars with a 
new perspective on examining, evaluating and predicting firm behavior through the 
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further exploration of the "black box" containing psychological and behavioral influence 
on CEO decision making.  I present additional detail regarding the regulatory focus 
literature in the section below.   
           
REGULATORY FOCUS THEORY 
 Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997; 1998) was developed to explain different 
motivational systems associated with an individual's self-regulating behavior.  Higgins 
(1997) argued that two fundamental human emotions - pleasure approach and pain 
avoidance -  manifest in two different behavioral approaches to achieving desired end 
states: a promotion focus (approach or eagerness) and a prevention focus (avoidance or 
vigilance).  Promotion focus individuals are concerned with advancement, growth and 
accomplishment (i.e., ideals) in pursuit of positive outcomes.  Prevention focus 
individuals are concerned with protection, safety and responsibility (i.e., oughts) in 
pursuit of avoiding negative outcomes (Higgins, 1998).   
 GENERAL OVERVIEW.  According to Molden, Lee and Higgins, promotion focus 
and prevention focus "are fundamentally distinct in how [the two foci] are represented 
and experienced, and [the two foci] have fundamentally different effects on the processes 
of evaluation, judgment and decision making, and goal pursuit" (2008: 184).  Crowe and 
Higgins (1997) demonstrated the differences between the eagerness behaviors of a 
promotion focus and the vigilance behaviors of a prevention focus through an experiment 
where individuals who did well on an initial memory task would get to perform a 
previously selected 'liked' activity (the promotion-focused framing) or by not doing 
poorly on the memory task the participant would not have to do the disliked task (the 
prevention-focused framing).  The study demonstrated that promotion-focused 
individuals had a bias toward saying 'yes' in the recognition memory task, while the 
prevention-focused subjects had a conservative bias of saying 'no' (Crowe & Higgins, 
1997).  While all individuals in this experiment were tasked with achieving a similar goal 
(strong performance on a memory test), their strategic choices differed. 
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 Furthering the study of eagerness versus vigilance, Förster and colleagues (1998) 
examined the depth of commitment individuals possessed in their promotion- or 
prevention-focused strategies.  In a set of laboratory experiments, the authors tasked 
subjects with solving anagrams under both chronic and induced promotion or prevention 
focus.  As the subjects approached the end of the anagram task, those with a promotion 
focus showed a greater increase in eagerness than vigilance, and the opposite was true for 
those with a prevention focus (Förster et al., 1998).  The commitment to what "ought" to 
be done was strong and prevention focused individuals attempted to avoid the pain of 
making a mistake. 
 In these various studies, individuals with a promotion focus appeared to 
consistently demonstrate a predilection for a sense of eagerness to ensure hits (Förster et 
al., 1998).  By seeking to increase their opportunities to achieve gains, promotion focused 
individuals chose strategies focused on achievement and accomplishment.  Conversely, 
individuals with a prevention focus consistently chose vigilant strategies centered on 
avoidance and safety.  The commitment to what "ought" to be done is strong and 
prevention focused individuals attempt to avoid the pain of making a mistake. 
 GOAL PURSUIT.  The process of identifying and pursuing goals has been found to 
differ significantly between those having a promotion or prevention focus.  Shah and 
Higgins (1997) asserted that the expectancy-value interaction with different regulatory 
foci will affect goal selection.  Through a variety of laboratory experiments (i.e., anagram 
completion, university class selection, graduate entrance exam commitment), the 
accomplishment and achievement orientation of a promotion focus increased the positive 
interaction between expectancy and value on goal commitment.  Conversely, the 
prevention focus perspective of responsibility and necessity shifts the interaction to a 
negative direction.  The authors conclude that "the promotion focus on accomplishment 
strengthens commitment to maximizing expected utility, while a prevention focus on 
responsibility strengthens commitment to doing what is necessary or what can be done 
with assurance" (Shah & Higgins, 1997: 455). 
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 Beyond the effect of regulatory focus on the expectancy-value goal pursuit 
decision, Liberman and colleagues (1999) explored the influence of regulatory focus on 
an individual's openness to new experiences and willingness to change course from a 
current goal.  Promotion-focused subjects were more willing than prevention-focused 
subjects to start a new task after the interruption of an existing task rather than continue 
the previous task (Liberman et al., 1999).  Additionally, subjects with a promotion focus 
were more willing to exchange an object in their possession for an alternative object (i.e., 
exchanging a pen subjects received for participating in the study for another pen of 
similar value) than prevention-focused individuals (Liberman et al., 1999).  Individuals 
with a promotion focus were more open to considering change than prevention-focused 
individuals (Liberman et al., 1999), particularly since the new alternative may have the 
potential benefit of providing advancement or accomplishment and increase the chances 
for a hit. 
 Promotion and prevention focus may facilitate different means by which to pursue 
goals as well as an individual's commitment to those choices.  Once a goal is selected, 
individuals may elect to prioritize either speed or accuracy in completing the goal 
(Molden et al., 2008).  Promotion focused individuals tend to prioritize speed over 
accuracy, while a prevention focus generates the opposite effect (Förster, Higgins, & 
Bianco, 2003).  With a promotion focus characterized by eagerness to pursue hits (Crowe 
& Higgins, 1997), Förster and colleagues (2003) find that promotion focused individuals 
emphasized speed over accuracy in a drawing task, while prevention focus individuals 
centered on accuracy over speed.  Additionally, the study demonstrated that as 
individuals approached the completion of the task, promotion focused individuals 
increased their speed and decreased their accuracy while prevention focused subjects 
increased their accuracy and decreased their speed (Förster et al., 2003). 
 The two regulatory foci have been shown to influence the choice, commitment to 
and performance of particular goals.  A promotion focus drives individuals towards an 
eagerness to achieve, and this leads to choosing goals with greater potential rewards than 
prevention-focused individuals.  Promotion-focus individuals may abandon a previous 
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tactic or strategy if they identify a potentially more attractive one, and attempt to achieve 
that goal with greater speed than an individual with a prevention focus.  The overriding 
motivation to avoid errors of omission may propel promotion-focused individuals toward 
a diverse set of aggressively pursued, higher risk and higher reward goals. 
 GENERATING ALTERNATIVES.  In their eager pursuit of goals, promotion-focused 
individuals are expected to generate more alternatives to ensure hits, thereby avoiding the 
omission of any potential solutions (Higgins, 1998).  Prevention focused individuals, 
conversely, could be driven by their state of vigilance to limit alternatives, thereby 
increasing their chance to reject potentially incorrect options (Higgins, 1998).  Liberman, 
Molden, Idson and Higgins (2001) tested this conjecture through the evaluation of 
individuals' considerations of others' actions.   
 In the Liberman et al. (2001) experiments, subjects read about a focal individual's 
helpful behavior and were then asked to evaluate explanations for the person's behavior.  
Promotion focused individuals identified more explanations for the behavior than those 
with a prevention focus (Liberman et al., 2001).  The promotion focused subjects also 
were less certain when predicting the focal individual's future helpful behavior, likely due 
to the greater number of alternatives identified for the focal individual's behavior 
(Liberman et al., 2001).  Further, Molden and Higgins (2004) tested the hypothesis that 
promotion focused individuals would generate more alternatives than prevention-focused 
individuals when considering vague behavior and fewer alternatives than prevention-
focused individuals when faced with ambiguous behaviors.  In cases of vague 
information (where the evidence for any one alternative was weak), promotion focused 
individuals considered a greater number of alternatives than prevention focused 
individuals (Molden & Higgins, 2004) to explain the behavior.  When the information 
was ambiguous (a number of highly-developed alternatives were possible), the promotion 
focused individuals displayed an eagerness for hits by more readily choosing one 
alternative, while the prevention focused individuals demonstrated their vigilance by 
failing to rule out any of the alternates, for fear of making a mistake (Molden & Higgins, 
2004). 
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 Friedman and Förster (2001) expanded the investigation of differences in 
alternative generation beyond the evaluation of behavior.  The authors examined the 
different influences of prevention and promotion focus on creativity.  Freidman and 
Förster (2001) found that individuals primed for a promotion focus generated a greater 
number of creative solutions than prevention-focused individuals when tasked with 
finding uses for a brick.  The identification of a greater number of solutions is attributed 
to a more "adventurous" processing style of promotion focused subjects (Friedman & 
Förster, 2001) - driven to achieve their goals and ensure no potential solution was 
omitted. 
 In their eagerness to achieve their goals and ensure hits, individuals with a 
promotion focus are motivated to generate a large number of alternatives when faced 
with a variety of challenges.  While Friedman and Förster (2001) assert that promotion 
focus individuals may exhibit a more "risky" decision making style, this bold, 
achievement-oriented position may serve individuals well in the types of decision making 
scenarios where outcomes are uncertain and no clear pathways to a goal are evident.
 EXECUTION AND JOB PERFORMANCE. Scholars have also studied how regulatory 
focus affects work-related performance.  In a recent meta analysis, Lanaj and colleagues 
(2012) examined the influence of regulatory focus on five job performance dimensions: 
task performance, organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), counterproductive work 
behavior (CWB), innovative performance, and safety performance.  In their meta-
analysis of 97 articles, the authors found that regulatory focus has predictive validity 
above and beyond established motivation, personality and attitude predictors (Lanaj et al., 
2012).   
 Specifically, promotion focus was positively related to task performance, OCB 
and innovative performance.  A promotion-focused individual's concern with 
achievement, perseverance, and greater propensity to take risks all contributed to the 
positive relationship with these work outcomes.  Promotion focus, however, was found to 
have a negative relationship with CWB (Lanaj et al., 2012), which was counter to the 
authors' expectations.  The negative relationships with counterproductive work behavior 
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may be attributable to a promotion focused-individual electing to avoid CWB since it 
could negatively affect the chances for success of their other work tasks.  CWB may not 
align with an individual's perceptions of what the ideal behaviors are in a work setting.  
Prevention focus positively related to safety performance and CWB, although the latter 
relationship was called into question by the authors and may be the result of unclear 
coding procedures (Lanaj et al., 2012).  Critically, the differing behavioral motivations of 
promotion or prevention focus enabled researchers to isolate performance effects beyond 
the previously accepted predictors.            
 GROUP-LEVEL REGULATORY FOCUS.  Beyond the exploration of the behaviors and 
influences exerted by an individual's regulatory focus, scholars have examined a group 
level regulatory focus.  Levine, Higgins and Choi (2000) examined how group members' 
behavior would converge toward a shared reality and how the shared perspective would 
influence strategic choices.  The authors predicted that once a group developed a shared 
reality, the group's strategic orientation would adopt a particular bias, and groups with a 
promotion focus would adopt riskier strategies than prevention-focused groups.  The 
authors tested their hypotheses through group recognition memory tasks on groups 
primed for promotion or prevention focus based on rewards for their performance.  
Levine and colleagues (2000) found that groups with a promotion focus made riskier 
decisions than those converging on a prevention focus.  The converged perspective 
persisted over time - particularly when group membership remained constant.   
 Building on the Levine et al. (2000) work, Faddegon et al. (2008) developed a 
collective regulatory focus that uses the influence of social identity theory.  Beyond any 
task-specific influence or situational priming, the authors assert that group members will 
self-categorize themselves with a particular regulatory focus that is normative or 
prototypical for their group and potentially independent of their own chronic regulatory 
focus (Faddegon et al., 2008).  Additionally, Faddegon and colleagues (2008) 
demonstrate through two experiments that not only did individual group members adopt a 
group-level regulatory focus, this collective regulatory focus influenced the individual 
group member's behaviors to align with the group's regulatory focus. 
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 Florack and Hartmann (2007) studied financial investment decisions made by 
small groups that were primed for prevention or promotion focus.  Their experiments 
demonstrated that a group-level regulatory focus took time to develop, but once in place, 
the differences in motivations were evident.  Groups primed for prevention focus were 
more risk averse and ultimately decided to invest in a secure investment, while groups 
primed for a promotion focus chose riskier investments (Florack & Hartmann, 2007).    
 More recently, Rietzschel (2011) employed the collective regulatory focus 
concept to predict team-level innovation activity.  Rietzschel (2011) segmented the 
innovation process into three phases: 1.) idea generation - the proposal or generation of a 
creative idea; 2.) idea promotion - the selling of the idea to various stakeholders that 
requires the willingness to invest resources; and 3.) idea realization - the actual 
implementation of the creative idea.  In his empirical study, Rietzschel (2011) 
demonstrated that team level promotion focus increased a team's idea generation and idea 
promotion output, while a team-level prevention focus did not.   
 Through a survey of project teams in several Dutch organizations, Rietzschel 
(2011) measured the team-level regulatory focus construct and identified its influence on 
certain elements of the innovation process.  By adapting the regulatory focus 
questionnaire developed by Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans (2003) - which questions 
respondents' ratings of a series of 14 proverbs (i.e., he who does not dare, does not win) 
related to either promotion or prevention focus - Rietzschel surveyed project team 
members on their rating of how strongly the 14 proverbs apply to way their entire project 
team worked.  Scores on the 7-point scales were averaged for each team for collective 
promotion and prevention focus scores for each team.  Team innovativeness was derived 
from a separate survey of the team leaders, and asked the team leaders to indicate how 
often (1=never; 7=always) their team performed each of the three innovation 
components.  The three components - generation, promotion and realization - were 
measured using a nine item scale from Janssen (2001).   
 Rietzschel (2011) employed structural equation modeling to test his proposed 
model.  Team level promotion focus was found to be significant and positively predicted 
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idea generation as well as idea promotion.  Team level prevention focus was not 
significant in predicting either component of the innovation process.  Neither measure, 
team-level promotion or prevention focus, was significant in predicting innovation 
realization.  Interestingly, the team-level regulatory focus was a stronger predictor of 
innovation promotion than innovation generation, which highlights the influence of 
regulatory focus on resource allocation decisions.  Teams with a promotion focus were 
eager to invest resources in support of their various innovation ideas.  In order to achieve 
their goals, promotion-focused groups needed to garner the resources needed for success.   
 
REGULATORY FOCUS THEORY VS. OTHER RELEVANT MOTIVATIONAL THEORIES   
 PROSPECT THEORY.  One potential challenge to the uniqueness of regulatory focus 
theory as a motivator of firm behavior would be its similarity or differences with prospect 
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  As explained by Levine, Higgins and Choi (2000), 
regulatory focus theory addresses individuals striving for accomplishment versus safety, 
while prospect theory addresses individuals approaching gains as desired end states 
versus avoiding losses as undesired end-states.  According to Levine et al., (2000) two 
individuals are motivated by the same positive prospect of earning a cash payout, but the 
promotion-focused individual could view earning the money as an accomplishment, 
while the prevention-focused individual may consider earning the money as a 
responsibility to be fulfilled.  Both individuals would be seeking a gain (i.e., the cash 
payout), but one could be seeking it with strategic eagerness, while the other could be 
seeking it with strategic vigilance.  These motivations are therefore distinct from the 
motivations posited by prospect theory.  The behavioral effects of regulatory focus are 
not characterized by a 'good versus bad' dynamic as one might assert under prospect 
theory, but rather two good outcomes influenced by the perspective of accomplishment 
versus safety (Higgins, 1998). 
 ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION.  At the firm-level of analysis, regulatory focus 
may share some commonalities with the construct of entrepreneurial orientation (Covin 
& Slevin, 1991; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).  Entrepreneurial orientation (EO) is a reflection 
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of the organizational processes, methods and styles that firms use to act entrepreneurially 
- essentially "how" new product or market entry is undertaken (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996).  
Entrepreneurial orientation is a firm-level construct developed on the premise that firm 
entrepreneurial effectiveness is a phenomenon that can be measured in terms of firm 
performance (Covin & Slevin, 1991).  Covin and Slevin (1991) emphasize that 
organizational actions make a firm entrepreneurial, and firm behavior is essential to the 
entrepreneurial process. 
 The entrepreneurial orientation literature (Covin & Slevin, 1991; Lumpkin & 
Dess, 1996) outlines five factors that underlie entrepreneurial orientation: autonomy, 
innovativeness, risk taking, proactiveness, and competitive aggressiveness.  Each of the 
factors may vary independently, depending on the environment and organizational 
context.  Entrepreneurial orientation, however, does not appear to address the ex ante 
influences on firm-level entrepreneurial behavior, rather developing a characterization of 
firm behavior after the evaluation of firm actions in the five factor groupings.  
 
REGULATORY FOCUS IN THE MANAGEMENT LITERATURE 
 ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH.  The application of regulatory focus theory in 
management is in its nascency.  Regulatory focus theory has begun to emerge in the 
management literature through work in entrepreneurship (Brockner, Higgins, & Low, 
2004; Bryant, 2007; Dai, 2012; Hmieleski & Baron, 2009; Tumasjan & Braun, 2012).  
Brockner et al. (2004) present propositions addressing the most effective time for a 
promotion or prevention focus in the entrepreneurial process.  The authors propose that a 
promotion focus, with its emphasis on eagerness and generating successful hits, would 
best serve an entrepreneur in the earlier stages of firm development.  The eager 
identification of potentially successful business ideas motivated by a promotion focus 
would be beneficial to an entrepreneur.  The authors also posit that the vigilance of a 
prevention focus would best suit an entrepreneur during the screening of ideas and during 
the due diligence process (Brockner et al., 2004).  Brockner and colleagues (2004) also 
propose that a hybrid, or simultaneous promotion and prevention focus, is necessary 
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during other stages of the entrepreneurship process - namely fundraising and product 
rollout.  The balance of eagerness and vigilance would best serve the entrepreneur when 
one motivational system might imperil the successful execution of the entrepreneurial 
opportunity. 
 Scholars have also explored how regulatory focus influences entrepreneurial 
intent and opportunity recognition (Baron, 2004).  In an empirical study using 
undergraduates in a strategy course, McMullen and Shepherd (2002) find that as the 
benefit of a potential action increases, the entrepreneurial intentions of individuals 
increases, particularly in those with a promotion focus.  McMullen and Shepherd (2002) 
hypothesized that a promotion focus would positively moderate the effect of an increase 
in the benefit of action (defined as increases in the net benefit of a "hit" and decreases in 
the net cost of "false alarms") on entrepreneurial intention.  In addition, the authors 
posited that a prevention focus would positively moderate the effect of an increase in the 
cost of inaction (defined as decreases in the net benefit of a "correct rejection" and 
increases in the net cost of a "miss") on entrepreneurial intention.  The authors 
successfully tested their hypotheses by priming the student subjects for promotion or 
prevention focus and framing the options and potential outcomes available to them as 
they assumed the role of a CEO contemplating the launch of a new product into a new 
market.  Within these scenarios, the subjects indicated their likelihood of acting on the 
potential opportunity to launch the new product.  In addition to the positive moderating 
effects of a promotion focus on the increases in benefits of action and entrepreneurial 
intention, the prevention focus positively moderated the positive effects of increases in 
the cost of inaction on entrepreneurial intention.  The authors (2002) explain that the 
promotion focus effects on the increased benefits of action can be attributed to 
promotion-focused entrepreneurs considering their options in terms of gain and gain 
maximization.   
 Interestingly, McMullen and Shepherd (2002) explain that the positive 
moderating effects of prevention focus on entrepreneurial intention when the cost of 
inaction increases (which might be counter-intuitive on its face) can be attributed to 
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prevention-focused entrepreneurs assessing their options in terms of losses and loss 
minimization.       
 Tumasjan and Braun (2012) examined opportunity recognition through 
experiments with entrepreneurs in the United Kingdom.  Participants were tasked with 
responding to the comments of a focus group; identifying the underlying problems with a 
product presented to the focus group; and providing solutions to the problems identified.  
The authors found that a promotion focus increased both the number of opportunities 
identified by entrepreneurs as well as the innovativeness of the opportunities identified 
(Tumasjan & Braun, 2012).  Prevention focus, however, had no significant effect on 
opportunity recognition, and the authors suggest that the lack of promotion focus (rather 
than the presence of a prevention focus) may negatively influence opportunity 
recognition (Tumasjan & Braun, 2012). 
 In addition to examining entrepreneurial intent and opportunity recognition, 
scholars have begun to examine the effects of an entrepreneur's regulatory focus on firm 
performance.  Hmieleski and Baron (2009) surveyed approximately 300 entrepreneur-led 
firms across both dynamic and stable environments.  In dynamic environments, an 
entrepreneur's regulatory focus was found to affect new venture performance.  Firms with 
entrepreneurs with a prevention focus experienced negative effects on performance in 
dynamic environments, which the authors ascribe to a prevention focused-individual's 
rigidity and unwillingness to change (Hmieleski & Baron, 2009).  Interestingly, the 
authors found no effects of regulatory focus on firm performance in stable environments - 
which the authors define as ones where changes are smaller and more predictable.  These 
environments may enable both prevention and promotion focused entrepreneurs to 
succeed despite their differing motivations. 
 Dai (2012) examined the influence of an entrepreneur's regulatory focus on a 
number of strategic attributes of start-up firms, including decision speed and 
comprehensiveness, number and prestige of customers, and number and prestige of 
strategic partners.  Using a survey of entrepreneurs leading high-technology start-up 
firms, Dai (2012) found that entrepreneurs with a promotion focus positively influenced 
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decision speed, the number and prestige of customers, and the number and prestige of 
strategic partners.  An entrepreneur with a prevention focus was found to increase 
decision comprehensiveness and decrease decision speed, while also increasing customer 
and strategic partner prestige.  Interestingly, Dai (2012) hypothesized and found that both 
promotion and prevention focus would positively influence the prestige of customer and 
strategic partners.  Promotion focused entrepreneurs would be expected to be 
inspirational and demonstrate better interpersonal skills than prevention focused 
individuals.  These sharper communication skills enable new firms to more effectively 
convey their business ideas and facilitate productive communication between the focal 
firm, customers, strategic partners and other stakeholders.  Additionally, Dai (2012) 
posits and finds that prevention focused individuals can also attract customers and 
strategic partners of high prestige.  Prevention-focused individuals are valued by 
prestigious customers and strategic partners for their heightened attention to detail and 
greater internal consistency than promotion-focused individuals (Dai, 2012).  The ability 
of both promotion and prevention focused entrepreneurs to achieve the same goal of 
attracting prestigious customers and strategic partners through highly divergent means is 
an empirical demonstration of one of the foundational elements of the regulatory focus 
construct, namely the variability in tactics and strategies used in pursuit of a goal 
(Higgins, 1998).   
 
 REGULATORY FOCUS THEORY IN OTHER MANAGEMENT LITERATURES.  Beyond 
entrepreneurship, the management literature has begun to embrace the regulatory focus 
construct as one of growing interest across a variety of research streams.  Weber and 
Mayer (2011) offer a variety of propositions regarding the effects of regulatory focus 
framing - characterizing an item, such as a contract, with a promotion or prevention focus 
- on the exchange relationship between contract parties.  Among the effects of regulatory 
focus-framed contracts on relational governance, the authors posit that a contract framed 
with a prevention focus will act as a substitute for relational governance and a promotion 
focus framed contract will complement relational governance - where a transaction 
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requires flexibility, creativity or cooperation.  Webber and colleagues (Weber, Mayer, & 
Macher, 2011) empirically examined the effects of a promotion framed contract on 
managing transactions and the relationships between parties.  The authors established that 
a promotion framed contract component, specifically duration safeguards, elicits 
emotions and behaviors of the exchange relationship that reduces tensions in the 
negotiations of the contract (Weber et al., 2011). 
 Further, management and psychology scholars have begun to examine the effects 
of regulatory focus on firm level outcomes, including creativity (Wu, McMullen, 
Neubert, & Yi, 2008), exploration/exploitation (Kammerlander, Burger, Fust, & 
Fueglistaller, 2014), and new product development (Sedighadeli & Kachouie, 2013).  In a 
study of matched pairs of leaders and employees in China, Wu and colleagues (2008) 
found that leaders with a promotion focus could use situational priming to increase 
employees' promotion focus and positively influence employee creativity - even to the 
point of being able to overcome the employees' chronic regulatory focus.  Prevention 
focus, however, had no measurable effect of employee creativity.  In a study of small and 
medium sized firms that surveyed CEO's in Switzerland, Kammerlander and colleagues 
(2014) established that CEOs with a promotion focus positively influenced both 
exploration and exploitation actions of mature firms.  The study also confirmed the 
authors' hypothesis that a CEO with a prevention focus is negatively associated with 
exploration, but was not significant relative to the authors' expectations that a CEO 
prevention focus would be positively associated with exploitation (Kammerlander et al., 
2014).  The effects of a CEO with a promotion focus on exploration and exploitation 
were heightened by conditions of intense competition (Kammerlander et al., 2014).  
Finally, Sedighadeli and Kachouie (2013) investigate hypotheses that six factors could be 
influential in the success of new product development: commitment, regulatory focus, 
entrepreneurial orientation, social capital, international orientation, and future study.  The 
authors surveyed a number of Iranian manufacturing executives and established that each 
of the six factors were important for new product development.  Specific to regulatory 
focus, the authors indicate that both promotion and prevention foci were important in the 
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new product development process (Sedighadeli & Kachouie, 2013).  Leader promotion 
focus was most important for new idea generation, while leader prevention focus would 
be beneficial in the idea screening stage (Sedighadeli & Kachouie, 2013).  Each of these 
studies contributes to the understanding of the multifaceted influences of regulatory focus 
on firm activities, and that promotion and prevention focus may both contribute 
positively to firm outcomes - unlike many of the other leader psychological influences.           
 
 LEADER'S REGULATORY FOCUS AND FIRM-LEVEL BEHAVIORS.  While the 
foundational work on regulatory focus centers on an individual's motivations (Higgins, 
1997; 1998), three papers in the management literature have extended the theory to the 
firm level.  Das and Kumar (2011) theorize that regulatory focus could be elevated to the 
firm level through an institutionalization of the consensus regulatory focus of the firm's 
dominant coalition.  The dominant coalition could imbue the firm's culture with a 
particular regulatory focus that would shape group dynamics and firm behavior (Das & 
Kumar, 2011).  The authors (2011) also offered propositions regarding differing firm 
behaviors surrounding alliance formation.  A promotion-focused firm could be more 
tolerant of a partner's opportunistic behavior; more tolerant of interpartner conflicts; and 
would not hesitate to extract whatever knowledge it could from its partner.  Prevention-
focused firms would be less tolerant of a partner's opportunistic behavior and would not 
attempt to extract knowledge from a partner.  Promotion-focused firms would be 
concerned with maximizing the return in a risk-return dilemma, while a prevention-
focused firm would be most concerned with minimizing the risk of a risk-return dilemma.  
The authors explain that firms face similar problems as individuals with regards to ideals 
and oughts that underlie the regulatory focus logic, and their predictions align with what 
one might hypothesize about individuals' regulatory foci in the same situation. 
 In addition to the potential for a collective regulatory focus to permeate a firm's 
culture, other scholars are examining the influence of the individual CEO on an entire 
firm's regulatory focus.  Kark and Van Dijk (2007) propose that a leader may be able to 
prime the regulatory focus of groups of followers that could lead to organizational level 
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outcomes.  The authors (Kark & Van Dijk, 2007) assert that a leader can prime a group of 
followers to a particular regulatory focus through a variety of actions, including: 
 the leader's representative character that embodies a group's identity and values.  
The leaders, through their behavior and regulatory focus, can serve as role models 
for the rest of their organization to emulate.  The leader's behavior can shape the 
climate of the entire organization. 
 a leader's specific symbolic, verbal and performance acts aimed at the broader 
organization can influence a organization's shared regulatory focus. 
 the creation of a certain emotional environment (which the authors describe as 
leader-follower emotional contagion).  Leaders may display emotions such as 
happiness or dejection to communicate a promotion focus, while emotions such as 
anxiety or serenity may assist in priming for a prevention focus. 
 shaping the work context - through the selection of specific group tasks, 
allocation of rewards or the composition of the task structure.  Each of these 
decisions can elicit different motivational orientations for the work group or 
organization as a whole. 
 
Kark and Van Dijk (2007) assert that these varying behaviors can lead to an innovation-
oriented culture (through the leader's promotion focus priming) or a quality or efficiency-
oriented culture (through the leader's prevention priming). 
 Gamache, McNamara, Mannor and Johnson (2013) investigated the influence of 
CEO-level regulatory focus on firm behavior.  Specifically, the authors argue that firms 
led by CEO's with a promotion focus will execute more acquisitions than CEO's with a 
prevention focus.  The authors use letters to shareholders to determine CEO regulatory 
focus.  Gamache and colleagues (2013) also considered the moderating effects of 
executive compensation (specifically stock options) on the effects of CEO regulatory 
focus.  The authors determined that regulatory focus is a distinct attribute that influences 
strategic choices of managers, and affirmed their assertion that promotion-focused CEO's 
increased likelihood to execute acquisitions.  Stock options do not effect CEO's 
promotion focus likelihood to act, but options have a countervailing influence on a 
prevention-focused CEO's reduced likelihood to pursue acquisitions. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 In summary, regulatory focus theory has gained acceptance in the social 
psychology literature over the past 15 years as a primary influence on goal pursuit 
behavior.  A great majority of the studies have tested the theory in the laboratory.  In the 
field of management, regulatory focus theory has been used primarily to examine 
entrepreneurial decision making and action.  A couple of recent papers have extended the 
influence of the construct to the firm level (Das & Kumar, 2011; Kark & Van Dijk, 
2007), which potentially opens new avenues for exploration of firm behaviors and firm 
performance.  This work raises the possibility that many avenues of firm behavior could 
be influenced by a CEO's regulatory focus.  Equally interesting is the priming effects of 
CEO behavior outlined by Kark and Van Dijk (2007).  The authors explain that a more 
proactive process of leadership can prime an organization for a specific regulatory focus.  
The authors assert that organizations primed for different regulatory foci will potentially 
make different strategic decisions and have lasting effects on firm culture (Kark & Van 
Dijk, 2007).  Each of these studies suggest that the influence of a CEO's regulatory focus 
could be a critical factor in gaining a better understanding of the foundations of firm 
strategic actions.             
 In the next chapter, I develop hypotheses about a CEO's regulatory focus and its 
effects on firm actions.  I propose hypotheses in which a CEO's regulatory focus affects a 
firm's new product introductions and product recall behavior, followed by a series of 
hypotheses predicting the influence of CEO regulatory focus on multiple dimensions of 
firm reputation.  Finally, I develop a series of hypotheses examining the mediating effects 
of the firm actions - new product introductions and product recalls - on the relationship 
between CEO regulatory focus and firm reputation.      
 The regulatory focus construct captures two motivational systems (Higgins, 
1997), and my theoretical model explains that CEO regulatory focus motivates different 
behaviors related to new product introductions and mistake avoidance behavior.  Crossan 
and Apaydin (2010) highlight one of the critical takeaways from their recent review of 
the innovation literature is the need for more productive linkages of innovation outcomes 
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and firm performance.  My model attempts to incorporate the influence of new product 
introductions and product recall behaviors on multiple facets of firm reputation, a critical 
non-financial firm performance measure.      
 Beyond the more traditional measures of firm performance (i.e., accounting and 
financial market performance) resident in many strategy studies (Venkatraman & 
Ramanujam, 1986), I analyze the non-financial performance effects of firm actions by 
examining firm reputation.  Firm reputation has emerged as a critical intangible asset 
(Barney, 1991; Deephouse, 2000; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Rao, 1994), and an important 
contributor to a firm's competitive advantage.  A firm's reputation is constructed by 
stakeholders through the evaluation of a firm's ongoing behavior and can be a source of 
competition among firms (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990).  A firm may make investments in 
developing its reputation - consider these the "flows" in the Dierickx and Cool (1989) 
resource model - in order to build its "stock" of accumulated reputation that is 
constructed by external stakeholders.  Over time, a firm's reputation evolves as various 
stakeholders - customers, media, competitors, industry analysts and others - are exposed 
to a firm's behavior. 
 I examine the firm-level behavioral effects of CEO promotion and prevention 
focus by developing a series of hypotheses regarding new product introductions and 
product recall behavior.  The first group of hypotheses address how a CEO promotion or 
prevention focus affects the a.) number; b.) diversity or c.) deviation from industry norms 
of a firm's new product introductions.  The second group of hypotheses address how CEO 
regulatory focus affects product recalls.  The third group of hypotheses address how CEO 
regulatory focus affects firm reputation for quality and prominence and the mediating 
effects of new product introductions and product recalls on the relationship between CEO 
regulatory focus and the two dimensions of firm reputation.   
 
(Figure 1 presents a summary of regulatory focus-inspired behaviors and their relevance 
to the key variables of my study.) 
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Chapter 3 - Theory Development 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, existing literature suggests that a firm's 
actions may be influenced by its CEO's regulatory focus orientation.  My research 
question guiding this study asks how does CEO regulatory focus influence firm strategic 
actions, and how does CEO regulatory focus and these actions influence firm reputation.  
Promotion and prevention foci clearly motivate different strategies and tactics for 
achieving goals (Higgins, 1998), and these different strategies motivated by the CEO's 
regulatory focus may be evident in firm conduct and performance.  CEO regulatory foci 
may manifest not only in specific behaviors, such as a firm's eagerness to execute M&A 
transactions or a firm's vigilance to avoid issuing high yield debt in turbulent public 
markets, but more broadly to behavioral tendencies across multiple facets of firm 
behavior.  I expect that strategic eagerness behavior will manifest in more innovative 
behavior, reflected in new product introductions.  Similarly, I expect strategic vigilance 
to manifest in fewer product recalls.      
 OVERVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL MODEL.  The entirety of my theoretical model is 
presented in Figure 2.  The first components of my theoretical model encompass the 
influence of  CEO-level promotion and prevention foci on firm strategic actions.  CEO 
decision making shaped by a promotion focus, or strategic eagerness, is expected to 
influence firm behavior towards achieving firm goals through frequent, creative actions 
(Friedman & Förster, 2001; Higgins, 1998).  CEO strategic eagerness will drive firms to 
generate more innovative ideas and be more willing to accept risk when considering 
potential actions (Florack & Hartmann, 2007; Levine, Higgins, & Choi, 2000).  The 
collective logics of CEO strategic eagerness should manifest in innovative behavior 
(Rietzschel, 2011) and a greater propensity for errors, as CEOs drive firms to seek 
achievements and success in pursuit of their goals.  
 CEO decision making shaped by a prevention focus, or strategic vigilance, is 
expected to influence firm behavior in different ways.  CEO strategic vigilance should 
prompt firms to keep safety and security (Higgins, 1997; 1998) in the forefront of their 
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selection and execution of strategic actions.  Firms driven by CEOs with the logic of 
strategic vigilance will likely make more conservative choices regarding firm actions 
(Levine et al., 2000) and demonstrate a preference for stability and maintaining the status 
quo (Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999).  Firms with a CEO motivated by 
strategic vigilance will still pursue goals, but the actions taken in pursuit of those goals 
will likely not resemble the actions of firms with a CEO motivated by strategic eagerness.  
I develop hypotheses to test the influences of CEO strategic eagerness and strategic 
vigilance on specific firm actions.  In order to consider the performance effects of the 
strategic actions, I develop additional hypotheses regarding the influence of CEO 
strategic eagerness and CEO strategic vigilance on firm reputation.  These relationships 
may be mediated by new product introductions or product recalls.   
 
CEO REGULATORY FOCUS AND FIRM ACTIONS 
 In order to understand the foundations of firm strategic behavior, I first examine 
the effects of CEO regulatory focus on specific actions.  A strategic action is defined as 
an "externally directed, observable competitive move carried out to improve the firm's 
relative competitive position" (Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001: 12).  Firm strategic 
actions have been a critical unit of analysis in the strategy literature - most directly in the 
competitive dynamics literature from its inception (Smith et al., 2001) - and serve as the 
basis for evaluation and comparison of performance outcomes based on interconnected 
actions and reactions (Ferrier, 2001).  In their review of the competitive dynamics 
literature, Smith and colleagues (2001) explain that the majority of competitive dynamics 
literature evaluates firm strategic actions in light of their performance outcomes, and 
appears to leave any underlying firm behavioral influences unaddressed.  With 
competitive dynamics rooted in the Schumpeterian and Austrian economics perspectives, 
actions are perceived as being motivated by exogenous forces such as industry conditions 
and subsequent changes to the competitive arena.  It is not clear from the existing 
literature how specific CEO psychology would influence the firm actions at the heart of 
competitive dynamics.   
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 In the competitive dynamics literature, the primary internal firm-level influences 
on firm actions are captured in the awareness-motivation-capability (A-M-C) construct 
(Chen, 1996; Smith et al., 2001), but limited attention is directed at underlying behavioral 
influences on actions.  Smith et al. (2001) address the characteristics of the actor in the A-
M-C framework, but these characteristics center on observable firm-level descriptors 
such as firm size, TMT demographics, market share, past performance and slack 
resources.  CEO level behavioral and psychological influences on the framework are 
absent.  Chen, Su and Tsai observe that "although the awareness-motivation-capability 
perspective has been applied to the investigation of interfirm rivalry, it has yet to be used 
for the study of prebattle competitor analysis" (2007: 104).  Regulatory focus theory may 
enable us to unlock some of the CEO-level behavioral influences on firm strategic actions 
and contribute to the study of the actions on display in the competitive battleground.             
 The regulatory focus literature has examined a number of specific outputs of 
behavior influenced by promotion or prevention focus; including creativity (Friedman & 
Förster, 2001), decision speed (Dai, 2012; Förster, Higgins, & Bianco, 2003), financial 
risk tolerance (Florack & Hartmann, 2007), and idea generation (Brockner, Higgins, & 
Low, 2004; Rietzschel, 2011).  In the context of the specific firm behaviors that I am 
studying here, new product introductions and quality failures, we may see the influence 
of CEO regulatory focus-influenced decision-making.  First, I focus on the relationship 
between regulatory focus and innovation behavior, namely new product introductions.  
Second, I examine the relationship between regulatory focus and product recall behavior.     
 A variety of scholars in the management literature have examined the effects of 
new product introductions on firm outcomes.  Zirger and Maidique (1990) and Eisenhardt 
and Tabrizi (1995) explain that new products introductions enable firms to adapt and 
better compete in dynamic environments.  Sorescu and Spanjol's (2008) investigation of 
the consumer products industry demonstrated that new products can influence various 
elements of firm performance - normal profits, economic rents, and firm risk - differently.  
New product introductions remain a focus of management researchers in the search for 
additional understanding of the influences on firm performance (Page & Schirr, 2008).   
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NEW PRODUCT INTRODUCTIONS 
 New product introductions, and their influences on firm performance, have been 
the subject of significant study in the management literature (Bayus, Erickson, & 
Jacobson, 2003; Chaney, Devinney, & Winer, 1991; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995; Katila 
& Ahuja, 2002).  The value of new product introductions to firm success has been 
consistently recognized in the literature (Blundell, Griffith, & Van Reenen, 1995; Chaney 
& Devinney, 1992; Zirger & Maidique, 1990), and new products can serve as a primary 
output of strategic decisions in response to changing environments (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 
1995).  Dougherty and Hardy explained that "successful new products and services are 
critical for many organizations, since product innovation is one important way that 
organizations can adapt to changes in markets, technology, and competition" (1996: 
1120).  New product introductions reflect the commercial value of a number of critical 
firm resource allocation decisions, including R&D investment, knowledge and learning, 
and scientific publications (Katila & Ahuja, 2002).  Balachandra and Friar summarized 
the necessity of new product introductions by explaining that "bringing new products 
successfully to market is the lifeblood for most organizations" (1997: 276).   
 The introduction of new products or services is a critical outcome of innovative 
behavior (Balachandra & Friar, 1997; Chaney & Devinney, 1992; Dougherty & Hardy, 
1996; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995).  Chaney and Devinney explain simply that "product 
and service innovation is argued by many to be the driving force behind managerial and 
corporate success" (1992: 677).  From their study of new product introductions in the 
electronics industry, Zirger and Maidique (1990) argue that new product introductions are 
critical components of the majority of manufacturing firms' growth and prosperity.   
 ASPECTS OF NEW PRODUCT INTRODUCTIONS.  Scholars have examined a variety of 
factors that would contribute to successful new products and new product development 
processes (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Ernst, 2002; Page & Schirr, 2008).  Three 
elements have received significant attention, including the number of new products 
introduced, the diversity of new products introduced, and the degree of conformity (or, 
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conversely, the deviation from industry norms) of the types of new products introduced 
(Cooper, 1985; Kleinschmidt & Cooper, 1991).  
 While a firm's new products may contain a variety of features and characteristics, 
for this study I am focused on three characteristics of a firm's yearly output of new 
products: number, diversity and deviation from industry norms.  Each of these 
characteristics has been identified in the innovation and product development literature as 
critical for understanding the performance and impact of new product introductions 
(Herrmann, Gassmann, & Eisert, 2007; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Kleinschmidt & Cooper, 
1991).  The number of new products provides insight into a firm's capacity for 
transitioning innovation into marketable products.  Second, the diversity of new products 
may provide stakeholders with better awareness of the scope of a firm's innovative 
behavior and how the firm defines its presence across its competitive landscape.  Finally, 
the conformity or deviation of the breadth of new products from industry norms may 
enable stakeholders to assess how firms attempt to position themselves versus their 
competitors and how these firms behave when faced with established industry behavioral 
patterns.        
 For many firms, innovation is revealed through the introduction of new products 
(Utterback & Abernathy, 1975).  From Schumpeter (1934, 1942) to more recent analysis 
in management (Abernathy & Clark, 1985; Roberts, 1999), "innovative behavior is 
believed to be the engine of economic growth and development" (Chaney, Devinney, & 
Winer, 1991: 574).  In order to best understand the influence of new product 
introductions, aggregating new product introductions annually can serve as a means of 
evaluating the characteristics of a firm's stream of new products. 
 CEO influence on new product development also has been examined in the 
popular business and automotive press.  High profile auto industry veteran Bob Lutz has 
witnessed the product development process from a variety of positions at a number of 
major auto manufacturers - from Chrysler, Ford and General Motors to BMW.  Recently, 
Lutz discussed the new product development process at General Motors surrounding a 
long-rumored, mid-engine Chevrolet Corvette, a design development that would position 
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the venerable American sports car against a new collection of competitors, including 
Ferrari, Lamborghini and Porsche and specialty sub-brands such as Mercedes AMG.  In a 
recent article for Road & Track, Lutz revealed the 2003 internal discussions of the mid-
engine Corvette that could be priced only $5000 above the existing Corvette 
[approximately $70,000 - $90,000].  Lutz (2015) explained GM CEO Rick Wagoner's 
reaction to the product proposal and the potential for a new, mid-engine Corvette: 
"Imagine an American-built car with the proportions of a Lamborghini at that 
price point . . . that's pretty appealing.  [GM CEO] Rick Wagoner's reaction was 
the same as mine: "Oh. no, no.  We're not going mid-engine."  . . . [Wagoner] 
thought a little more power next time would fill the bill." (p. 103)  
Wagoner's negative reaction to the mid-engine Corvette design cemented the rejection of 
the mid-engine design, and General Motors has yet to develop a mid-engine Corvette.  
New Corvette models continue to display incremental improvements in horsepower, 
suspension architecture and driver-focused technologies.  This anecdote illustrates some 
of the influence of the CEO on the new product design process - despite the numerous 
designers, engineers, finance professionals and product planners involved with the 
development process.   
    
 NUMBER OF NEW PRODUCTS.  First, the aggregate output of innovation activity - 
represented by the number of new products - is considered a strong indicator of a firm's 
innovative capabilities.  In their investigation of how firms solve problems to create new 
products, Katila and Ahuja explain that a firm's ability to introduce new products is 
defined as the "number of new products a firm introduces" (2002: 1184).  Using patent 
data and new product introduction announcements for industrial robotics companies over 
a 10-year period, Katila and Ahuja tested their hypotheses that assert both the depth 
(defined as the search of a firm's prior knowledge) and scope (defined as the degree of 
new knowledge explored) of a firm's search process will influence the number of new 
products introduced in a curvilinear fashion (both in an inverted U shape).  The authors 
find that search depth does have a curvilinear relationship with new product 
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introductions, while search scope has a positive, linear relationship with new product 
introductions.   
 A variety of other studies also examine the number of new products when testing 
influences on firm performance (Sorescu & Spanjol, 2008; Srinivasan, Pauwels, Silva-
Risso, & Hanssens, 2009).  Sorescu and Spanjol (2008) count the number of new 
consumer products introduced by firms between 1985 and 2003 to test any variations in 
the influence of incremental versus breakthrough products on normal profits, economic 
rents and firm risk.  Both breakthrough and incremental product introductions have 
positive effects on a firm's normal profits.  Breakthrough products are found to have a 
positive effect on economic rents and firm risk, while incremental product introductions 
have no measurable effects on economic rents or firm risk.  Srinivasan and colleagues 
(2009) examine new product introductions and marketing expenditures on financial 
performance in the automobile industry.  Regarding new product introductions, their 
results confirm their expectations that both new-to-the-market and new-to-the-firm 
product innovations improve stock returns.  However, Srinivasan and colleagues' (2009) 
results indicate that new-to-the-market product introductions generate stock return 
benefits that are seven times larger than those generated by new-to-the-firm product 
introductions.      
 The competitive dynamics literature also centers on the number of actions as a 
critical measure of firm competitive activity.  Ferrier et al. (1999) hypothesized that the 
number of actions taken by a market leader would influence both the amount of erosion 
of that firm's market share leadership as well as the leader's status as the market leader.  
Actions included new product introductions, pricing decisions, marketing efforts and 
capacity adjustments, among others (Ferrier et al., 1999).  Their study found that the 
greater number of actions taken by the market leader lessened the amount of erosion and 
reduced the chance of the leader being dethroned (Ferrier et al., 1999).  Lee et al. (2000) 
examined the timing and order of strategic moves - operationalized through new product 
introductions and potential imitations - on stock market performance.  In line with their 
expectations, the authors find that the faster and earlier that a firm introduces a new 
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product, the greater the positive stock market effects.  Imitations, however, are found to 
be able to erode the new product first mover advantage.  Lee and colleagues' work 
expands the scope of work on new product introductions to the timing and durability of 
performance advantages beyond the more traditional analysis of the number of 
introductions. 
 The number of new products introduced may indicate a willingness to invest in 
new product development, a highly skilled research and development program, or a more 
efficient product development process.  The number of new products introduced may be a 
means of understanding the goal selection and goal commitment of firms led by CEOs 
with different regulatory focus orientations.  With a promotion focused CEO, the 
strategic imperative is an eagerness to achieve goals by generating a lot of alternatives - 
all in search of successful hits (Higgins, 1997).  CEOs with a promotion focus orientation 
may drive their firms to pursue success in a product market by generating a high volume 
of product innovations.  A promotion focus orientation facilitates strategic flexibility 
(Liberman et al., 1999), which could be expected to enable firms to commit resources to a 
variety of new product development efforts.   
 When examining the influence of CEO personality characteristics on firm 
behaviors in the Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella's bounded rationality model (2009), 
where CEO psychological characteristics and observable experiences affect the CEO's 
information filtering and interpretation processes that lead to strategic choices, one could 
consider that a CEO's promotion focus would expand her field of vision as she 
contemplates new product alternatives.  A broader field of vision may enable more 
opportunities to be identified and evaluated - reaffirming the pursuit of more successful 
hits.  Motivated by a desire to ensure hits by eagerly pursuing a variety of alternatives 
(Higgins, 1998), a broader field of vision may serve as a mechanism to facilitate the 
pursuit of more new product introductions.   
 Additionally, a CEO with a promotion focus may be more willing to approve new 
product introductions.  This predisposition to "yes" (Crowe & Higgins, 1997) could be 
expected to trigger the increased development of a greater number of new product ideas.  
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As a result of this broader field of vision, predisposition for approval and the ongoing 
search for hits, a firm led by a CEO with a promotion focus orientation could be expected 
to generate a high number of new products.  It can therefore be hypothesized that: 
 Hypothesis 1: Firms led by a CEO with a promotion focus orientation will 
introduce a high number of new products. 
 
 A prevention focus emphasizes safety and the preservation of the status quo 
(Liberman et al., 1999).  When pursuing a goal, the prevention focus orientation will 
likely motivate a CEO to narrow her potential options to avoid making a mistake 
(Liberman et al., 2001).  This narrowing of perspective may center a firm's product 
development pipeline to a few potential new products. 
 In addition to a desire to avoid making mistakes, a CEO with a prevention focus 
orientation may heighten firms' vigilance against introducing lower quality products 
(Higgins, 1998).  Firms are faced with limited resources, and stretching these constrained 
resources across a broad set of new product opportunities would be undesirable for firms 
led by a CEO with a prevention focus.  The risk of developing a "weak link" in the new 
product collection or introducing a less than fully developed product would be in direct 
opposition to a prevention focused CEO's orientation towards vigilance, safety and 
avoiding losses (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1997).  As those with a prevention 
focus are most concerned with responsibility and what ought to be done, CEOs with a 
prevention focus would be loathe to violate the high expectations for new product 
introductions (i.e., Intel CEO's assertion that "only the paranoid survive").  This would 
suggest that a smaller, well-developed new product introduction portfolio could be 
expected. 
 As opposed to the broadened field of vision triggered by a CEO with a promotion 
focus, one could expect that a CEO with a prevention focus may employ a narrower field 
of vision (Finkelstein et al., 2009) when proceeding through the new product introduction 
decision-making process.  A CEO with a prevention focus may also interpret each 
element in the new product development process more conservatively, in an attempt to 
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eliminate potential negative outcomes from less desirable alternatives.  The bounded 
rationality and managerial cognition literatures have suggested "cognitive filtering 
mechanisms . . . may explain how attributes of CEOs dispose them toward specific 
strategic behaviors with implications for firm performance" (Nadkarni & Herrmann, 
2010: 1050).  The narrower field of vision and more critical and conservative 
interpretation would be expected to reduce the number of new products that gain the 
approval from a CEO with a prevention focus.   
 As seen in the organizational ecology literature and elsewhere in the management 
literature (Carroll & Teo, 1996; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Henderson & Clark, 1990; 
Rosenbloom & Christensen, 1994), innovation can be disruptive for both the innovator 
and the competition.  CEO prevention focus would be expected to motivate firms to 
avoid disrupting the status quo (Liberman et al., 1999).  A broad array of new product 
introductions would certainly increase the risk of disruption and potentially threaten a 
firm's vigilantly preserved stability.  As a result of being led by a CEO with a prevention 
focus, firms would be expected to limit the number of new product introductions to 
preserve stability, avoid potential errors and narrow the number of opportunities that need 
significant analysis and due diligence.  It can therefore be hypothesized that: 
 Hypothesis 2: Firms led by a CEO with a prevention focus orientation will 
introduce fewer new products. 
  
 DIVERSITY.  A number of researchers have examined the variety and diversity of 
new product introductions.  The work has ranged from the development of typologies and 
frameworks for characterizing new products (Danneels, 2002; Nobeoka & Cusumano, 
1997) to examining the role of new product diversity in a firm's product variety strategy 
(Ramdas, 2003) to the role of innovativeness - the nature of what a firm produces when 
developing new products - and existing firm product offerings (Danneels & 
Kleinschmidt, 2001; Kleinschmidt & Cooper, 1991).  Danneels (2002) centers on the 
influence of a firm's competencies (across multiple dimensions) to characterize the 
diversity of a firm's new products.  Danneels (2002) developed a typology encompassing 
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the nature of technology and customer-oriented competencies inherent in a new product 
to characterize it along an exploitation/exploration continuum.  This typology/matrix 
helps researchers understand how existing or new competencies define the uniqueness 
and function of the new product. 
 Nobeoka and Cusumano (1997) use the auto industry as their context for 
examining the diversity of a firm's new product portfolio.  In examining new product 
development projects in the auto industry over more than a decade, the authors develop a 
typology centered on the significance of the new product versus existing products and the 
time required to develop the product.  The authors establish four categories to 
characterize a new product - ranging from a completely new design to a modest design 
modification.  Nobeoka and Cusumano focus their attention on the two intermediate 
categories - rapid design transfer and sequential design transfer - which capture the speed 
by which previous design elements could be incorporated into new products.  The authors 
find that rapid design transfer can facilitate significant competitive advantage beyond the 
traditional product development processes, particularly in industry sectors where this 
process is not yet evident. 
 Ramdas (2003) offers an integrated theoretical model addressing the creation and 
development of new product variety.  Her model encompasses variety creation and 
implementation, and how the degree of new product variety is related to customer 
demand, product-line synergies, and, ultimately, long term profitability.  Ramdas (2003) 
defines product variety or diversity across differences in form and product function, and 
emphasizes the elimination of design elements that do not drive differentiation to reduce 
unnecessary resource commitments.  Product variety - particularly the management and 
development of diverse and varied new products - can forge competitive advantages 
leading to superior financial performance.     
 In their examination of the influence of new products on firm performance, 
Kleinschmidt and Cooper (1991) discuss the influence of innovativeness on performance 
- or how different the new product introductions are from the firm's existing products.  
The authors identify three levels of innovativeness - high, medium, and low - that are 
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defined by the degree of "new-to-the world products and innovative new product lines to 
the company" (Kleinschmidt & Cooper, 1991: 243).   
 In their examination of product innovativeness, Danneels and Kleinschmidt 
(2001) offer a multi-dimensional construct of innovativeness and new products' 
relationships with a firm's existing offerings.  First, the authors posit the newness of a 
product introduction with regards to familiarity of a firm with the domains in which it 
offers products.  A new product may position a firm into an unfamiliar environment, and 
the new environment may pose challenges for firms to support the new product.  The 
authors extend this concept to include familiarity with the technological and market 
environments that are deemed equally important for the success of a new product.  
Additionally, Danneels and Kleinschmidt (2001) posit that new product introductions 
may or may not fit with the firm's existing internally available resources.  How well the 
new product fits within the firm's existing resource base may help define how much the 
new product differs from the firm's existing product lineup.  The new product may 
challenge the firm's ability to successfully commercialize the product if the fit with 
existing resources and capabilities is poor. 
 The diversity of the new products introduced may tap into a leader's strategic 
focus or tolerance for the additional risk of competing in a variety of product categories.  
The eagerness versus vigilance characteristics of a CEO's regulatory focus orientation 
may be represented by the diversity of the firm's new product introductions.  As firms 
consider developing new products, a CEO with a promotion focus orientation could be 
expected to motivate her firm to search more broadly for potential solutions (Brockner et 
al., 2004).  The eagerness to find one or more hits - all in pursuit of achieving success - 
would drive a firm led by a CEO with a promotion focus orientation to leave no stone 
unturned in its search.  While a number of factors may influence the success of such a 
search - financial resources, design talent, etc. - the underlying motivation to search more 
broadly would be a common feature of firms led by a CEO with a promotion focus. 
 A potential byproduct of the broader search could be a more diverse array of new 
products (Rietzschel, 2011).  Rietzschel (2011) found that promotion focused groups 
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generated more innovative ideas than their prevention focused counterparts.  Firms may 
identify previously unidentified opportunities of underserved markets that could propel 
the firm to developing new products to serve the new opportunities.  A CEO with a 
promotion focus orientation could motivate a firm to bring these new ideas to market in 
search of additional hits (Higgins, 1998). 
 As expected with the number of new product introductions, the diversity of a 
firm's new products could be expanded with a CEO's promotion focus orientation.  Firms 
could be expected to seek more opportunities for success and be willing to take a riskier 
approach of attempting to find hits in a more diverse array of product categories.  Given 
the broader search process and more creative solution generation, a firm led by a CEO 
with a promotion focus orientation could be expected to create a more diverse portfolio of 
new product innovations.  It can be hypothesized that: 
 Hypothesis 3: A firm led by a CEO with a promotion focus orientation will 
introduce new products in a large number of product categories. 
 
 Firms led by a CEO with a prevention focus orientation will remain ever-vigilant 
to avoid mistakes and maintain the status quo (Crowe & Higgins, 1997).  This would lead 
one to expect that these types of firms would refrain from introducing new products in a 
broad variety of product categories.  In order to exert the necessary vigilance in ensuring 
against losses, CEOs with a prevention focus orientation will narrow the scope of new 
products considered and offered (Liberman et al., 2001).  We could expect that firms led 
by a CEO with a prevention focus could have a narrower array of product categories 
offered than firms led by a CEO with a promotion focus orientation.  As a result, new 
product introductions could be expected to remain in those narrowly focused categories. 
 Additionally, firms led by a CEO with a prevention focus orientation would be 
more likely to remain committed to their existing product categories (Liberman et al., 
1999) and fear mistakes that could come from introducing products that would take the 
firm outside of these existing boundaries.  This commitment to a firm's existing product 
categories would be strengthened by the firm's narrower product category presence.   
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 While a CEO with a prevention focus orientation may attempt to mine her firm's 
existing product categories for additional product successes, we could anticipate that 
these CEOs would find it difficult to risk failure by broadening the product categories 
that their firms serve.  As a result of this reluctance to risk losses in new areas and the 
narrowed scope of a firm led by a CEO with a prevention focus orientation, these firms 
would likely be reluctant to introduce new products in a broad array of product 
categories.  It can be hypothesized that: 
 Hypothesis 4: A firm led by a CEO with a prevention focus orientation will 
introduce new products in fewer product categories. 
 
 CONFORMITY TO INDUSTRY NORMS.  A number of scholars across the strategy 
literature examine innovation and new product introductions as a means of assessing 
firms' conformity or nonconformity to industry norms (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; 
Christensen & Rosenbloom, 1995; Tushman & Anderson, 1986), however these 
approaches typical focus on the specific characteristics of the focal innovation, rather 
than pursuing greater understanding of the underlying firm behaviors driving the attempts 
at differentiation.  Competitive dynamics researchers have addressed differentiation and 
conformity through the comparison of firm actions with those of the competition, and 
classifying the level of dissimilarity (Ferrier et al., 1999).  Dissimilarity is characterized 
as the level of differentiation "relative to rivals and captures the extent to which the 
actions of a particular firm are different from those of other firms" (Ferrier et al., 1999: 
376).  The authors explain that actions (which include new product introductions) reflect 
a firm's "aggressive attempt to break away from the norms of everyday competition" 
(Ferrier et al., 1999: 376).  This perspective on dissimilarity builds on the Austrian 
economics concept of actions serving as the source of competitive differentiation and 
Penrose's conceptualization of strategic differentiation (Ferrier et al., 1999).  Ferrier and 
colleagues posit that dissimilar actions and deviation from industry strategic norms are 
critical for industry leaders to preserve their leadership positions. 
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 In their examination of the competitive dynamics of small and large airlines, Chen 
and Hambrick (1995) show that firms benefit from competitive conformity, rather than 
pursuing strategies that deviate from the industry norm.  Small firms that deviate from 
strategic norms - which may be considered the optimal and legitimate competitive profile 
for firms of a certain size - suffer from threats to legitimacy by deviating; while large 
firms may suffer threats to their perceptions among stakeholders when deviating 
significantly from established norms of strategic action (Chen & Hambrick, 1995).  For 
smaller airlines, Chen and Hambrick (1995) indicate that the specific strategic behavior 
that forms the basis for the competitive norm centers on action execution speed - and 
their study demonstrates that smaller firms execute strategic actions more quickly than 
larger firms.  For larger airlines, the benchmark strategic behavior centers on these firms' 
propensity for both action and response.  The study finds that larger firms announce 
strategic moves more quickly than smaller firms and are more likely to respond to an 
action by a competitor than smaller firms.  Deviation from norms may garner attention, 
but can be strategically damaging to both small and large firms. 
 Miller and Chen (1996) complement the work of Chen and Hambrick by 
examining factors that may influence conformity and nonconformity from a sociological 
perspective.  The authors hypothesize that nonconforming behavior may be driven by 
firms' interaction with other industry players - specifically the diversity of the focal firm's 
competitors and customers.  Miller and Chen (1996) are careful to highlight that other, 
more conventional factors such as firm size and market performance may also contribute 
to the level of nonconforming strategic behavior.  Using the airline industry and a 
longitudinal analysis of firm strategic moves, the authors do find that customer diversity 
did contribute to nonconformity and competitor diversity contributed to tactical 
nonconformity, but not overall nonconformity (Miller & Chen, 1996).  Importantly, 
Miller and Chen assert that there are not a priori industry strategic norms, but de facto 
norms may emerge - specifically, "patterns of competitive behavior that are typical of a 
group of interacting competitors of similar market scope" (1996: 1210).  Also, 
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conformity to industry norms should not be considered a binary condition, but rather 
occurs along a continuum on which firms may differ significantly. 
 Beyond the competitive dynamics literature, other strategy scholars have also 
addressed conformity and nonconformity of firm strategic behavior.  Carpenter (2000) 
examines the effect of CEO compensation on firm behavior varying from accepted 
norms.  He defines strategic deviation as "changes in the deviation of a firm's resource 
commitments from industry norms of competition" (Carpenter, 2000: 1182).  To 
illustrate, Carpenter identifies Chrysler's reduction in internationalization in the early to 
mid-1990's (through the reduction of foreign sales and production) as deviation or 
nonconformity in the face of other firms in the U.S. auto industry significantly increasing 
international operations.  Carpenter calculated deviation as firm behaviors differing from 
industry averages for strategic actions such as R&D, advertising, SG&A intensity, and 
inventory levels, among others.  The differences between the focal firm and industry 
averages reflected "how much, on average, a firm tended to gravitate toward or away 
from industry strategic norms" (Carpenter, 2000: 1188).  Carpenter did find that increases 
in CEO compensation had a positive effect on strategic change and strategic deviation.                      
 I expect CEO regulatory focus to affect a firm's deviation from industry norms in 
breadth of new product introductions.  Differences in CEO-level regulatory focus may 
drive firms to behave differently in regards to the level of deviation from industry norms.  
A promotion-focused CEO may be more open to change (Liberman et al., 1999), and 
consider industry norms as too constricting as she searches for successful outcomes 
(Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Förster, Higgins, & Idson, 1998).  Promotion-focused CEOs 
may be more willing to look outside of existing industry norms for solutions, and be 
willing to discard existing industry conventions in exchange for new alternatives 
(Liberman et al., 1999).   
 A promotion focus may propel an entity towards more creative solutions in its 
search for hits that produce gains (Friedman & Förster, 2001; Higgins, 1998).  As a firm 
broadens its search for success (Brockner et al., 2004; Pham & Chang, 2010) and 
generates more creative solutions than one led by a CEO with a prevention focus, the 
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firm may introduce a slate of products that do not conform to the typical or accepted 
offerings of the industry.  The broader search and more creative new product 
introductions could be expected to incorporate more new knowledge than the new 
products developed by the more conservative and loss averse firms led by a CEO with a 
prevention focus orientation.  More new knowledge could generate an array of 
innovations (Dewar & Dutton, 1986) that may not conform to typical industry behaviors 
regarding the breadth of new product introductions. 
 In addition to the promotion focus producing more creative solutions, it appears 
that a promotion-focused CEO may be prone to making riskier decisions (Florack & 
Hartmann, 2007).  A promotion-focused CEO may not value the need to conform to 
industry norms or be considered the leader of an "average" firm in its industry.  A firm 
led by a CEO with a promotion focus orientation may more broadly define what is an 
"acceptable" risk when introducing new products - further discounting any influence of 
what might be considered the norm for its industry.  An increased acceptance of potential 
risk may facilitate the introduction of a breadth of products that vary more significantly 
from the industry norms.  As a result of an openness to change, greater risk taking and 
more creative solution generation, it could be expected that firms with CEOs with a 
promotion focus orientation would generate a collection of new product introductions 
that deviate more from industry norms.  It can by hypothesized that: 
 Hypotheses 5: A firm led by a CEO with a promotion focus will introduce new 
products in departure from industry norms.  
 
 Unlike a firm led by a promotion-focused CEO, a firm led by a CEO with a 
prevention focus will be driven to maintain stability and the status quo (Crowe & 
Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1998) and be more sensitive to social pressures (Higgins, 2000).  
A CEO with a prevention focus would be prone to behave in accordance with what was 
accepted and what the status quo deems as what ought to be done (Higgins, 1997).  While 
a promotion-focus oriented CEO may be willing to make riskier and more creative 
decisions, a firm led by a CEO with a prevention focus would be expected to minimize 
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the chance for a loss by being more conservative (Higgins, 1998).  A CEO leading a firm 
with a prevention focus orientation would adhere more closely to industry norms and 
avoid any threats to a sense of safety (Higgins, 1997).  This predilection for safety and 
the status quo could be manifest in introducing new products in accordance with industry 
norms.   
 CEOs with a prevention focus would be more aware of potential punishments and 
the negative repercussions of deviating from the status quo (Liberman et al., 1999).  As a 
prevention focus motivates an individual to limit her options when making decisions and 
generate less creative solutions (Friedman & Förster, 2001), it would also motivate 
individuals to remain focused on existing products (Liberman et al., 1999).  By remaining 
committed to existing products and product categories, a firm led by a CEO with a 
prevention focus would continue to conform to accepted industry norms regarding new 
product introductions.  As a result of a predilection for maintaining the status quo and a 
commitment to behaving in a manner that is expected, firms led by a CEO with a 
prevention focus could be expected to conform more closely with accepted industry 
strategies regarding new product introductions.  It can be hypothesized that: 
 Hypothesis 6: A firm led by a CEO with a prevention focus will introduce new 
products that conform with industry norms. 
 
CEO REGULATORY FOCUS AND PRODUCT RECALL BEHAVIOR 
 Management scholars have shown significant interest in the influence of firm 
errors and the reliability of product performance on firm outcomes (Haunschild & Rhee, 
2004; Reilly & Hoffer, 1983; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006).  Much of this work has focused 
on the impact of the errors or poor product performance on firm stock prices, market 
share or sales (Barber & Darrough, 1996; Cho & Pucik, 2005; Reilly & Hoffer, 1983).  
Limited attention has been paid to the underlying drivers of firm behavior that may lead 
to unreliable product performance - as reflected in product recalls.  Haunschild and Rhee 
(2004) use product recalls as a basis for exploring firm learning behavior, but do not 
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examine underlying influences on behavior - rather focusing on prior recalls and 
production experience as potential influences on future recall behavior.   
 Regulatory focus theory can provide some insight into potential behavioral 
mechanisms affecting product performance reliability.  Prevention focus is centered on 
vigilance behaviors - featuring a predilection for safety, responsibility and the avoidance 
of negative outcomes (Higgins, 1998).  A system of behavior driven by a prevention 
focus is attuned to preserving the status quo and the commitment to pursue goals based 
on what ought to be done (Crowe & Higgins, 1997).  In the context of product 
performance, one can assert that a CEO with a prevention focus could be expected to 
avoid pursuing opportunities that could lead to mistakes or recalls.  Once a new product 
opportunity was pursued, a CEO's prevention focus would prioritize behavior leading to 
accuracy (Förster et al., 2003) and correct outcomes.  A should be expected to refine its 
procedures and manufacturing practices to produce its vehicles most effectively and in 
accordance with manufacturing standards (Wallace et al., 2010).  CEO's with a 
prevention focus will highlight safety and mistake avoidance behavior (Förster, Higgins, 
& Bianco, 2003; Lanaj, Chang, & Johnson, 2012) in regards to product production.  
Product development processes would be centered on accuracy and producing vehicles in 
accordance with proscribed safety standards.  One could expect firm culture to be 
centered on avoiding mistakes and generating safe, successful outcomes. 
 A CEO with a prevention focus can also be expected to motivate her firm to 
generate fewer, less risky alternatives than a CEO with a promotion focus orientation 
when considering new product opportunities (Friedman & Förster, 2001; Molden & 
Higgins, 2004).  When considering the decision-making process regarding the selection 
of potential alternatives, a CEO with a prevention focus orientation would be expected to 
select the lower risk option (Levine et al., 2000).  Lower risk alternatives - combined with 
an underlying behavioral predisposition for safety and error avoidance - could be 
expected to generate new products that were more reliable and less error prone.  Fewer, 
well thought out alternatives could be expected to generate fewer poor performing 
products that might necessitate recalls.  Once a product was put into production, a CEO 
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with a prevention focus orientation would assure a greater focus on safety and safe work 
outcomes (Lanaj, Chang, & Johnson, 2012), which could be expected to foment a work 
environment centered on error avoidance.  For example, under CEO Philip Caldwell, and 
successor CEO Donald Peterson, Ford Motor Company instituted the broadly publicized 
slogan "Quality is Job 1" to inform customers and, almost equally importantly, Ford 
employees that Ford produced quality vehicles that could compete with recent Japanese 
imports, as well as to re-align Ford's internal culture toward one of higher quality, market 
focused vehicles (Banham, 2002).  The strategic vigilance espoused by the CEO could be 
expected to permeate the entire product development and production process (Kark & 
Van Dijk, 2007), thereby potentially reducing product quality failures and any subsequent 
product recalls.  It can be hypothesized that: 
 Hypothesis 7: A firm led by a CEO with a prevention focus orientation will issue 
fewer product recalls.          
       
 The prior discussion addresses how a CEO-level promotion or prevention focus 
may influence specific behaviors, namely new product introductions and product recalls.  
The next section examines 1.) the effects of CEO promotion focus on prominence; 2.) the 
potential mediating effects of new product introductions on the relationship between 
CEO promotion focus and firm prominence; 3.) the effects of CEO prevention focus on 
reputation for quality; and 4.) the potential mediating effects of product recall behavior 
on the relationship between CEO prevention focus and a firm's reputation for quality 
(Rindova et al., 2005).  I provide some insights into the various dimensions of firm 
reputation as I develop the direct and mediation hypotheses.     
 
FIRM REPUTATION 
 Reputation is defined as "stakeholders' perceptions about an organization's ability 
to create value relative to competitors" (Rindova et al., 2005: 1033).  The benefits of a 
positive reputation on firm performance have been established through a variety of 
studies in the management literature (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Podolny, 1993; Roberts 
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& Dowling, 2002).  Additionally, firm reputation has been established as a valuable 
intangible asset (Barney, 1991; Hall, 1992, 1993; Rindova & Martins, 2012), which 
provides benefits regarding reduced stakeholder uncertainty (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; 
Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001) in addition to positive financial benefits.  The effects of 
reputation have been studied extensively, but there is less consensus on the antecedents 
and formative elements of firm reputation (Rindova et al., 2005).  The importance of 
reputation on performance and non-performance outcomes mandates further study to 
expand our knowledge of the particular foundations of firm behavior that contribute to 
the formation of firm reputation in the eyes of stakeholders (Rindova et al., 2007).             
 In his examination of a broad array of intangible assets, Hall (1992) surveyed 
approximately 100 CEOs who identified overall company reputation as the most 
important contributor to the overall success of their business from a selection of 13 
intangible assets.  Hall (1992) asserts that an overall firm reputation is fragile and touches 
all areas of an organization, and merits constant attention in interaction with all 
stakeholders.  Fombrun (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, 1996) explains that firms 
compete for reputation assets and target broad constituencies of stakeholders to facilitate 
reputation development. 
 As firm reputation emerged as a prominent construct in the management 
literature, scholars have debated the dimensionality of the construct (Chun, 2005; 
Rindova et al., 2005; Rindova & Martins, 2012; Schwaiger, 2004).  In their seminal paper 
examining the development of firm reputation, Fombrun and Shanley (1990) use a single 
construct for firm reputation, supported by a factor analysis of the Fortune Most Admired 
Companies survey data.  However, in the discussion of their results, the authors raise the 
question of whether firm reputation is a multidimensional construct, and suggest that 
different audiences (i.e., customers, employees, etc.) may hold different perceptions of 
firm reputation.   
 Recent work has begun to explore the multi-dimensionality of reputation.  
Scholars have proposed various models to incorporate multiple dimensions of reputation 
in a strategy context.  Rindova et al. (2005) is the first paper in this stream.  Rindova and 
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colleagues (2005) present bi-dimensional model of firm reputation built upon two 
streams of reputation research, namely: 1.) the economics perspective of a firm having a 
reputation associated with a particular organizational attribute and 2.) the institutional 
perspective of a reputation serving as an overall impression of the firm among actors in 
an organizational field.  Rindova and her colleagues (2005) present an integrated model 
that presents firm reputation as being comprised of both an overall impression, deemed 
prominence, and an attribute-based dimension, defined as perceived quality.  Using U.S. 
business schools as the context, their study identifies the different antecedents of the 
reputation dimensions and explores the influence of the two dimensions on variations in 
MBA graduate salaries.  In the formation of the overall prominence component, the 
influence of the media and other high status actors is found to be critical for the formation 
of the overall firm reputation (Rindova et al., 2005).  The quality of the firm's inputs (i.e., 
Intel Inside for PC manufacturers) and the quality of the firm's productive assets (i.e., 
leading research scientists at a biotechnology firm) are found to be critical to the 
formation of a firm's reputation for quality.  This two-dimensional model of firm 
reputation, consisting of both prominence and perception of quality aspects, serves as the 
foundational constructs for the focal dependent variables in this study. 
 Rindova and Martins (2012) characterized the development of firm reputation as a 
valuable firm asset as being comprised of four dimensions: specificity, accumulation, 
breadth of appeal and codification.  In examining the accumulation of reputational assets 
through the perceptions of a variety of stakeholders and the firm's breadth of appeal, the 
authors highlight two components: 1.) prominence/visibility that encompasses the 
collective attention paid to a firm and 2.) favorability that holds the collective evaluations 
across a broad range of stakeholders.  Prominence and visibility are often associated with 
the amount of attention the focal firm is granted in the media (Deephouse, 2000; 
Fombrun & Shanley, 1990).  Favorability is often associate with the positive or negative 
tone of the coverage of a firm (Deephouse, 2000; Greenwood, Li, Prakash, & Deephouse, 
2005; Rindova et al., 2007).   
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  Finally, Rindova, Petkova and Kotha (2007) employed a multiple case study to 
inductively develop a model of how new firms in the emerging e-commerce market 
developed and accumulated reputation through their market actions.  The authors 
developed a multi-dimensional model of firm reputation, consisting of visibility, strategic 
character, favorability and esteem.  Each of these reputation components was affected by 
different types of firm actions, and resulted in different patterns of media coverage.  
Specifically, a new firm was found to increase the perceptions of its favorability by 
"providing observers with indications of its ability to create value, and, in particular, by 
taking innovative actions" (Rindova et al., 2007: 56).  Innovative actions vary between 
firms, and may be difficult to undertake, especially for the newer firms that were the 
subjects of the study.  Accordingly, favorability was found to be more difficult to 
accumulate than visibility, which was accumulated by taking a high level of market 
actions, and may be considered more valuable than visibility or salience.       
 
 FIRM PROMINENCE.  The literature addressing the prominence element of overall 
firm reputation often looks to the media as an important medium for disseminating 
information about a focal firm.  Fombrun and Shanley (1990) assert that the media are 
"active agents" in shaping information about a firm and shaping their audiences' 
assessment of firm activities.  The authors posit that frequent, positive messages 
delivered by the media about a focal firm may "therefore develop better reputations than 
other firms because they occupy more central positions in a social network" (1990: 240).  
Interestingly, Fombrun and Shanley (1990) found the opposite effect in their empirical 
tests of their hypotheses; in fact, the higher the firm's visibility (measured by unit sales) 
the more negative the firm's reputation.  The authors (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990) assert 
that media exposure may be centered on negative stories; the public may react negatively 
to all media coverage, whether negative or positive; or only those predisposed to making 
negative evaluations of a firm use media accounts for information about a focal firm. 
 Additionally, Wartick (1992) examined the influence of single episodes of intense 
media exposure on overall firm reputation. The author offered hypotheses regarding the 
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amount, tone and recency of media exposure on the magnitude, direction and total 
movement of changes in corporate reputation.  Increases in the amount of media exposure 
are expected to increase absolute changes in reputation; negatively influence the direction 
of reputation; and be associated with larger, negative changes in reputation.  The negative 
tone of media exposure is hypothesized to generate larger absolute changes in reputation; 
generate negative changes in reputation; and is associated with larger, negative changes 
in reputation.  Finally, the more recent the media exposure on a focal firm is 
hypothesized to produce larger absolute change in reputation; the change in reputation in 
the direction of the tone of the exposure; and is associated with larger, negative or 
positive change in reputation.   
 Wartick (1992) used the Fortune Most Admired survey as the measure of firm 
reputation for 29 subject companies, and used an aggregation of news reports relating to a 
focal firm within a specific period computed by the Conference on Issues and the Media 
(CIM).  The author (1992) found that more media exposure is directly related to larger, 
positive changes in reputation for good and average firms.  The tone of media exposure is 
only found to be significant for poor reputation firms, and negative exposure decreased 
firm reputation.  Finally, more recent media exposure for companies with a good starting 
reputation is found to be associated with both improvements and larger improvements in 
firm reputation.            
 Pfarrer, Pollock, and Rindova (2010) examined the effect of firm celebrity - 
which incorporates prominence and the tenor of the attention - and firm reputation on a 
firm's likelihood to announce positive and negative material earnings surprises.  The 
authors operationalized reputation by combining Fortune Most Admired Companies 
rankings with the Wall Street Journal/Harris Interactive "Corporate Reputation" list.  
Celebrity is measured through the combination of the amount of public attention - 
defined as articles published in BusinessWeek - and the tenor of media coverage.  As 
theorized, the authors found that high-reputation firms less likely and celebrity firms are 
more likely to announce positive material earnings surprises.  Also, these same types of 
firms - high reputation and high celebrity - generate greater rewards for positive surprises 
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and smaller negative consequences for negative surprises than firms without either of 
these characteristics.  Finally, celebrity firms generate higher positive returns for positive 
surprises than positive returns to high reputation firms for positive surprises.  These 
multiple instantiations of external stakeholders' perceptions of firms - either through firm 
reputation, celebrity or prominence - provide further empirical evidence for the validity 
and market effects of these intangible assets.        
 
CEO PROMOTION FOCUS, FIRM PROMINENCE AND NEW PRODUCT INTRODUCTIONS 
 Firm reputation is a multi-dimensional construct, with Rindova and colleagues 
(2005) demonstrating that reputation is comprised of two dimensions - perceived quality 
and prominence.  For prominence, the authors assert that a firm's reputation depends on 
"support and endorsement by influential third parties, such as institutional intermediaries 
and high-status actors" (Rindova et al., 2005: 1044).  One of the principal intermediaries 
that can influence a firm's reputation is the media.  The media interprets the available 
information regarding a firm and its activities to determine its worthiness as a subject and 
to determine the amount of coverage the firm merits (Rindova, Petkova, & Kotha, 2007).  
Given its agenda-setting power, the media has a significant influence on other 
stakeholders' perceptions of prominence of a focal firm. 
 A promotion-focused CEO will be more likely to be attuned to positive outcomes 
(Higgins, 1998), and likely will communicate these positive outcomes to the media.  
Given a CEO with a promotion focus is motivated to pursue more opportunities in search 
of successful outcomes, this type of CEO will likely communicate this pursuit of 
opportunities and successes to the media to enhance her firm's opportunity for positive 
reinforcement and greater positive affect through media coverage (Kark & Van Dijk, 
2007).  A promotion-focused CEO will be motivated to frame her firm's behavior in a 
more positive light - reflecting her aspirations for accomplishment (Higgins, Shah & 
Friedman, 1997) - which may be reflected in the media coverage of the firm's actions. 
 A promotion-focused CEO may attract media attention as a result of greater 
tolerance for risk, with this risk-tolerant - and potentially risk seeking - behavior (Florack 
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& Hartman, 2007) enhancing firm prominence in the media.  The more risk-tolerant 
behavior and greater frequency of decisions (Förster, Higgins & Bianco, 2003) can attract 
more media attention, as a promotion-focused CEO may be called on to communicate 
more frequently with the media to address her firm's more frequent strategic actions 
(Rindova, Petkova & Kotha, 2007).  The ever-expanding media appetite for content could 
be expected to be fed by a promotion-focused CEO and her ongoing, riskier actions 
(Levine, Higgins & Choi, 2000).  It can be hypothesized that: 
 Hypothesis 8a: A firm led by a promotion-focused CEO will garner greater 
prominence through the attention from the media. 
 
 A firm with greater new product introduction behavior - reflected in greater 
number, more diverse and potentially nonconforming new product introduction portfolio 
- could be expected to receive greater media coverage of its actions.  Firms with greater 
number of new products will be more frequent issuers of press releases and likely be 
more active in seeking media coverage of their new products (Robertson, Eliashberg, & 
Rymon, 1995).  In their examination of new firms' actions and media coverage of those 
actions, Rindova, Petkova and Kotha observe that "taking high levels of market actions 
appears to increase the salience of a firm and its actions, resulting in higher levels of 
visibility" (2007: 56).  Stakeholders, including the general media, could gain increased 
familiarity with a firm through the greater amount of innovative behavior and determine 
that these types of firms are worthy of significant attention.  This significant attention 
should increase the focal firm's prominence among its stakeholders, thereby increasing its 
reputation.  It can therefore be hypothesized that: 
 Hypothesis 8b: Greater new product introduction behavior mediates the positive 
relationship between a firm led by a promotion-focused CEO and greater prominence 
through media attention.    
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CEO PREVENTION FOCUS, REPUTATION FOR QUALITY AND PRODUCT RECALL BEHAVIOR 
 REPUTATION FOR QUALITY.  In addition to stakeholders' assessment of a focal 
firm's overall prominence, scholars have identified a component of firm reputation as the 
perception of a specific attribute of a firm - a firm being known for something (Fischer & 
Reuber, 2007; Lange, Lee, & Dai, 2011; Rindova et al., 2005).  In their review of the 
reputation literature, Lange and colleagues (2011) distinguish between overall 
prominence (being known) and prominence for a specific firm attribute (being known for 
something) that is of particular interest or relevance to stakeholders.  Specific attributes 
such as aggressive pricing policies, quality products, environmental sensibility, and labor 
relations, among others, could be evaluated by specific stakeholder groups.  A firm could 
have a number of stakeholder groups with each group holding the perceptions of specific 
attributes, and the various attribute reputations could differ significantly without affecting 
the perceptions of various other stakeholder groups.  Mahon comments that “reputation is 
an asset in relation to (a) a specific context or process, (b) a specific issue, (c) specific 
stakeholders, and (d) expectations of organizational behavior based on past actions and 
situations” (2002: 439).    
 Shapiro (1983) examines the influence of a firm's reputation for producing quality 
products, specifically when consumers are unable to observe the attributes of a product 
prior to making a purchase decision.  Rather than prior predatory actions influencing 
competitors and stakeholders, as seen in Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Shapiro asserts 
that "consumers may plausibly use the quality of products produced by the firm in the 
past as an indicator of present or future quality" (1983: 659, emphasis by the original 
author).  Shapiro's (1983) model demonstrated that high quality items sell for a premium 
above cost, and the premium is compensation to the seller for the expenditure of 
resources needed to build its reputation.  Consistent with Milgrom and Roberts, Shapiro 
posits that past actions are valuable signals to a particular subset of stakeholders of future 
behavior and can be used to establish a perception of a particular trait of the focal firm.  
Additionally, as seen in Fombrun and Shanley's (1990) work on reputation in the strategy 
literature, Shapiro (1983) explained that a firm's reputation (in this case, a reputation for 
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quality products) is dynamic and must be developed over time - only accruing to firms 
that invest in the development of this asset (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). 
 The auto industry has been the subject of a number of papers examining aspects 
of firm reputation, including a reputation for quality products or reputation for product 
innovation (Henard & Dacin, 2010; Nichols & Fournier, 1999).  Henard and Dacin 
(2010) used the auto industry as the context to test a measure they developed, reputation 
for product innovation (RPI).  The authors assert that consumer involvement (defined as 
personal relevance) is a mediating mechanism between a firm's RPI and a number of 
consumer behaviors, including excitement toward the firm, overall firm image, loyalty to 
the firm, tolerance for occasional failure, and propensity to pay price premiums.  A firm's 
reputation for product innovation was found to positively influence consumers' 
excitement to the firm; consumers' perceptions of the overall image of the focal firm; 
consumers' loyalty to the focal firm; and consumers' tolerance for occasional product 
failure.   
 Additionally, Nichols and Fournier (1999) examined the influence of a firm's 
reputation for quality products on future product pricing.  The authors posit that firms 
that experience the greatest increase in reputation for product quality should experience 
the greatest increase in product pricing.  The authors used Consumer Reports product 
ratings for approximately 120 car models from 1985-1990 as a measure of product 
quality and used car pricing from Edmund's Publications to measure changes in product 
pricing.  Nichols and Fournier (1999) find that the strongest reputational effects occur 
where the largest quality changes were made.  However, American cars of the era 
suffered from a negative influence of prior poor quality when compared to similar 
Japanese models, and experienced lower prices than the Japanese models.  Nichols and 
Fournier (1999) assert that the Big Three U.S. auto manufacturers were still suffering 
negative effects from significantly poor product quality reputations in the early 1980's 
that affected pricing for the following decade.  This study demonstrates the lasting and 
meaningful effects of a firm's reputation for quality products.  Despite the well-publicized 
improvements in product quality of the Big Three during the 1990's, stakeholders' 
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perceptions of poor product quality generated by previous products remained and 
continued to negatively affect pricing (Nichols & Fournier, 1999).  Nichols and Fournier 
(1999) conclude that there is no specific time period for auto manufacturers to completely 
replace the accumulation of a reputation for poor product quality; rather it is an ongoing, 
incremental process.  
 A CEO with a prevention focus will likely be motivated to prime her organization 
to generate quality products through both her words and actions (Kark & Van Dijk, 
2007).  A prevention-focused CEO is more risk averse (Florack & Hartman, 2007) and 
will likely be less tolerant of potential quality problems.  A firm led by a prevention-
focused CEO could be expected to publicize a culture of quality and error prevention 
(i.e., Ford's "Quality is Job 1" marketing campaign) and potentially enhance stakeholders' 
perceptions of a firm's reputation for quality. 
 A prevention-focused CEO is typically focused on the dependability and error-
free nature of their company's products (Werth & Förster, 2007).  By continually 
spreading her message related to product quality (Kark & Van Dijk, 2007), a prevention-
focused CEO can enhance her firm's reputation for quality in the eyes of its stakeholders.  
Wallace and colleagues (2010) identified prevention focus as a driver for organizations to 
focus towards operational improvements rather than greater innovation, and a prevention 
focused CEO can reinforce these quality-focused attitudes through her monitoring-
oriented behavior (Kark and van Dijk, 2007).  This monitoring behavior could be central 
to creating a firm culture centered on avoiding mistakes that could be perceived as a 
greater reputation for quality by the firm's stakeholders.  It can be hypothesized that: 
 H9a: A firm led by a prevention-focused CEO will garner more positive 
perceptions of its reputation for quality. 
 
 Product recall behavior could be expected to have an influence on stakeholders' 
perceptions of a firm's reputation for quality (Simpson, Siguaw, & Enz, 2006).  Each of 
the firm's recalls could be an important signal (Heil & Robertson, 1991) to competitors, 
customers and other stakeholders.  How others interpret the signals generated by recall 
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announcements can contribute to the construction of a firm's reputation (Basdeo, Smith, 
Grimm, Rindova, & Derfus, 2006).  As stakeholders evaluate a firm's product attributes, 
providing more reliable products that generate fewer recalls could resonate as critical 
inputs towards an enhanced perception of favorability (Greenwood et al., 2005; Rindova 
& Martins, 2012).  Mistake-free products could be expected to be reflected in 
stakeholders' more positive perception of a firm's reputation for quality.  Fewer recalls 
over the course of a focal firm's year may produce benefits to its reputation for product 
quality.   
 Recalls may signal that a firm's products have a greater propensity to fail, or to 
fall short of delivering the intended level of satisfaction to the customer base (Cooper, 
1994; Simpson et al., 2006).  A greater number of recalls may indicate that a firm lacks 
comprehensive quality control and could reduce the attractiveness of future product 
offerings (Nichols & Fournier, 1999).  Disappointed customers saddled with unsatisfying 
products or numerous product recalls will likely hold a more negative perception of a 
firm's reputation for quality.  As a result, it would appear likely that the larger the number 
product recalls, the greater the chance that the firm's reputation for quality could be 
negatively impacted.  Conversely, the fewer product recalls may enable stakeholders to 
generate a more positive perception of a firm's reputation for quality.  It can be 
hypothesized that: 
 Hypothesis 9b:  Fewer product recalls issued by a firm mediates the positive 
relationship between a firm led by a prevention-focused CEO and more positive 
perceptions of its reputation for quality. 
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Chapter 4 - Methodology 
RESEARCH SETTING 
 The CEO of an automotive manufacturer leads a complex business comprised of a 
large number of interconnected functions.  One of a firm's critical success factors is the 
product development process, and the CEO may be only one of many influences on the 
product introduction process.  In his recent memoir covering his experiences at General 
Motors in the early 2000s, Bob Lutz explained that "a car company ... is one enormous, 
hugely complicated organism that has many moving parts, all closely interrelated and 
interdependent.  Where it suddenly turns complex, and where the winners are separated 
from the losers, is in the long-cycle product development process" (2011: 203).  Lutz 
compared the auto industry with multinational conglomerates such as General Electric, 
and concluded that "running this conglomerate [like GE] in detail is clearly beyond the 
capability of any one man" (2011: 203).  However, Lutz argued that a 'highly skilled 
autocrat", such as Volkswagen Chairman Dr. Ferdinand Piech could run an auto 
manufacturer, particularly when demonstrating "self confidence bordering on and 
perhaps crossing into arrogance" and "strong direction and [an] insistence on excellence" 
(2011: 204-05).  Toyota CEO Watanabe expressed similar sentiments regarding the 
interconnectedness and complexity of the auto industry by explaining that "our [process] 
is complicated by many factors that are peculiar to the automobile industry: long product 
life cycles; large and complex supplier networks; and increasingly, state-of-the-art 
technologies vis-a-vis safety, the environment, and traveling comfort" (Stewart & Raman, 
2007: 80). 
 In their seminal study of the product development processes of global auto 
manufacturers, Clark and Fujimoto characterize the new product development process as: 
"A project to develop a new car is complex and long lived; it may involve 
hundreds, even thousands, of people over many months.  Planning and design are 
complicated by changing markets, long lead times, and a multiplicity of choices." 
(1991: 9)  
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Clark and Fujimoto studied the new product development processes of U.S., Japanese 
and European manufacturers and provided a multi-faceted perspective on the influences 
on product development: 1.) market input from competitors and customer preferences; 2.) 
internal strategic planning inputs shaping the firm's complete product range; and 3.) 
technological inputs arising from both internal and external engineering developments.  
Scholars and industry insiders provide examples of these various influences below. 
 In his study of the influences on product development in the auto industry, 
Dauletova (2008) reaffirms the influence of the customer on product development.  
"Customer involvement is an important part of automobile development.  The added 
value of customers in the automobile industry is customers' ideas and complaints are 
analyzed by marketers and sent to engineers for further improvement.  The customers 
help make the products better ..." (Dauletova, 2008: 2).  In a PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
2013 survey of automotive industry executives and analysts, Dr. Stefan Bratzel from the 
Center of Automotive Management shared that in his industry research "we actually see 
customers experiences as intimately linked to all product innovation ... the bigger the 
benefit to the customer, the more relevant and important the innovation is" 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2013: 18).  Additionally, Naumann explained that competitors 
play an increasingly important influence on a focal firm's new product development, "and 
so everybody keeps a sharp eye on their competitors and it is quite common for different 
manufacturers to feature astonishingly similar design elements" (2009: 3). 
 In addition to the consumer and competitor influences, the firm's broader product 
development planning processes strongly contribute to new product introductions.  Lutz 
(2011) described the product planning and brand management processes within General 
Motors that often overrode the desires of the more creative product designers.  Toyota 
CEO Watanabe explained the various influences within his firm on the product 
development process: "we have hours of debate and discussion, and just as my colleagues 
air their opinions, I make my own views known" (Stewart & Raman, 2007: 79).  These 
collective, firm-wide influences on new product development can potentially supplement 
or supersede the influence of a CEO on the process. 
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 Finally, both internal and external technological developments contribute strongly 
to the new product development process.  As Dr. Bratzel of the Center for Automotive 
Management explains: "the more the OEMs strive for ... innovation, the more we see new 
players from other industries coming in and beginning to make an impact.  These 
companies bring a different, new perspective" (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2013: 18).  
Suppliers have emerged as a meaningful source of innovation and technological 
development.  Bratzel explained that "[OEMs are] working to become the 'Partner of 
Choice' in their innovation ecosystem.  That helps [OEMs] attract the best ideas from 
strategic partners and suppliers alike, giving them access to faster, better, and cheaper 
innovations - a major competitive advantage" (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2013: 20).  The 
evolution of the tiered supplier network ecosystem (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991) continues to 
promote technological innovation as a means of cost reduction as well as enhancing the 
portfolio of lower tier suppliers to attract attention - and business - from higher tier 
suppliers.  Much of this technological innovation flows to the end product produced by 
the OEMs.  As seen in the dramatic success of Tesla Motors and its introduction of fully 
electric vehicles featuring extended range batteries - developed in partnership with 
consumer electronics manufacturer Panasonic, technological innovations in the product 
development process are arriving from a variety of internal and external sources. 
 CEO ROLE IN PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS.  While the external and internal 
influences on new product development may be significant, I am following prior research 
in the management literature to examine the micro-foundational influences on firm 
actions (Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004).  Building off of the upper echelons 
perspective (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), this study attempts to expand the study of the 
influence of CEO psychological attributes on firm strategic actions (Finkelstein, et al., 
2009).  Recent work in the management literature has examined a variety of CEO 
attributes, including affectivity (Delgado-Garcia & De La Fuente-Sabate, 2010), charisma 
(Agle, Nagarajan, Sonnenfeld, & Srinivasan, 2006), personality (Resick, Whitman, 
Weingarden & Hiller, 2009), and narcissism (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007). 
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 Given the complexity of the product development process, the direct role of the 
CEO across the entire development process may be difficult to ascertain.  Industry 
insiders offer anecdotal evidence that CEOs may have the most influence on the process 
when final decisions regarding the launch of new products are made.  As depicted by 
Clark and Fujimoto (1991), the earlier stages of the product development process involve 
myriad designers, engineers and technicians in the origination of product ideas and in the 
early prototyping and refinement of early designs.  These complex earlier stages may fall 
under the direction of lead engineers and product planners, who insulate the upper 
echelons from the day-to-day, detailed engineering and design activities of potential new 
vehicles (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991).   
 As a means to better isolate the influence of the CEO on firm actions, I examined 
the influence of five auto industry CEOs on the later stages of the product development 
process.  Throughout the automotive industry, senior executives - specifically the CEO - 
have been shown to be influential in the product development process.  In their 2013 
survey of automotive industry CEOs and other executives, PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
reported that 79% of executives responded that direct involvement of senior executives in 
innovation and development projects was critical for growth and future success.  
Naumann explained that "... it can happen that the CEO sits down next to the designer 
and dictates how the design should look" (2009: 2). While firms involve legions of 
designers, engineers and product planners to create new vehicles, anecdotal evidence 
from industry insiders and journalists demonstrate the direct influence of the CEO on the 
decision to go forward with new products.   
 In a discussion with Thomas Stewart and Anand Raman chronicled in Harvard 
Business Review, Toyota CEO Katsuaki Watanabe explained that in his unending quest 
for quality improvement, he imposed himself directly in the product development 
process: 
"We have to improve quality even if I have to slow our pace of growth.  After 
examining every project in our pipeline, product by product, market by market, 
we have created a new product-development plan.  Some projects have taken a 
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different direction, and I have halted others - just as workers stop the line.  I 
suggested that we extend the deadlines for several projects by six months, even if 
that meant delays in new launches, and that we postpone or eliminate other 
projects."  (2007: 77) 
The famed Toyota process of continuous improvement, kaizen, empowers workers to 
stop the production line if quality problems are identified, and CEO Watanabe extended 
that premise to his direct influence on product development. 
 In his memoir, Car Guys vs. Bean Counters, Bob Lutz provides an example of the 
CEO's direct influence on the final stages of product development when recalling an 
interaction with GM CEO Rick Waggoner regarding the final design of the windshield 
and roof of the new Cadillac STS.  Lutz recollected that, when faced with input from the 
marketers and the accountants, CEO Waggoner explained that "I'm tired of seeing 
financial analysis telling us it's better to do a lousy car earlier rather than a good one later.  
We are going to delay this program, and get it right!" (2011: 93).  General Motors' 
process of developing more appealing vehicles - directed by Lutz himself - greatly 
benefitted from CEO Waggoner's direct support.  The decision regarding the go/no-go 
production of the Cadillac STS was "one of many times that [GM CEO] Rick Waggoner's 
support, at a critical juncture, facilitated the changing of the product-creating culture" 
(Lutz, 2011: 93). 
 Lutz also greatly admired Volkswagen Chairman/CEO Dr. Ferdinand Piech, who 
he was able to observe during Lutz's tenure at BMW.  He described Piech's direct 
influence on Volkswagen's products as a process "ruled with an iron fist ... He made 
portfolio decisions; he insisted on cars with advanced technology; he made design 
decisions, often ordering a redo shortly before production if he spotted an interior detail 
he didn't like, such as an air vent in a poor position" (Lutz, 2011: 205).  Volkswagen 
emerged as a global power in the industry under Piech, and a producer featuring dynamic 
vehicles lauded for their design as well as performance. 
 In his book, Once Upon a Car, automotive journalist Bill Vlasic describes the 
direct influence Chrysler CEO Dieter Zetsche exerted on the perennially third-place Big 
 64 
Three U.S. auto manufacturer's product line after the merger with Daimler.  Vlasic 
explained that "Zetsche attacked [Chrysler's] shortcomings with a vengeance.  He added 
fancy station wagons and a hot little two-seat convertible, but none of them sold all that 
well" (2011: 39).  Vlasic further described the product-focused CEO's ultimate success 
during Zetsche's tenure as Chrysler CEO was "when Zetsche hit his home run, it was with 
the Chrysler 300 - a muscular statuesque real-wheel-drive sedan with an imposing grille 
and a generous helping of Mercedes components" (2011:39-40).  Chrysler CEO Zetsche's 
tenure featured significant influence of Mercedes engineering and design elements on 
new Chrysler vehicles.   
 After the separation of Chrysler and Daimler/Mercedes, Zetsche was replaced by 
former Home Depot executive Robert Nardelli.  Vlasic explained the zeal with which 
Nardelli attacked his job as the CEO representing Chrysler's new, private equity fund 
owners, Cerberus Partners.  "Inside Chrysler, the engineers and designers were a bit 
stunned by how Nardelli gave orders," Vlasic chronicled, "In one week, [Nardelli] came 
up with two hundred specific improvements he wanted made to the interiors of its cars 
and trucks" (Vlasic, 2011: 135). 
 In addition to the failed marriage of Daimler and Chrysler, Vlasic discussed the 
various merger talks that occurred during the financial meltdown in the U.S. auto 
industry in 2008-2009.  One of the potential combinations involved General Motors and 
Renault/Nissan, which was provoked by GM Board of Directors member Jerry York, 
who represented billionaire investor Kirk Krekorian's significant equity investment in 
GM.  Vlasic captured the dynamics between York and Renault/Nissan CEO Carlos 
Ghosn.  Vlasic wrote that "Ghosn ... was brimming with ideas ... [and] he impressed York 
with how he supervised decisions on vehicle styling.  'For our large-volume products, I'm 
looking at clay models before they are even finished,' Ghosn said" (2011: 135).   
 As seen with fellow CEOs Watanabe, Waggoner, Zetsche and Nardelli, Ghosn 
demonstrated that CEOs have direct, hands-on influence on product design and 
demonstrate the ability to start or stop product development projects in their tracks. 
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SAMPLING FRAME 
 To test the hypotheses, I chose to study the global automotive industry competing 
in the U.S. market from 1996 to 2010.  A single industry was chosen to enhance the 
internal validity of the empirical analysis.  The auto industry has served as a productive 
context for a diverse set of research in the management and strategy literatures, including 
core concepts of interest to this study of new product introductions, recalls and reputation 
(Nichols & Fournier, 1999; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006) and product development and 
innovation (Barber & Darrough, 1996; Clark, Chew, Fujimoto, Meyer, & Scherer, 1987).  
The industry features a diverse set of manufacturers competing across a broad set of 
product categories.  Additionally, while a few firms have entered or exited the industry 
over the sampling frame, a strong core of competitors remained consistent over the 
course of the analysis period.     
 The dataset consists of firms manufacturing passenger cars, sport utility vehicles, 
light trucks, passenger vans and minivans.  These vehicle categories constitute the 
majority of the passenger vehicles sold in the U.S. market.  These vehicle categories also 
encompass the range of vehicles tracked by major industry analysts, including Ward's 
Automotive Yearbook, J.D. Power and Associates, and the automotive press (i.e., 
Automotive News, Auto Week).  The sample excludes producers of medium and heavy-
duty trucks, commercial vehicles (i.e., delivery trucks, ambulances, fire trucks), buses 
and motorcycles.  The excluded vehicle categories serve significantly different customer 
bases than the included categories, and the product development, manufacturing and 
retail functions differ greatly from the included categories.         
 The sample includes 16 firms and approximately 240 firm-year observations, with 
a number of these firms producing multiple brands (i.e., Toyota Motor Company sells 
vehicles under the Toyota, Lexus and Scion brands in the U.S. market).  Over the course 
of the sampling frame, manufacturers offered 47 different brands in the U.S. market.  
Firms were selected as the unit of analysis, rather than brand or model, in order to align 
the firm action data with the CEO regulatory focus data that is collected from the firms' 
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letters to shareholders.  While multi-brand firms may have separate managers for each of 
the brands, major strategic decisions and corporate communications - particularly the 
annual report - are created and delivered by the CEO at the ultimate parent firm level.  
Within the 16 firms in the sample, a total of 57 CEOs served as leaders of their firms for 
at least one firm year.  Over the course of the sampling timeframe, 13 of the 16 firm 
changed CEOs at least once.   
 The majority of the firms in the sample compete in more than one vehicle 
category (i.e., passenger cars, SUVs and light trucks), and offer multiple models within 
each vehicle category.  For each firm year, the dataset encompasses all models offered by 
the manufacturer in that year.  Within each model, all offerings within the model range 
are captured.  Unique identifiers were created for manufacturer, model and specific 
model offering.  For each firm-year model offering, specific descriptive and performance 
measures are included.  Product reputation data is coded for each model year and 
aggregated to the firm level            
 The fifteen year sampling timeframe of 1996-2010 was chosen to include a 
variety of overall economic cycles and variability in product demand in the car/truck/suv 
categories.  (See Figure 3 for vehicle sales data)  Within the sampling timeframe, overall 
economic performance varied.  The overall U.S. economy during the period of 1996 to 
2001 demonstrated consistent growth.  Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, the auto industry experienced a decline in automobile sales, but the decline was 
counteracted by the rise of SUV and light truck sales.  Sport utility vehicles and light 
trucks continued to generate strong growth until the entire automotive industry suffered 
significant sales declines starting in 2007.   
 The sampling frame provides a comprehensive array of conditions and market 
changes that can be expected to provide a stringent test of the hypotheses.  The U.S. and 
major global economies suffered through significant recessions from 2007 to late 2009.  
By the end of the sampling frame in 2010, overall economic conditions and 
automobile/light truck/suv sales showed signs of improvement.  Other studies using the 
automotive industry as the primary sample also appear to use sampling time frames 
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encompassing a variety of industry and overall economic conditions; Barber and 
Darrough (1996) examined the effect of product recalls on U.S. and Japanese auto firm 
value over a 20 year period (1973-1992) and Rhee and Haunschild (2006) used a 25 year 
period (1975-1999) to examine the effects of firm reputation on market reactions to 
product recalls.   
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 FIRM REPUTATION FOR QUALITY.  In order to capture a comprehensive measure of 
reputation for quality, I computed overall problem rate scores from  Consumer Reports 
(Conlon, Devaraj, & Matta, 2001; Levin, 2000; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006) for the years 
1991-2010.  Consumer Reports presents 5-point scores (represented by graphical scores) 
in a variety of automotive categories derived from annual surveys of the magazine's 
membership.  Categories, termed "trouble spots" by Consumer Reports, include engine, 
transmission, brakes, suspension, body integrity and audio system performance, among 
others that reflect a comprehensive evaluation of a vehicle's performance, reliability and 
functionality.  Following the procedure conducted by Rhee and Haunschild (2006), I 
computed an average of the quality survey categories for each model for a manufacturer 
for each firm-year.  The average of the scores for all of the trouble spots enables "each 
model of each brand [to have] its own specific rating of quality" (Conlon et al., 2001: 
1197). An overall, firm-level problem rate score was computed by averaging the model-
level quality score for all of a manufacturer's models for the firm-year.  In order to 
mitigate any dramatic one-year rise or fall in the survey results, I computed a trailing 
three year average quality sore for each manufacturer firm year (Conlon et al., 2001; 
Rhee & Haunschild, 2006).  Finally, to encapsulate broader trends of the perceptions a 
manufacturer's quality, I computed a five-year trailing average, product_quality, to 
generate the overall problem rate score for a manufacturer (Rhee & Haunschild, 2006).     
 Rhee and Haunschild's (2006) auto industry study created a reputation measure 
comprised of two elements.  The first element was a combination of the average scores 
for automakers in two consumer ratings - Consumer Reports' overall problem rating and 
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J.D. Power and Associates Initial Quality Survey ratings.  These scores were combined 
through principal components analysis to create a single measure that was rescaled to a 0 
to 1 scale, with 1 representing the highest reputation score for a manufacturer.  The 
second measure used depreciation rates from the Kelley Blue Book: Used Car Guide.  
Average annual depreciation rates across a manufacturer's product line were computed 
and rescaled to a similar 0 to 1 scale as employed with the media ratings, where the 
lowest depreciation rate generated a score of 1 and the highest depreciation rate generated 
a score of 0.  Finally, the authors created a composite measure through principal 
components analysis that incorporated both the consumer ratings and depreciation 
measures.  The composite measure was rescaled to a 0 to 1 scale.  The three reputation 
measures were highly correlated with each other, with Pearson correlation coefficients all 
exceeded 0.78.  The authors determined that the composite measure, which incorporated 
both the third-party ratings and the depreciation rates - produced the best fitting models 
(Rhee & Haunschild, 2006: 113) 
 My reputation for quality score differs from the measure created by Rhee and 
Haunschild (2006) on two dimensions.  First, I exclude the J.D. Power and Associates 
Initial Quality Survey results because this measure only captures any problems reported 
by owners after the first three months of ownership.  My hypotheses concerning the 
effects of product recalls on product quality address all years of vehicle ownership, not 
solely the first three months of ownership.  The Consumer Reports data is sourced from 
surveys distributed to approximately 8.4 million members
1
, which incorporates problems 
and quality perceptions from vehicle owners across the entire life cycles of vehicles.   
Second, I exclude the Kelley Blue Book depreciation rates from my measure.  The 
depreciation figures reflect "observable" quality in the form of suggested purchase prices 
and depreciation rates.  The Blue Book values quantify vehicle conditions and 
expectations for future value, which may incorporate a variety of influences beyond a 
perception of quality, including market trends, manufacturers' maintenance programs, 
                                                 
1 Consumer Reports membership reported in the Consumer Reports 2014 Annual Report. 
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and fuel economy standards.  In order to focus my measure on perceptions of product 
quality, I excluded this component from my measure.   
 PROMINENCE.  As a means of capturing the prominence of firms when examining 
their reputations, I collected annual counts of media mentions for each firm.  I used a 
general media source, the Wall Street Journal, and coded an annual count variable, 
wsj_mention, to capture the results.  The prominence count will reflect the appearance of 
a firm in the title or abstract of any article that appears in the media source. 
 A second measure, all_media_mentions, was coded to capture annual counts of 
media mentions of each firm in a broad collection of periodicals and newspapers in the 
U.S. market (as defined by "major U.S. periodicals" in the LexisNexis database).  While 
the wsj_mention variable captures the prominence of a firm in a leading business 
periodical, consumers, competitors and other stakeholders may be exposed to firms in 
other media sources.  The all_media_mentions variable captures the presence and 
prominence of a firm across this broad spectrum of potential media sources.  As executed 
with the wsj_mention variable, the all_media_mentions coded the count of appearances of 
a focal firm in the headline or abstract of any article for each year.  Results for multi-
brand firms were aggregated into one count for each focal firm for each year.        
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 CEO-LEVEL REGULATORY FOCUS.  In order to investigate CEO-level regulatory 
focus, I chose to conduct content analysis of firm communications, specifically letters to 
shareholders (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997; Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; Salancik & 
Meindl, 1984; Segars & Kohut, 2001).  Over the past three decades, content analysis has 
grown to become a meaningful element of research in management and strategy (Duriau, 
Reger, & Pfarrer, 2007).  Duriau and colleagues asserted that "content analysis . . . is 
promising for rigorous exploration of many important but difficult-to-study issues of 
interest to management researchers" (2007: 5).   
 I chose the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count ("LIWC") software package 
(Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) to conduct the text analysis on my corpus of text.  
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In addition to addressing challenges of reliability and processing speed of traditional text 
analysis, computer-aided text analysis ("CATA") facilitates the analysis of a large corpus 
of text for each focal firm and the evaluation of constructs across multiple organizations 
(McKenny, Short, & Payne, 2013).  CATA facilitates the analysis of larger, more 
representative text samples than what could be generated through surveys, and facilitates 
longitudinal analysis.  Finally, CATA enables researchers to collect organizational 
narratives in an unobtrusive manner, with the potential to contain fewer  biases from 
recall and demand characteristics than surveys (McKenny et al., 2013). 
 The primary source of text for my analysis is the Letter to Shareholders in the 
annual report issued by each firm during the period of the study.  The annual report is the 
primary source of formal communication between a firm and its shareholders (Barr, 
Stimpert, & Huff, 1992).  While a majority of the content of the annual report for firms 
listed on exchanges under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission is fairly proscribed, the letter to shareholders is free of specific content 
requirements (Clapham & Schwenk, 1991).  The letter to shareholders has been used to 
provide more nuanced insight into managerial and organizational cognitions than other 
firm communications such as press releases or third-party news articles (Abrahamson & 
Hambrick, 1997; Michalisin, 2001). 
 A number of scholars in the strategy literature have used the analysis of letters to 
shareholders to produce meaningful theoretical contributions.  In one of the most 
influential studies of letters to shareholders, D'Aveni and MacMillan (1990) examined 
the focus of top management in successful and bankrupt firms on the internal and 
external environment.  Importantly, the authors explain that content analysis of written 
firm communication is "useful for constructing perceptions and beliefs of their authors . . 
. [and] differences in language reflect differing cognitions and perceived realities" 
(D'Aveni & MacMillan, 1990: 639).  Additionally, D'Aveni and MacMillan explain that 
letters to shareholders are useful tools for firm analysis as they "reflect the perceptions of 
organizational stewards because they are the product of the inputs of many individuals" 
(1990: 640).   Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997) examined letters to shareholders for 
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firms across a diverse array of industries to examine industry-level discretion effects.  
Abrahamson and Hambrick (1997) find that industries with greater discretion may enable 
top managers to divide their attention to a broader array of strategic choices, which 
provides top managers the opportunity to focus on a more diverse array of factors - 
reflected in the variation of words used in the letter to shareholders.  Michalisin (2001) 
explores the relationship between the words a firm uses in its letter to shareholders 
regarding innovation and a firm's actual innovative behavior.  Michalisin (2001) suggests 
that letters to shareholders could reflect firm-level values, beliefs and ideologies, and 
should be the subject of further study of organizational cultures.   
 While the standard LIWC dictionary encompasses a significant volume of words 
and categories, LIWC also enables researchers to create custom dictionaries (Pennebaker 
et al., 2001).  For this study, I am using a custom dictionary created by Gamache, 
McNamara, Mannor and Johnson (2013) that was specifically created for regulatory 
focus text analysis (the "Gamache dictionary").  The Gamache dictionary contains 52 
words, with 27 words identified as promotion focus-related words and 25 words 
identified as prevention focus-related words (See Figure 4). 
 Gamache and colleagues (2013) developed the dictionary through both inductive 
and deductive processes for word identification (Short et al., 2010).  The deductive 
process entailed the use of a thesaurus or synonym finder to identify potentially relevant 
words from key constructs.  The inductive process included the identification of the most 
frequently used words in the primary text corpus to be analyzed.  High frequency words 
were identified through the use of word count software, and words relevant to the 
regulatory focus construct were added to the working list.        
 A second, critical component of custom dictionary development is the validation 
of the final dictionary word list (McKenny et al., 2013; Pennebaker et al., 2007; Short et 
al., 2010).  Gamache and colleagues (2013) validated the dictionary through the use of 
expert raters (Short et al., 2010).  A panel of 25 expert raters were presented with the list 
of words being considered for inclusion in the dictionary, and these raters were tasked 
with indicating if the words appropriately reflected a promotion or prevention focus.  The 
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list of words was presented to the raters in simple alphabetical order, with no words 
marked as either prevention or promotion focus.  The final Gamache dictionary reflected 
the confirmation of the categorization of words as either promotion or prevention focus 
(Gamache et al., 2013). 
 CEO-LEVEL PROMOTION AND PREVENTION FOCUS MEASURES.  The LIWC 
software generates percentages of occurrences in the text corpus of the words in the 
dictionary employed.  For the Gamache dictionary, the promotion focus and prevention 
focus words are grouped into separate categories.  The percentage results for the 
promotion and prevention focus words was coded for each year of each firm.  The 
variable, promo_value, was coded for the promotion focus word percentages, and the 
variable, prev_value, was coded for the prevention focus word percentages.  (See Figure 
5 for CEO regulatory focus results by firm.) 
 While the CEO regulatory focus measure in my study is derived from the CEO's 
letter to shareholders, which has been shown to reflect the perceptions and beliefs of the 
author (D'Aveni & MacMillan, 1990) and should be expected to reflect individual CEO 
regulatory focus, further differentiation between an individual level and firm-level 
construct may be warranted.  Researchers in psychology characterize regulatory focus as 
having a chronic component (Higgins, 1997; 1998) - which reflects a relatively stable 
attribute in individuals.  With the potential for a CEO to prime an organization to reflect 
his or her regulatory focus (Kark & Van Dijk, 2007), one could consider that a firm may 
reflect a particular regulatory focus orientation for a significant period of time - beyond 
the tenure of any particular CEO.   
 In order to identify regulatory focus as a distinct, CEO level construct, I examined 
the dynamics of changes in regulatory focus measures within my dataset.  My data is 
coded on a firm-year basis, and CEO changes are coded in the year they occur.  For each 
CEO change, I computed the change in the regulatory focus measures for the focal firm 
between the CEO change year and the prior firm year.  On average, the promotion focus 
and prevention focus measures changed 45% and 102%, respectively, when compared 
with the prior firm year.  For all firm years, excluding the years of a CEO change, the 
 73 
firms in my data experienced annual changes in promotion focus and prevention focus of 
34% and 61%, respectively2.  On a firm-by-firm basis, every firm that experienced a 
CEO change during my sampling frame (13 of 16 firms) featured greater average change 
in promotion or prevention focus in CEO change years than in non-CEO change years.  
This comparison suggests that the regulatory focus measures in my study better reflect 
the characteristics of the individual CEOs than of a firm. 
 
PRODUCT INTRODUCTIONS 
 NUMBER OF PRODUCT INTRODUCTIONS.  The majority of the product level data 
was developed from Ward's Automotive Yearbook (Ward's, 1996-2010).  Ward's 
Automotive Yearbook compiles detailed sales, manufacturing and product level data for 
all vehicles sold in North America.  Ward's data has been used in a variety of automotive 
industry studies over time (Fisher, Griliches, & Kaysen, 1962; Yu, Subramaniam, & 
Cannella Jr, 2009, among others) and provides the most comprehensive primary source 
data for the industry.  The variable product_introductions represents the annual count of 
new product introductions for each firm.  The number of new product introductions is 
determined by a count of new models, such as Mazda introducing a 626 LX model to its 
existing lineup of 626 models, or a new series, such as Mazda introducing the MPV 
series.  For firms with multiple brands, such as Honda with its Honda and Acura brands, 
the count is aggregated at the firm level. 
 DIVERSITY.  I measured the extent to which a firm's new product introductions for 
the focal year consists of introductions in a variety of categories in the diversity measure.  
Each new product introduction is coded into one of a number of dichotomous categories 
spanning the product varieties of the automotive industry.  Product categories are sourced 
from Ward's Automotive Yearbook's Market Segmentation Criteria (Ward's, 1996-2010).  
Presence in the various categories serve as the input for the diversity equation, I use a 
Herfindahl-type index presented below:   
                                                 
2 All annual changes were computed on an absolute value basis to facilitate comparison. 
 74 
Diversity = (Pi / Pt)
2
 
where Pi is the count of categories of products in which the focal firm i has a presence in 
and Pt is the total number of product categories for that year. A single category count for 
each firm year will be coded to avoid duplicate counts in the event that a firm has 
multiple vehicles in the same product category.  Higher values represent firms that have a 
presence in a broader range of categories and thus more diverse new product 
introductions; lower values represent firms with a narrower range of categories and thus 
less diverse new product introductions.   
 DEVIATION FROM NORMS.  The measure deviation_from_norm captures the extent 
to which a firm's new product introductions for a focal year differs from that of its 
competitors.  Deviation is calculated as the sum of squared differences in proportion of 
the categories of new product introductions between the focal firm and the industry mean 
(Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999).  The deviation measure is represented below: 
Deviation from Norm =           
 
 
where Pi is the proportion of categories of products introduced versus all categories for 
the focal ﬁrm, and    is the industry mean proportion (excluding the focal ﬁrm) of 
categories of product introduced versus all categories.  A higher value represents firms 
that deviate further from new product introduction norms in the industry; lower values 
represent firms that deviate less that the norm for new product introductions.  
 
PRODUCT RECALLS   
 I used product recall information collected from the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) database.  The NHTSA enforces the National Traffic 
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 that requires automakers to produce vehicles that 
meet federal safety standards.  Automakers are subject to recalls when their products are 
determined to not meet standards for safe operation or protection of drivers and 
passengers.  The database holds records for all manufacturers offering products for sale in 
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the U.S. markets, and recall data has been used in recent management studies including 
Rhee and Haunschild (2006). 
 For this study, I coded a count variable, recall_count, to capture the number of 
recalls by firm for each focal year.  In order to best align CEO influence on product recall 
behavior, I coded recall counts by vehicle model year.  As recalls can be issued for 
vehicles in any year on or after its production, this perspective captures issues associated 
with a vehicle produced in a specific year - rather than simply capturing the number of 
recalls issued in any focal calendar year.  A specific vehicle production year is more 
closely aligned with the CEO for that year, rather than the count of recalls announced in 
the year.  Model year recall counts incorporate the counts of recalls for that model year 
across the entire sampling frame.  For multi-brand firms, one count was computed that 
encompasses all of the firm's brands.   
 The NHTSA data provides additional detail regarding each recall included in the 
database - specifically the unique source of the recall.  Three sources are recorded in the 
data: 1.) Manufacturer sourced recall - the recall is initiated by a manufacturer's report to 
the NHTSA; 2.) Third-party sourced recall - the recall process was initiated by consumers 
reporting problems to the NHTSA (coded as "odi" in the NHTSA database); or 3.) 
Government testing-sourced recall - the recall process was initiated by problems 
identified in vehicle testing by the Department of Transportation (coded as "ovsc" in the 
NHTSA database).  While these subcategories are captured in the NHTSA data, my 
reading of the management literature indicates that scholars focus on the total recall 
measure when studying the effects of automotive recalls on firm outcomes (Bae & 
Benitez-Silva, 2011; Bromiley & Marcus, 1989; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006, among 
others).  As a result, I focus on the total number of recalls in my analysis.  (See Figure 6 
for distribution graphs of all independent and dependent variables.)            
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
 GENERALIST VS. SPECIALIST.  As seen in earlier studies in the auto industry, one 
firm-level measure of interest to researchers has been the determination of specialist 
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versus generalist firms (Dobrev, Kim, & Carroll, 2002; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006).  In 
this study, specialist firms may behave differently than generalists firms with regard to 
new product introductions, in particular.  A generalist firm may be competing in a broad 
array of product categories and may offer products across these categories in order to 
address consumer demands and competitor moves.  A specialist firm may be centered on 
a limited number of models and product categories.  These firms may be more inclined to 
refine existing products, or introduce new products very infrequently.  In the automotive 
industry, niche players such as Rolls Royce, Lamborghini or Smart offer two or fewer 
models and have introduced new products approximately once per decade.  I compute the 
spread of engine capacity, engine_spread, for an automaker for a focal year (Rhee & 
Haunschild, 2006).  Engine capacity is reported in liters, and typically ranges from a low 
of 1.0 liters to a high of over 6.0 liters for some of the larger pickup trucks and SUVs.  
Engine capacity spread is computed by subtracting the lowest engine capacity from the 
largest engine capacity for a manufacturer annually.   
 Specialists will generate results with a small spread, as these producers may focus 
on one type of engine or commit to a number of similar capacity engines to leverage 
manufacturing synergies and reduce costs.  A generalist firm will most often generate a 
larger spread, which will reflect the firm's commitment to a broader product line.  A 
broader product line may require significant financial commitments to various engine 
manufacturing facilities and diverse product design and development resources.  For 
firms with multiple brands, one calculation was made per year that incorporates the 
engine capacities of all of that manufacturer's brands. 
     FIRM AGE.  Younger firms may be aggressively developing new products to 
establish legitimacy in the industry.  Conversely, new firms may be resource constrained 
that may focus their attention on fewer new product categories.  New firms may also 
come to the market with one dominant product innovation that they expect to disrupt the 
current dominant design.  Age was computed annually as the elapsed time since the firm's 
founding.  
 77 
 FIRM SIZE.  Firm size was computed as the natural log of a firm's annual total 
sales.  Firm size controls for economies and diseconomies of scale that may be present at 
the firm level (Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997).  Firm size was computed using total 
revenue, in U.S. dollars - converted for non-U.S. headquartered firms - and the 
consolidated revenue for multi-brand firms from COMPUSTAT or firm annual reports.  
 MULTI-BRAND FIRM.  A number of the firms in the sample are comprised of 
multiple brands (i.e., General Motors included Chevrolet, Pontiac, Buick, Cadillac, 
Saturn, Hummer, GMC, and Oldsmobile, or some subset of these brands, over the course 
of the sampling period).  A dichotomous variable, multi_brand_firm, was coded to 
identify single or multi-brand firms. 
 HOME REGION.  Given that the U.S. market is served by automotive 
manufacturers from across the globe, a three item categorical variable, region, was coded 
to reflect the home region of each manufacturer.  The categories are 1.) U.S.; 2.) Europe; 
and 3.) Asia.  While many manufacturers locate production or design facilities in the 
U.S., each firm faces different strategic pressures based on its home region.  Throughout 
the sampling period, Asian manufacturers faced varying foreign exchange rates with the 
U.S. dollar that may have influenced different product and manufacturing strategies than 
were faced by other competitors.  Similarly, the European manufacturers faced a 
significant, persistent sales decline across Europe in the later years of the sampling frame. 
 INDUSTRY SALES VOLUME.  Total industry volume is a measure of annual sales 
volume (units) for the U.S. market.  During the sample frame, the automotive industry 
experienced significant sales variability and this measure enables me to control for some 
of the variability.  The natural log of the measure, industry volume, was taken to 
accommodate an uneven distribution.  
 CEO CHANGE.  The dichotomous variable, ceo_change, is coded to capture any 
changes in focal firm CEO during the focal year.  Any changes in CEO was coded = 1, 
while a focal firm with no changes in CEO for the focal year was coded = 0. 
 CEO CHARACTERISTICS.  In addition to any change in focal firm's CEO, personal 
characteristics of a focal firm's CEO were collected.  Specific CEO characteristics that 
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were coded include CEO age (coded as ceo_age), CEO functional background (coded as 
a categorical variable, ceo_background) to include 1= financial; 2 = engineering; 3 = 
legal; 4 = marketing, and a dichotomous variable, ceo_insider, coded = 1 if the CEO 
ascended to the CEO position from a previous position within the focal firm or coded = 0 
if the CEO was appointed to the position from a position outside the focal firm.  In any 
year with a CEO change, the characteristics of the CEO in office at year end were 
captured in the CEO characteristics variables. 
 FIRM ACCOUNTING PERFORMANCE.  The primary measure of firm performance in 
this study is return on assets (ROA).  ROA was calculated annually for each focal firm, 
and captured in the variable roa_annual.  ROA is a secondary source financial measure 
(others include return on investment and profit growth) that is nonbiased and particularly 
useful for single-industry studies such as this one (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986).  
ROA was selected over return on sales to avoid any autocorrelation effects with the firm 
size control variable.  Secondary measures such as ROA produce a uniformity in 
measurement across all firms in the sample (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986).  (See 
Table 1 for a complete list of variables.) 
   
ESTIMATING PROCEDURES 
 Given the nature of the data in this study - panel data with a number of limited 
range, nonnegative dependent variables - I used Poisson regression to estimate the 
parameters for my analysis of new product introductions and recall counts.  With panel 
data,  it is possible that certain firm-specific factors remain constant across the years of 
my sample (such as firm management).  This implies that the firm observations may be 
correlated across years, which would violate the assumption of independence across 
observations needed for ordinary least squares regression.  With the Poisson regression 
approach, I use fixed effects at the firm level to account for any unobserved heterogeneity 
among the firms.  I employed the xtpoisson model command in STATA 12.  Linear 
regression was used to estimate results for product quality, as this measure features a 
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more normal distribution.  I used linear regression, specifically the xtreg function in 
STATA 12, to predict these results.       
 In order to test the mediation hypotheses, I used the process outlined by Preacher 
and Hayes (2004, 2008) that focuses on the testing of the IV-Mediator-DV relationship 
through bootstrapping
3
.  Unlike the Baron and Kenny (1986) process that outlines a four 
step test that includes the requirement for a significant direct relationship between the IV 
and the DV, the Preacher and Hayes (2004) process establishes a mediating relationship 
(IV-Mediator-DV) without the need for the direct relationship.  Zhao and colleagues 
(2010) facilitated further interpretation of the Preacher and Hayes bootstrapping test 
results by illustrating five possible mediation outcomes - ranging from complimentary or 
competitive mediation, which include a significant direct relationship between IV and 
DV; to indirect-only mediation, which satisfies the Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008) 
mediation outcome (IV-Mediator-DV) and equates to the full mediation result identified 
through the Baron and Kenny (1986) process; to non-mediation. 
  
                                                 
3 In their 2004 study, Preacher and Hayes created testing syntax for the SAS and SPSS statistics software 
packages.  I used STATA syntax created by Eric DeRosia (2013) that was specifically developed to mimic 
the Preacher and Hayes tests for STATA. 
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 Chapter 5 - Results 
 In this chapter I present the results of the analysis used to test the hypotheses 
presented in Chapter 3.  First, I provide an overview of the descriptive statistics and 
correlations among the various dependent, independent and control variables used in this 
study.  Then I discuss the various regression modeling approaches used to test the 
specific hypotheses, present the results of the modeling, and indicate the effects of the 
modeling results on the hypotheses. 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
 I have computed descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variables 
central to my study, and present the results in Table 2 below.  Of note, the variance of 
some of the dependent variables (number of new models, total recalls, and both 
prominence measures) that display a Poisson-shaped distribution is greater than the mean 
for these measures.  This may suggest overdispersion of these data.  Often, a 
recommended solution for testing hypotheses involving these outcome variables with 
multiple regression is negative binomial models.  However, a number of scholars have 
recommended against using negative binomial modeling for longitudinal data with fixed 
effects - as is the case with the data for this study - as the regression outcomes produce 
results that do not reflect true fixed effects (Allison & Waterman, 2002; Greene, 2007).  
As a result of this guidance, I use Poisson regression for the testing of my hypotheses.  
Additionally, my approach is consistent with Gamache, et al. (2013), who addressed 
similar overdispersion concerns with longitudinal data and fixed effects and used Poisson 
regression to test their hypotheses. 
 Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations and correlations for the variables 
in this study.  Correlations among variables were generally low, with a number of 
correlations significant at the p < 0.05 threshold.  First, in examining the correlations 
among the independent and control variables and the new product introduction measures, 
a number of significant correlations were identified.  Both the diversity (0.60) and 
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deviation from norms (0.13) have significant correlations with the new product 
introduction measure.  The correlation between the prevention focus measure and new 
product introductions (0.13) and new product introduction diversity (0.22) are significant.  
Among the control variables, the number of models offered by a firm is highly correlated 
with the number of new product introductions (0.83).  Both the firm size (0.52) and 
multi-brand firms (0.44) control variables were moderately correlated with new product 
introductions. 
 The deviation from norms measure is correlated (0.17) with new product 
introduction diversity measure.  Among the control variables, engine spread (0.85), 
number of models (0.81), firm size (0.74) and multi-brand firm (0.74) were significant 
correlations with new product introduction diversity.  Similarly, the only significant 
correlations between the new product introduction deviation from norms and the 
independent and control variables were engine spread (0.14), firm size (0.14) and multi-
brand firm (0.14). 
 Additionally, when examining the correlations between product recall-related 
measures and the independent and control variables, a few results should be highlighted.  
Among the control variables, the number of models (0.73), engine spread (0.77), firm age 
(0.31), CEO background (-0.37), CEO age (-0.17) and industry volume (0.19) were 
significantly correlated with total recalls.  Similar results were generated for the 
correlations between variables for the three recall subsets generated from the NHTSA 
data and the control variables. 
 In examining the correlations of independent and control variables with the 
prominence DVs (i.e., media mentions in the Wall Street Journal or among a broader 
array of major newspapers and periodicals), one can see the relatively strong correlations 
between the new model introduction counts and the prominence measures.  Specifically, 
the correlation between new model introductions and prominence (0.43) was significant; 
additionally, this correlation was also significant (0.65) when the more broadly defined 
prominence measure was considered.  Additionally, the diversity measure was significant 
when correlated against both prominence measures (0.74 and 0.72).  Also, the deviation 
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from norms measure is significant when correlated to the two prominence measures 
(0.17, 0.14).  Among the control variables, the correlations between engine spread (the 
measure of generalist vs. specialist) and both measures of prominence were significant 
(0.75 and 0.79, respectively).  Additionally, the correlations between 1.) firm size and 
both measures of prominence (0.63 and 0.64, respectively); 2.) multi-brand firm and both 
measures of prominence (0.64 and 0.63, respectively); 3.) the number of models and both 
measures of prominence (0.73 and 0.88, respectively); and 4.) firm age and both 
measures of prominence (0.34 and 0.47, respectively) were of note. 
 An examination of the correlations among the independent and control variables 
and the product quality DV produced a few results of note.  CEO prevention focus was 
correlated with product quality (0.20).  Among the control variables, the correlations 
between product quality and engine spread (-0.23), firm size (-0.13), and region (0.32) 
were significant.     
 With select correlations producing strong results, further tests for multicollinearity 
were conducted to examine the variance inflation factor (VIF) results.  The VIF values all 
fell below the recommended 10.0 level (Bobko, 2001).  As a further robustness check, I 
estimated the models using random effects, but the Hausman test suggested that fixed-
effects estimates were more appropriate given the nature of my sample (Cameron & 
Trivedi, 2009). 
 
MODELING APPROACHES 
 A significant majority of the variables of interest in this study are count variables, 
including the number of new products introduced, the number of product categories filled 
by new products, the number of recalls, and the number of media mentions.  Each of 
these variables of interest is a non-negative count variable, or a transformed version of a 
non-negative count.  As a result, the primary modeling technique used for these variables 
was Poisson regression with fixed effects.  With the longitudinal nature of the dataset, I 
employed the xtpoisson modeling option in STATA 12.  Poisson regression was used to 
test hypotheses H1 - H8.  The dependent variable for Hypotheses 9a-9b is product quality 
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reputation, which demonstrates a more normal distributions.  The components of the 
panel for this longitudinal analysis - firm and year - remained the same as used in the 
Poisson regression modeling executed for H1-H8, but linear regression modeling was 
used with xtreg in STATA 12.  A summary of results from testing all hypotheses are 
presented in Table 8.    
 
NEW PRODUCT INTRODUCTIONS 
 Hypotheses 1 through 6 examine the influence of CEO regulatory focus on 
various aspects of new product introductions.  Hypothesis 1 predicts that a CEO with a 
promotion focus will motivate a firm to introduce a larger number of new products.  
Models 2 on Table 4 presents the results for the Poisson regression analysis of the count 
of new models (DV = product_introductions), using the one year lag of the regulatory 
focus variables.   
 Hypothesis 1 was supported for a 1-year lag, as the promotion focus measure was 
significant (Model 2: IRR = 1.191, p < .01).  The coefficients reported in Table 4 are 
presented as incident rate ratios (IRR) to facilitate interpretation of the Poisson 
regression
4
.  Hypothesis 2 predicts that a CEO's prevention focus will reduce the number 
of new products a firm introduces.  The results of Model 2 on Table 4 supports the 
hypothesis for a 1-year lag.  The coefficient for the prevention focus measure was 
significant (Model 3: IRR = 0.641, p < .01).   
 Hypotheses 3 and 4 predict the influence of regulatory focus on the diversity of 
new products introduced.  Hypothesis 3 predicts that a promotion focused CEO will 
influence firms to introduce new products in a large number of product categories.  The 
                                                 
4 Incident rate ratios are computed by exponentiating the coefficients produced in the Poisson regressions.  
The 1.191 IRR coefficient can be interpreted as if a CEO's promotion focus measure increased by one unit, 
the rate ratio for all recalls would be expected to increase by a factor of 0.191, while holding all other 
variables in the model constant.  Similarly, IRR coefficients less than 1.0 would indicate a decrease in the 
rate ratio for the dependent variable of interest (Hilbe, 2008). 
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results from Models 3 on Table 4 was not significant for the effect of promotion focus on 
diversity (Model 2: IRR = 0.988, n.s.), and Hypothesis 3 was not supported.  
Additionally, Hypothesis 4 predicted that a firm influenced by a CEO's prevention focus 
would introduce new products in fewer categories.  Hypothesis 4 was not supported, as 
prevention focus had no significant effect on the diversity of new products introduced 
(Model 3: IRR = 1.014, n.s.).        
 Hypotheses 5 and 6 predict the influence of CEO regulatory focus on a firm's 
conformity to industry norms.  First, Hypothesis 5 predicts that a firm led by a CEO with 
a promotion focus will be negatively related to conformity of industry norms.  Results in 
Models 4 on Table 4 are in the opposite direction of the hypothesized direction (Model 4: 
IRR = 0.661, p<.10).  Hypothesis 5 is not supported.  Hypothesis 6 was not supported, as 
the IRR coefficient for a firm with a CEO with a prevention focus orientation was not 
significant (Model 4: IRR = 1.590, n.s.).  None of the control variables was significant in 
explaining their effects on new product introduction deviating from industry norms.            
 
RECALL BEHAVIOR  
 The primary dependent variable of interest in the examination of the influence of 
regulatory focus on firm mistake avoidance behavior is the count of total recalls issued 
(recall_count).  The prevention and promotion focus predictor variables were lagged one 
year to reflect the time needed for a CEO's regulatory focus to permeate a firm's 
operations (Kark & Van Dijk, 2007) and to capture some of the lag in the influence of the 
CEO on product development (as improvements to existing vehicles and new product 
introductions roll out over time).  The coefficients reported in the model results are 
presented as incident rate ratios (IRR) to facilitate interpretation of the Poisson 
regression. 
  Hypothesis 7 examined the effect of a prevention focus on the number of recalls 
issued - predicting that a greater prevention focus would produce fewer recalls..  The 
results are presented in Table 5, and indicate that the prevention focus predictor was 
significant (Model 2: IRR = 0.783, p < .05).  As a result, Hypothesis 7 is supported.     
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PROMINENCE 
 Hypotheses 8a predicts that firms led by CEOs with a promotion focus will garner 
greater prominence through attention from the media.  I modeled the influence of a 1-
year lag of CEO promotion focus on two measures of prominence: 1.) media mentions in 
the Wall Street Journal (wsj_mention) and 2.) media mentions in a broader collection of 
U.S. newspapers and periodicals (all_media_mentions).  For the prominence measure 
derived from Wall Street Journal mentions, the results from Model 4 on Table 6 do not 
support the hypothesis (IRR = 1.074, n.s.).   
 For the prominence measure derived from mentions in all major media sources, 
the results on Table 6 produce results not supporting the hypothesis.  The 1-year lag of 
CEO promotion focus produces a non-significant results (Model 5: IRR = 1.075, p<.10).  
As a result, Hypothesis 8a is not supported.  
 In order to examine the mediating hypothesis addressing the effect of new product 
introductions on the relationship between CEO promotion focus (lagged 1 year) and 
prominence (H8b).  I used the multiple regression estimating procedures outlined by 
Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008).  Each of the new product introduction variables 
(number, diversity, and deviation from norms) was tested separately.  Hypothesis 8b was 
partially supported, as the bootstrap test (5,000 iterations) of the indirect effect of new 
model introductions on the relationship between CEO promotion focus and prominence 
(measures by Wall Street Journal mentions) produced a 95% confidence interval that did 
not include 0, indicating full mediation (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  The two other product 
introduction mediation measures, diversity and deviation from norms, produced 95% 
confidence intervals that included 0, signifying non-significance (Table 7) (Preacher and 
Hayes, 2008).   
 
REPUTATION FOR PRODUCT QUALITY 
 To examine the influence of CEO prevention focus on perceptions of a firm's 
reputation for quality, I modeled the influence of CEO prevention focus on the product 
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quality measure.  Hypothesis 9a predicts that CEO prevention focus will result in more 
positive perception of a firm's reputation for quality.  Model 2 on Table 6 presents the 
non-significant result for the linear regression (Model 2: β = -0.043, n.s.).  As a result, 9a 
is not supported. 
 In order to examine the mediating hypothesis addressing the effect of product 
recalls on the relationship between CEO prevention focus (lagged 1 year) and product 
quality, I used the multiple regression estimating process proscribed by Preacher and 
Hayes (2004, 2008).  Hypothesis 9b was supported.  The mediating effects of the total 
number of recalls on the relationship between CEO prevention focus and reputation for 
quality generated results indicating partial mediation (Zhao, et al., 2010), with the 
mediated effect and the direct effect exist and point in the same direction.  (Table 7)  
 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 One important consideration for the modeling approach is the lag of the 
regulatory focus measures to accommodate time necessary for a CEO's influence to 
spread throughout the firm.  For this study, I examined various lags of the regulatory 
focus measures, specifically one, two and three years.  The strategy literature has 
examined the effects of various lags of CEO-related measures and their effect on firm 
behavior.  A one-year lag has been employed by a variety of scholars (Decker & 
Mellewigt, 2012; Eggers & Kaplan, 2009; Marcel, Barr & Duhaime, 2010) when 
considering the influence of CEO behavior.  Marcel and colleagues (2010) examine the 
relationship between a one-year lag of a CEO's cognitive framework and competitive 
retaliation.  Additionally, the authors used firm letters to shareholders as their source for 
CEO cognition measures.  Decker and Mellewigt (2012) tested a one-year lag of CEO 
behavior - among a series of firm-level and industry-level factors - on firm industry exit 
decisions.  Finally, Eggers and Kaplan (2009) use letters to shareholders to identify CEO 
focus of attention and test a one-year lag of that measure on competitive and strategic 
responses to technological change.   
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 Finkelstein, Hambrick and Canella address the concept of lagging a CEO 
psychological measure when examining the influences on strategic actions by 
commenting that "if the researcher is interested in studying the effects of executive 
psychological characteristics on subsequent strategic choices, and perhaps even on 
further subsequent performance, any psychological data gathered must "await," possibly 
two years or more, the strategic and performance measures being explained" (2009: 50).  
Additionally, new product development projects in the automotive industry can take a 
number of years to reach the market, and any immediate, real-time influence of a CEO's 
regulatory focus on product development could still take significant time to reach the 
market.  The three year lag could provide the basis for my results to reflect the time 
potentially necessary for a CEO's regulatory focus to permeate the firm's culture 
(Brunninge, Nordqvist & Wiklund, 2007; Finkelstein et al., 2009).  The three year lag 
also could be a sufficient timeframe for strategic change efforts to materialize (Brunninge 
et al., 2007).  The CEO-level control variables were also lagged to align with the 
regulatory focus measures. 
 A one-year lag of CEO regulatory focus was used for a majority of the tests of the 
hypotheses in this study, as this time lag best reflected the dynamics of the relationship 
between CEO regulatory focus and the firm actions in this study.  Regulatory focus is 
deeply ingrained in the motivation for individual behavior (Higgins, 1997), and this deep-
seated behavioral driver may be a dominant characteristic that comes to the fore more 
quickly when I examine CEO behavior. 
 I conducted sensitivity analysis of 2 and 3-year lags of CEO regulatory focus.  
While the guidance from Finkelstein and colleagues (2009) indicated a period of two or 
more years may be appropriate for top management psychological constructs to permeate 
throughout the firm, there has been less study of the effects of CEO regulatory focus in 
the management literature and, as a result, the "window" for any permeation of CEO 
regulatory focus may be shorter or longer.     
 In examining the sensitivity analysis of the 2 and 3-year lags, the results produced 
limited significant outcomes.  Hypothesis 1 (CEO promotion focus → + New model 
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introduction count) was not supported when using a 2 or 3-year lag of CEO promotion 
focus (See Table 9 for a complete summary of all sensitivity analysis).  Hypothesis 2 
(CEO prevention focus → ─ New model introduction count) was not supported.  
Hypotheses 3 and 4 are not supported in the sensitivity analysis.  Hypotheses 5 and 6 
examined the influence of CEO regulatory focus on the deviation of new product 
introductions from industry norms.  The sensitivity analysis produced no support for H5 
or H6 when using a two or three year lag of CEO promotion focus.   The sensitivity 
analysis produced a significant result when examining the relationship between CEO 
regulatory focus and firm recall behavior.  Hypothesis 7 (CEO prevention focus → ─ 
Total product recalls) was supported from the 2-year lag of CEO prevention focus.  
Finally, I conducted sensitivity analysis of the direct and mediated relationships between 
CEO regulatory focus and the multiple components of firm reputation.  Hypothesis 8a 
predicted the positive, direct relationship between CEO promotion focus and firm 
prominence.  When using the prominence construct measured by mentions in the Wall 
Street Journal, the analysis produced support for the 2-year lag of CEO promotion focus.  
Hypothesis 8b was not supported for the mediation of the relationship between CEO 
promotion focus and prominence by the count of new product introductions when using 
the 2 or 3-year lag of CEO promotion focus.  Hypothesis 9a (the positive relationship 
between CEO promotion focus and product quality reputation) was not supported in the 
sensitivity analysis.  When examining the mediating effects of product recalls on the 
relationship between CEO prevention focus and product quality reputation, Hypothesis 
9b was supported when using a 2-year lag of CEO prevention focus.  Specifically, total 
recalls produced significant, partial mediation results. 
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Chapter 6 - Discussion 
 In this final chapter I summarize my findings and assess how these results 
influence both theory and practice.  I address the limitations of the study and identify 
additional research opportunities to further develop and test the ideas presented here. 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 This study proposes a variety of hypotheses regarding the influence of a CEO's 
regulatory focus on firm strategic actions, specifically new product introductions and 
product recalls.  Further hypotheses addressed the influence of CEO regulatory focus on 
multiple elements of firm reputation.  The empirical results provide limited support for 
the hypothesized relationships.  CEO promotion focus (lagged one year) received support 
for its influence on the number of new products a firm introduced in a year (H1).  
Sensitivity analysis provided no additional support for the hypothesis when using a 2 or 
3-year lag of CEO promotion focus.  CEO prevention focus (lagged one year) was shown 
to reduce the number of new products introduced (H2).  Sensitivity analysis identified no 
additional support for the negative influence of a 2 or 3-year lag of CEO prevention focus 
on new product introductions.  Firms led by a CEO with promotion focus (H3) or 
prevention focus (H4) were not found to influence the diversity of new products 
introduced.  Finally, firms led by CEOs with either promotion (H5) or a prevention focus 
(H6) lagged one year were not found to have an impact on new product introductions 
deviating from industry norm.  Sensitivity analysis found support for a 3-year lag of CEO 
promotion focus positively affecting the product introduction deviation from norms. 
 For new product introductions, the success of the 1-year lag of both promotion 
and prevention focus on total new products introduced may indicate the CEO's influence 
on the "final" decision regarding new products.  Rather than having specific creative 
input or reticence when pursuing early stage new product ideas (as there are no 
statistically significant results for 2 or 3-year lags), the CEO may have more specific and 
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direct influence as the projects reach fruition and the commitment of significant 
marketing and promotion resources are needed to initiate the launch of new products. 
 New product diversity may be a function of too many other influences to 
recognize the direct impact of CEO regulatory focus.  External market forces and 
customer preferences may drive the scope/diversity of new products.  Firms may be 
chasing competitors' entry into different market sectors, rather than relying on internally-
generated motivations for the scope of their product lines.  We continue to see more and 
more firms entering the small SUV market (often called the CUV market) as firms 
recognize the increasing demand and profitability of these vehicles.  Brands that have not 
played in that sector before - including Porsche, Jeep, and a number of others, including 
hyper-luxury brands Bentley and Maserati - have all entered or plan to enter the CUV 
market.  While these new product introductions are developed in-house, the motivation 
for increasing the product line diversity may be generated externally. 
 Prevention-focused CEOs may limit the number of models introduced to avoid 
errors that might arise from the drive to pursue all alternatives that is a feature of a 
promotion focus.  One may expect that a CEO's regulatory focus may influence the 
culture or overall identity of the organization (Kark & Van Dijk, 2007), and, in particular, 
the CEO's regulatory focus may have the most influence one year prior to product 
introductions, where the CEO may be a significant component of the final approval 
process.  This influence may shape a firm's final product introduction strategies.  Among 
the control variables, CEO insider, firm size and ROA were significant and strong 
positive influences on the number of new models introduced.  New product introductions 
may be a function of a variety of resource-intensive processes, and larger firms with 
significantly strong financial performance likely have access to greater resources to 
develop more new product. 
 When examining the influence of a CEO's regulatory focus on a firm's recall 
behavior, the empirical results supported hypotheses 7.  The total number of product 
recalls issued by a firm was found to be reduced by a firm led by a CEO with a 
prevention focus (H7) lagged one year.  In the sensitivity analysis, I found support for a 
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two-year lag of CEO prevention focus reducing the number of total recalls (H7).  The 
sensitivity analysis did not find any further support for the influence of CEO promotion 
focus on product recalls. 
 The success of 1-year lag of CEO prevention focus on the issuance of total 
product recalls may again reflect the influence of the near-launch influence of the CEO.  
While major production tooling and supplier inputs have already been incorporated into 
vehicle development prior to the 1-year lag, a prevention focused CEO may have 
significant input and approval over final "fit-and-finish" elements such as interior 
materials, infotainment/navigation system functionality, and overall feel that would all 
contribute to problems that may trigger recalls. 
 Additionally, this study proposed a series of hypotheses predicting the influence 
of CEO regulatory focus elements of firm reputation - prominence and reputation for 
quality.  The empirical results produced some interesting and statistically significant 
results.  A one year lag of CEO promotion focus was not found to have a positive 
influence on prominence, when using the Wall Street Journal or the broader composition 
of media as the source of media mentions, which did not support Hypothesis 8a.  Further, 
CEO prevention focus (lagged one year) was not found to influence a firm's reputation 
for quality (H9a).   
 Mediation testing for H8b and 9b produced varied support for the hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 8b received partial support, with the number of new product introductions 
generating full mediation for the relationship between CEO promotion focus, with a one 
year lag, and prominence (measured by Wall Street Journal mentions).  Mediation 
proposed in Hypothesis 9b received support from total recalls on the relationship between 
CEO prevention focus, lagged one year, and product quality.   
 The nearer-term influence of CEO promotion focus on new product introduction 
counts can be seen in the mediation hypothesis as well.  The relationship between the 1-
year lag of CEO promotion focus and firm prominence is fully mediated by new product 
introductions.  The final approval/input of a promotion focused CEO one year prior to 
new product introduction could enable more products to reach the market the following 
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year, which could generate significant "buzz" surrounding a firm's new vehicles - and 
garnering greater attention in the Wall Street Journal. 
 The sensitivity analysis produced some additional support for the mediation 
hypotheses.  The relationship between the two-year lag of CEO prevention focus and 
product quality reputation was partially mediated by the total recall measure.   
  
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE 
 The empirical findings of this dissertation contribute to the upper echelons and 
reputation literatures as well as furthering the use of diverse methods in strategy research.  
The primary question driving this study was the issue of the influence of CEO regulatory 
focus on firm strategic actions and firm reputation.  The use of CEO regulatory focus 
enabled me to delve further into a previously underexplored CEO psychological 
influence on decision making and firm actions.  The study extends the insight into the 
"black box" of psychological influences on firm action (Finkelstein et al., 2009) and 
attempts to answer the ongoing call for greater connectivity between micro and macro 
concepts in strategy.  To my knowledge, this is one of the first studies to empirically test 
the influence of regulatory focus on specific firm actions using unobtrusive measures of 
regulatory focus.  My study demonstrates that a CEO's particular regulatory focus - 
serving as the source of a firm's strategic eagerness or strategic vigilance - can influence 
firm behavior with regard to new product introduction behavior and the issuance of 
product recalls.  First, I am able to partially support the notion that strategic eagerness - 
as embodied by CEO promotion focus - can lead to the introduction of a greater number 
of new products.  Strategic eagerness positions a firm to boldly pursue more opportunities 
than competitors led by CEOs with less prominent promotion focus.  With regard to 
strategic vigilance, I am able to show that firms led by a CEO with a prevention focus 
will reduce the number of product recalls issued.  A CEO with a prevention focus may 
shape the firm's approach to new product development to align with her concerns for 
safety and attention to detail that enable the firm to do what is expected and "right" (i.e., 
producing products with fewer defects) regarding the development of new products. 
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 An additional component of the contribution to the upper echelons literature is the 
reaffirmation of CEO regulatory focus as a viable, distinct psychological influence on 
firm behavior.  As recently initiated by Gamache and colleagues (2013), CEO regulatory 
focus can be identified through unobtrusive measures and examined as a CEO-level 
motivation for firm action and goal pursuit.     
 The limited support for my hypotheses predicting the influence of CEO regulatory 
focus on new product introductions is also interesting.  While my study centers on one 
industry in an attempt to eliminate potentially confounding exogenous industry forces on 
new product development, the product development process in the auto industry may be 
too complex to link changes to any one element.  While top management remain 
extremely influential in shaping overall product strategy (Khurana & Rosenthal, 1998), 
the diversity and deviation from norms of new product introductions that reach the 
market may entail a variety of organizational hurdles that cannot be surmounted by CEO 
influence alone. Specifically, the CEO has little ability to directly influence customer 
preferences, and customer demands may have a dramatic influence on the types of new 
products that ultimately reach the market (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991).  My measures of 
new product introductions only account for products that reach the market, and cannot 
account for CEO influence on idea generation or preliminary design approaches that may 
be more diverse or non-conforming.  A CEO may be able to prime an organization to 
adopt elements of her regulatory focus (Kark & Van Dijk, 2007), but the specific action 
of bringing different types of new vehicles to the market may reflect a variety of 
influences beyond CEO regulatory focus. 
 The second component of my research question is the direct and mediated 
influence of CEO regulatory focus on a two-dimensional model of firm reputation 
(Rindova et al., 2005).  My study aims to answer the call for greater insight into the 
antecedents of the reputation dimensions outlined in the model.  The direct influence of 
CEO regulatory focus on reputation - either prominence or product quality - did not find 
support.  The specific mediating actions in my theoretical model - new product 
introductions and product recalls - received some support in the examination of their 
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ability to mediate the relationship between CEO regulatory focus and two dimensional 
model of reputation developed by Rindova and her colleagues (2005).  In the auto 
industry, there may be many more factors that are influencing firm reputation that are not 
captured by my study.  It appears that more study is needed to refine the influence of 
specific firm actions on firm prominence and reputation for quality.     
 I do contribute to the reputation literature by moving beyond the Fortune Most 
Admired survey to develop measures for quality reputation.  Specifically, I reaffirm the 
example of Rhee and Haunschild (2006) and leverage automotive industry-specific 
sources - the Consumer Reports vehicle trouble indices, in particular - to compute a 
reputation for quality measure.  This approach may be suitable for additional studies of 
the auto industry while moving the discussion of quality reputation away from the often 
derided Fortune survey (Brown & Perry, 1994), and the approach could be effective for 
future studies of industries with similar specialist media.   
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
 While this study makes a variety of contributions to the strategy literature, there 
may be additional insight for practitioners, particularly with greater insight into the 
regulatory focus of a firm's CEO.  For boards of directors, the selection of a CEO is a 
vital decision for a firm and gaining a better understanding of the motivations and 
personality characteristics that can influence a CEO's decision making could enable 
boards to select a CEO better aligned with their expectations for the firm's current or 
desired strategy.  Investors and analysts may be able to better predict firm behavior and 
performance by understanding a CEO's regulatory focus.  By understanding how 
regulatory focus could contribute to a consistency of actions in pursuit of the ideal or the 
"oughts" of promotion and prevention focus, investors and analysts may perceive firm 
behavior as a broader system of actions that are, in part, driven by a CEO's particular 
regulatory focus.   CEOs may be able to better understand how their own personality 
characteristics influence their decision making processes.  In communicating their 
strategic decisions - particularly through their letters to shareholders - CEOs can better 
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appreciate how the words used in their letters affect stakeholders and the perceptions of 
their firms' actions.   
 Additionally, CEOs may consider using their regulatory focus priming 
capabilities (Kark & Van Dijk, 2007) more broadly to better align all elements of the firm 
to their perspective - beyond products and production investigated in this study.  This 
CEO priming capability could also ensure a more consistent approach to customers, 
suppliers and other stakeholders in order to ensure a more coherent approach to firm 
actions, which could be a positive influence on the principals that construct the various 
dimensions of a firm's reputation.  Top management teams may be better able to 
understand the rationale for their own CEOs' decision-making processes and better align 
their processes to coordinate with the CEO's influences.  All of these elements could 
positively contribute to the enhancement of a firm's reputation and potentially benefit a 
firm's overall performance. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES 
 My study focuses on two firm actions - new product introductions and product 
recalls - that have been the subject of a variety of previous studies in the strategy 
literature (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Rhee & Haunschild, 2006).  However, the dynamics of 
the product development and recall process in the automobile industry may be too 
complex to isolate as being under the direct influence of the CEO.  The processes include 
a broad array of participants, both within the focal firm (i.e., dedicated design studios, 
market researchers, engineers) and outside (i.e., component suppliers, alliance partners), 
who all influence the product development process.  Additional factors, such as changing 
government environmental and safety mandates as well as ever-changing consumer 
demand, also influence product development and safety behavior.  While some of these 
factors can be controlled in my study, many cannot.  As a result, the direct effects of CEO 
regulatory focus on product development and recall behavior could be muted or 
obfuscated.   
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 One potential challenge to the structure of my study is the concern that the 
regulatory focus construct is a firm-level construct rather than an individual-level 
construct.  If the construct is anchored at the firm level, the study would suffer from 
extremely limited variability in the regulatory focus measures and would eliminate the 
need to consider the individual level influence on firm behavior that has become a 
foundational element of recent strategy literature.  Additionally, a firm-level regulatory 
focus measure would not enable me to unpack the influence of specific CEOs on firm 
behavior.  Anecdotal evidence of the specific influences of individual CEOs on firm 
behavior (Lutz, 2011; Stewart & Raman, 2007; among others) is persuasive, and the 
widespread nature of the CEO influence on firm actions in the auto industry appears 
sufficient to merit further investigation.  The upper echelons perspective (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984) has established the study of individual or specific top management team 
members' influence on firm behavior.  In my data, CEO regulatory focus measures 
change more significantly upon a change in CEO than in years without a change in CEO 
(i.e., promotion focus and prevention focus measures change 45% and 102%, 
respectively, compared with the prior year, versus 34% and 61%, respectively, excluding 
the years of a CEO change), indicating the significant role of the individual CEO 
construct rather than a firm-level construct. 
 Hambrick and colleagues (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984) have long espoused the study of CEOs and top management teams as a 
critical means by which researchers can gain better insight into firm-level behaviors.  One 
of the means by which upper echelons and other strategy researchers have gained further 
insight into the "black box" of top management team decision making has been through 
the use of unobtrusive measures (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Fanelli, Misangyi, & 
Tosi, 2009; Gamache et al., 2013; Kaplan, 2008).  In my study, the primary unobtrusive 
measure of regulatory focus was derived from text analysis of the letter to shareholder.  
While the letter to shareholders has been established as a viable means of accessing 
managerial, specifically CEO-level, cognition (Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997), the 
structure and purpose of the letter may limit the appearance of words associated with 
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prevention focus.  While the letter to shareholders is unregulated regarding its content 
from a legal perspective, it is typically positioned as the leading element of the glossy 
annual report.  In the auto industry, annual reports typically feature glowing feedback 
from customers and flattering pictures of new vehicles - interspersed with detailed 
financial reporting.  The underlying message is one of growth and expansion, or how the 
firm expects to achieve growth and expansion, and this positioning may reduce the use of 
words associated with a prevention focus.  Safety and preserving the status quo (both 
features of a prevention focus orientation) could be purposely excluded from the 
language used in the annual report and in the letter to shareholders.  Measuring regulatory 
focus from the language used in the letter to shareholders may be constrained by these 
conditions.        
 Another potential influence on the content of the letters to shareholders is the 
threat of the deliberate attempts to shape the word usage by promotion-focused CEOs.  A 
promotion focused CEO is driven to be more attuned to positive outcomes (Higgins, 
Shah, & Friedman, 1997), and, as a result, may be predisposed to avoid prevention focus-
toned words in corporate communications.  This predisposition towards highlighting 
success and the deep focus on pursuing additional opportunities could skew the content 
of the letters and potentially invalidate the use of text analysis as a means to establishing 
unbiased promotion and prevention measures. 
 Two of my new product introduction measures, diversity and deviation from 
industry norms, are dependent upon firms introducing new products in industry 
categories beyond their existing rosters.  Although variability in these measures does 
exist and is captured in my study, this variability appears somewhat limited.  This may be 
a feature of the automotive industry, as the development, production, marketing and sales 
efforts for every model are extensive.  CEOs and firms may be reluctant to venture too 
far beyond their existing offerings for fear of limited market acceptance, as well as 
significant up front commitments to tooling and other manufacturing accommodations 
that may be necessary to serve a new sector.     
 98 
 The study focuses on one industry, automobile manufacturing in the U.S., in order 
to reduce the number of exogenous factors that could influence the results.  However, this 
one-industry structure limits the generalizability of the results.  The firms in this study are 
all large, asset intensive firms attempting to leverage product design, manufacturing 
expertise, sourcing capabilities and marketing and sales networks to compete on a global 
basis.  Their core products - passenger cars, light trucks and sport utility vehicles - are 
governed by extensive safety and environmental regulation.  The specific dynamics of the 
industry may generate market conditions that are unique, and render any conclusions 
from this study as exclusive to the auto industry.    
 Further, prior firm performance - both financial or non-financial results - may 
affect a firm's selection of a CEO in the succession process.  In order to preserve 
successful ongoing performance, a firm may elect to select a CEO with similar 
characteristics to the previous CEO, or, conversely, a firm may attempt to significantly 
change a pattern of performance by selecting a CEO with a markedly different regulatory 
focus.  These proactive CEO choices could alter the content of the letters to shareholder 
as the letters may not reflect the depth of the CEO's core regulatory focus but may reflect 
the tenor that the Board wanted to maintain by the selection of the latest CEO.   
 I believe there are several avenues for future research.  As a means of addressing 
any potential limitations of measuring CEO regulatory focus solely through text analysis 
of letters to shareholders, scholars could expand the text corpus used in the regulatory 
focus measurement.  In addition to letters to shareholders, CEOs address stakeholders in 
a variety of other media.  Beyond the communication in the annual report, CEOs 
typically participate in earnings calls with the investor community.  While portions of 
these sessions may be scripted, the earnings calls typically include a question and answer 
component.  By analyzing the language used in these less formal, unedited statements, 
researchers may gain a more comprehensive understanding of CEO regulatory focus.  
Additional sources of text for analysis could include company press releases, which often 
include direct quotes from the CEO.  While these releases may be more formal and 
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composed by corporate communications personnel, the CEO will typically review 
important releases and approve the language used. 
 In addition, research could expand beyond the auto industry to test the new 
product introduction and product recall actions in different industry contexts while still 
being able to leverage specific reputation measures.  For example, the video game 
publishing industry faces challenges to introduce new and improved games across a 
variety of categories (i.e., first-person shooter, sports, massively multi-player games, etc.) 
that could test the diversity and deviation from norms constructs.  In addition, video game 
manufacturers preserve existing titles with add-ons and other incremental innovations 
similar to auto manufacturers ongoing improvements to their existing vehicle lineup and 
to address previous bugs or errors.  Further, the video game industry is tracked and 
covered by a number of industry-specific periodicals.  These periodicals often rate 
individual games and could provide additional detail for quality reputation measures.  
Finally, the industry is global, featuring a variety of publishers who are covered 
extensively in the media, which could provide sufficient data for prominence and 
reputational standing measures.  Other industries, including children's toys and 
commercial airlines could provide equally compelling dynamics.  I believe that these 
industries could provide the means for inter-industry comparisons and further 
generalizability of the results from this study. 
 Regulatory focus appears to be a distinct, micro-level construct that is gaining 
recognition as an important influence on CEO and firm behavior.  I believe that 
promotion and prevention foci should both be considered as meaningful, direct influences 
on firm behavior, and this study begins to unpack the varying influences of these 
characteristics on CEO behavior.  I hope that the growing literature using regulatory 
focus as a critical evaluative construct continues, and this study encourages further 
research towards greater understanding of the influence of regulatory focus. 
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Figure 1.  Regulatory Focus Behaviors 
 Idea Generation Product Development Recalls Reputation 
Promotion 
Focus 
 Generate more alternatives 
(Brockner, Higgins & Low 
2004) 
 Enhances creative thought 
(Higgins 1997) 
 Motivated to avoid errors 
of omission (Higgins 
1997; 1998) 
 Increased creative insight 
(Friedman & Förster 2001) 
 Volume of output to 
ensure hits (Higgins 1997) 
 Seek accomplishment / 
Aspirational (Higgins 
1998; Higgins, Shah & 
Friedman 1997) 
 Generate more innovation ideas 
(Rietzschel 2011) 
 Focus attention on innovative 
value of a product (Werth & 
Förster 2007) 
 Engage in higher degrees of 
innovation and new product 
development (in turbulent 
environments) (Wallace, Little, 
Hill & Ridge 2010) 
 Stronger influence of growth-
related information (Förster & 
Werth 2009) 
 Increases intention to commit the 
firm to entrepreneurial action 
(McMullen & Zahara 2006) 
 More risk tolerant (Florack 
& Hartman 2007) 
 Willing to make more risky 
decision/choose riskier 
alternatives (Florack & 
Hartman 2007; Levine, 
Higgins & Choi 2000)  
 Emphasize speed over 
accuracy (Förster, Higgins & 
Bianco 2003) 
 May make too many 
speculative assumptions 
and increase risks 
(Hmielski & Baron, 2008) 
 Predilection for riskier 
decision making (Levine, 
Higgins & Choi 2000) 
 Emphasize speed over 
accuracy (Förster, Higgins 
& Bianco 2003) 
Prevention 
Focus 
 Generate fewer 
alternatives (Brockner, 
Higgins & Low 2004) 
 Decreased creative insight 
(Friedman & Förster 2001) 
 Seek to attain correct 
rejections (Higgins 1997) 
 Undermines creative 
thought (Higgins 1997)  
 Generate fewer innovation ideas 
(Rietzschel 2011) 
 Focus attention on dependability 
of a product (Werth & Förster 
2007; Förster & Werth 2009) 
 Organizational focus toward 
operating improvements (Wallace 
et al., 2010) 
 Excessive time and energy 
committed to refining a decision 
to reduce chances of failure 
(Hmielski & Baron 2008) 
 More risk averse (Florack & 
Hartman 2007)  
 Preference for stability 
(Liberman, et al. 1999) 
 Focus attention on 
dependability of a product 
(Förster & Werth 2009) 
 Avoid costly errors - 
focusing on operating 
improvements (Wallace et 
al., 2010) 
 Emphasize accuracy over 
speed (Förster et al., 2003) 
 Preference for stability 
(Liberman, Idson, 
Camacho & Higgins 1999) 
 More conservative 
decision making (Levine, 
Higgins & Choi 2000) 
 Emphasize accuracy over 
speed (Förster, Higgins & 
Bianco 2003) 
 Predilection for the status 
quo (Higgins 1998) 
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Figure 2.  Theoretical Model 
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Figure 3.  Vehicle Sales Data 
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Figure 4.  Gamache Dictionary 
Promotion Words Prevention Words
Accomplish Accuracy
Achieve Afraid
Aspire Anxious
Aspiration Avoid
Advancement Careful
Attain Conservative
Desire Defend
Earn Duty
Expand Escape
Grow Escaping
Gain Evade
Hope Fail
Hoping Fear
Ideal Loss
Improve Obligation
Increase Ought
Momentum Pain
Obtain Prevent
Optimistic Protect
Progress Responsible
Promotion Risk
Promoting Safety
Speed Security
Swift Threat
Toward Vigilance
Velocity
Wish
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Figure 5.  Text Analysis Results 
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Figure 5.  Text Analysis Results, continued 
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Figure 5.  Text Analysis Results, continued  
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Figure 5.  Text Analysis Results, continued 
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Figure 6.  Dependent Variable Distributions 
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Figure 6.  Dependent Variable Distributions, continued 
 
 
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 50 100 150 200 250
new_mod_count
0
2
0
4
0
6
0
8
0
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
alt_diversity
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
0 .005 .01 .015
new prod intro deviation from ind norm
Distribution Graphs – Dependent Variables
  111 
Table 1.  List of Variables 
Category Description Variable Name Source Calculation Variable Type 
Dependent Variables      
Reputation for Quality      
 Consumer Reports 
Quality Reputation 
cr_quality Consumer Reports annual 
trouble indices 
Trailing 5-year average of 3-
year average of firm-level 
trouble index 
Continuous 
Prominence Media Prominence wsj_mention Wall Street Journal 
headlines 
Count of mentions in WSJ 
headlines or abstract 
Count 
  all_media_mentions Broad selection of U.S. 
media sources  
Count of mentions in media 
headlines or abstract 
Count 
Independent 
Variables 
     
Firm-Level Regulatory 
Focus 
     
 Promotion Focus Word 
Occurrence 
promo_value Letters to Shareholders LIWC word count % Non-negative 
continuous 
 Prevention Focus Word 
Occurrence 
prev_value Letters to Shareholders LIWC word count % Non-negative 
continuous 
Product Introductions      
 Number of New Products product_introductions Ward's annual product 
data 
Count of new models by mfg Count 
 Diversity of New Product 
Introductions 
diversity Ward's annual product 
data 
Annual Herfindahl index of 
categorization of new models in 
predefined categories   
Index (0 to 1) 
 Deviation from Norms of 
New Product 
Introductions 
deviation_from_norm Ward's annual product 
data 
Computation of squared 
difference between % of new 
product categories for focal 
firm vs. industry mean  
Index (0 to 1) 
Reliability of Product 
Performance 
Product Recalls recall_count NHTSA annual database Count by mfg Count 
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Table 1.  List of Variables, continued 
 
 
Control Variables      
Firm-Level      
 Generalist vs. Specialist engine_spread Ward's annual product 
data 
Difference between highest and 
lowest engine displacement 
Non-negative 
continuous 
 Firm Age age Firm annual reports From founding year to focal 
year 
Non-negative 
continuous 
 Firm Size firm_size Compustat/Firm 
financials - annual 
Natural log of total sales Continuous 
 Multiple Brand Firm multi_brand_firm Ward's data / Annual 
Reports 
0 - single brand firm 
1 - multiple brand firm 
Dichotomous 
 Home Region of Parent 
Firm 
region Annual Reports 1 - U.S. 
2 - Europe 
3 - Asia 
Categorical 
 Return on Assets roa_annual Compustat/Firm 
financials - annual 
Net Inc./Total Assets Continuous 
 CEO Change ceo_change Firm financial 
reports/Company 
information 
0 - No CEO change 
1 - CEO change 
Dichotomous 
 CEO Age ceo_age Firm financial 
reports/Company 
information 
Age of CEO Continuous 
 CEO Functional 
Background 
ceo_background Firm financial 
reports/Company 
information 
1 - Financial 
2 - Engineering 
3 - Legal 
4 - Marketing 
Categorical 
 CEO Prior Position ceo_insider Firm financial 
reports/Company 
information 
0 - CEO from external position 
1 - CEO from internal position 
Dichotomous 
Industry-Level      
 Industry Unit Volume total_industry_volume Ward's annual data Natural log of industry unit 
sales 
Continuous 
  113 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
  
Recalls
Promotion 
Focus
Prevention 
Focus Number Diversity Deviation All Quality
Prominence 
WSJ
Prominence 
All
number 228 228 240 240 240 240 225 240 240
mean 1.561 0.197 19.646 0.164 0.001 46.350 3.869 39.725 1348.313
median 1.520 0.165 9.000 0.053 0.000 18.000 3.920 19.000 424.000
min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 1.970 0.000 14.000
max 5.350 0.940 240.000 0.716 0.014 342.000 4.650 365.000 10560.000
sd 0.662 0.182 31.377 0.194 0.001 65.299 0.414 52.870 2113.943
variance 0.438 0.033 984.498 0.038 0.000 4264.019 0.172 2795.213 4468755.000
skewness 0.992 0.933 3.620 1.186 6.532 2.242 -0.906 2.335 2.011
kurtosis 7.029 3.840 19.645 3.016 53.747 7.502 4.773 9.939 6.169
CEO Regulatory Focus New Model Introductions Firm Reputation
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Table 3.  Correlations 
 
 
  
Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 Product Quality 3.87 0.41
2 Prominence - WSJ 39.73 52.87 -0.21 *
3 Prominence - All US Media 1348.3 2113.9 -0.17 * 0.86 *
4 New Models 19.65 31.38 -0.09 0.43 * 0.65 *
5 New Product Diversity 0.16 0.19 0.01 0.74 * 0.72 * 0.60 *
6 New Prod. Dev. fr. Norms 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.17 * 0.14 * 0.13 * 0.17 *
7 Recalls by Model Year 46.35 65.30 -0.27 * 0.61 * 0.75 * 0.65 * 0.69 * 0.14 *
8 Promotion Focus 1.56 0.66 0.10 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.09 -0.08 0.00
9 Prevention Focus 0.20 0.18 0.20 * 0.14 * 0.15 * 0.13 * 0.22 * -0.02 0.04 0.00
10 Number of Models 71.86 89.45 -0.11 0.73 * 0.88 * 0.83 * 0.81 * 0.10 0.73 * 0.05 0.20 *
11 Engine Spread 2.77 1.97 -0.23 * 0.75 * 0.79 * 0.66 * 0.85 * 0.14 * 0.77 * -0.06 0.11 0.84 *
12 Firm Age 71.31 19.96 -0.08 0.34 * 0.47 * 0.40 * 0.31 * 0.05 0.31 * -0.12 0.04 0.48 * 0.47 *
13 CEO Age 58.36 8.77 0.03 -0.05 -0.12 -0.15 * -0.07 -0.08 -0.17 * 0.22 * -0.09 -0.14 * -0.20 * -0.25 *
14 CEO Background 2.01 0.75 -0.07 -0.20 * -0.32 * -0.34 * -0.26 * -0.07 -0.37 * -0.02 -0.02 -0.37 * -0.35 * -0.39 * 0.44 *
15 CEO Change 0.18 0.38 0.05 0.08 0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.10 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.18 * -0.05
16 CEO Insider 0.95 0.21 0.03 -0.15 * -0.21 * 0.00 -0.10 0.03 0.08 -0.09 -0.18 * -0.17 * -0.12 -0.15 * 0.17 * -0.10 -0.11
17 Firm Size 24.47 1.09 -0.13 * 0.63 * 0.64 * 0.52 * 0.74 * 0.14 * 0.59 * 0.15 * 0.03 0.66 * 0.75 * 0.31 * 0.02 -0.26 * -0.01 -0.06
18 Multi-Brand Firm 0.44 0.50 -0.11 0.64 * 0.63 * 0.44 * 0.74 * 0.14 * 0.58 * 0.16 * 0.08 0.61 * 0.64 * 0.19 * -0.03 -0.32 * -0.04 -0.04 0.80 *
19 Region 2.44 0.71 0.32 * -0.59 * -0.76 * -0.57 * -0.41 * -0.12 -0.59 * 0.28 * 0.02 -0.68 * -0.66 * -0.64 * 0.33 * 0.39 * 0.05 0.16 * -0.42 * -0.37 *
20 ROA 0.02 0.08 -0.03 0.12 0.03 -0.14 * -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.27 * -0.06 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.12 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.01 -0.07
21 Industry Volume 16.55 0.15 0.06 -0.09 -0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.03 0.19 * 0.04 0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.12 -0.13 * -0.04 0.05 0.11 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.04
* p < 0.05
n = 240
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Table 4.  New Model Introductions 
 
Variables IRRa Rob. s.e. IRRa Rob. s.e. IRRa Rob. s.e. IRRa Rob. s.e.
Number of Models 1.006 ** (0.00) 1.006 ** (0.00) 1.000 (0.00) 0.996 (0.00)
Engine spread 0.975 (0.08) 0.970 (0.08) 1.034 (0.06) 0.658 (0.25)
Firm age 1.009 (0.02) 0.982 (0.03) 1.014 (0.01) 0.863 (0.09)
CEO ageb 1.010 (0.01) 0.998 (0.01) 1.001 (0.01) 0.942 (0.04)
CEO function - Engrb 0.921 (0.21) 1.090 (0.26) 0.847 (0.09) 0.537 (0.28)
CEO function - Adminb 1.267 † (0.17) 1.255 (0.25) 1.345 ** (0.09) 1.766 (0.90)
CEO function - Marketingb 0.151 ** (0.07)
CEO changeb 0.919 (0.12) 0.901 (0.06) 0.965 (0.03) 0.787 (0.38)
CEO insiderb 2.010 ** (0.35) 1.961 ** (0.45) 0.807 † (0.09) 0.402 (0.30)
Firm size 1.919 ** (0.43) 1.762 † (0.55) 1.368 ** (0.13) 4.130 (3.70)
ROA 3.712 ** (1.61) 3.554 * (1.98) 0.665 * (0.11) 1.640 (2.87)
Industry volume 1.215 (0.38) 0.627 (0.28) 0.846 (0.19) 0.171 (0.22)
Promotion focusb 1.191 ** (0.08) 0.988 (0.03) 0.661 † (0.16)
Prevention focusb 0.641 ** (0.09) 1.014 (0.07) 1.590 (1.12)
Observations 227 206 206 206
Groups 16 16 16 16
Wald χ2 2016.4 ** 1959.1 ** 1136.2 ** 921.1 **
Log pseudolik. -1057.1 -797.8 -50.0 -0.3
AIC 2138.2 1621.7 126.1 26.6
 a IRR coefficient represents the exponentialized version of the coefficient.
 b Variables lagged.
 ** p < .01  * p < .05  † p < .10
Model 1
Controls
New Model Introductions
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Deviation fron NormsDiversityNumber
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Table 5.   Error Avoidance Behavior - All Recalls 
 
Variables IRRb Rob. 
s.e. IRRa Rob. 
s.e.
Number of Models 0.999 (0.00) 1.000 (0.00)
Engine spread 1.095 * (0.04) 1.050 † (0.03)
Firm age 0.944 ** (0.01) 0.945 ** (0.01)
CEO ageb 0.987 (0.01) 1.001 (0.01)
CEO function - Engrb 0.946 (0.12) 0.895 (0.13)
CEO function - Adminb 0.516 ** (0.11) 0.426 ** (0.08)
CEO function - Marketingb 0.485 * (0.17)
CEO changeb 0.970 (0.09) 1.029 (0.06)
CEO insiderb 1.775 ** (0.23) 2.338 ** (0.29)
Firm size 1.348 † (0.22) 1.155 (0.17)
ROA 3.162 ** (1.04) 4.313 ** (1.57)
Industry volume 3.262 ** (0.99) 3.340 ** (1.10)
Promotion focusb 0.966 (0.04)
Prevention focusb 0.783 * (0.08)
Observations 227 206
Groups 16 16
Wald χ2 18267.2 ** 7466.8 **
Log pseudolik. -958.1 -855.6
AIC 1940.3 1737.2
 a IRR coefficient represents the exponentialized version of the coefficient.
 b Variables lagged.
 ** p < .01  * p < .05  † p < .10
Controls
Model 1 Model 2
All Recalls
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Table 6.  Firm Reputation 
 
Coeff. Rob. s.e. Coeff. Rob. s.e. IRR
a Rob. s.e. IRRa Rob. s.e. IRR
a
Rob. s.e.
Number of models 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.999 † (0.00) 1.003 ** (0.00) 1.000 (0.00)
Reputation 1-year lag 0.712 ** (0.07) 0.716 ** (0.07) 1.004 ** (0.00) 1.002 ** (0.00) 1.000 (0.00)
Engine spread -0.031 † (0.02) -0.035 † (0.02) 1.007 (0.10) 1.064 (0.08) 0.977 (0.03)
Firm age 0.004 (0.01) 0.005 (0.01) 0.995 (0.01) 0.979 (0.02) 0.987 * (0.01)
CEO ageb 0.000 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.995 (0.01) 1.005 (0.01) 0.994 (0.00)
CEO function - Engrb 0.001 (0.03) -0.011 (0.03) 0.975 (0.12) 1.098 (0.18) 1.010 (0.08)
CEO function - Adminb -0.036 * (0.02) 0.021 (0.03) 0.567 ** (0.05) 0.844 (0.11) 0.767 * (0.10)
CEO function - Marketingb 0.078 (0.18) 25.849 ** (8.21)
CEO changeb 0.020 (0.02) -0.024 (0.01) 1.072 (0.10) 1.076 (0.10) 1.009 (0.05)
CEO insiderb 0.030 (0.05) -0.022 (0.03) 0.965 (0.12) 1.490 ** (0.20) 0.998 (0.07)
Firm size -0.025 (0.08) -0.027 (0.08) 1.208 (0.17) 1.213 (0.31) 1.237 (0.18)
ROA -0.204 (0.19) -0.277 (0.17) 0.078 ** (0.02) 0.060 ** (0.02) 0.256 ** (0.05)
Industry volume 0.289 ** (0.07) 0.285 ** (0.06) 0.890 (0.18) 0.742 (0.19) 0.911 (0.25)
Constant -3.253 † (1.85) -3.245 † (1.68)
All recalls 0.001 * (0.00) 1.002 (0.00) 1.002 * (0.00)
New Model Count 0.000 (0.00) 0.995 ** (0.00) 0.998 ** (0.00)
Diversity -0.015 (0.19) 0.712 (0.24) 1.480 (0.52)
Deviation -4.973 (4.19) 1.2E+09 ** (8.1E+09) 0.106 (0.56)
Promotion focusb 0.004 (0.01) 1.074 (0.09) 1.075 † (0.04)
Prevention focusb -0.043 (0.04) 1.596 * (0.37) 1.517 ** (0.12)
Observations 206 202 214 206 206
Groups 16 16 16 16 16
AIC -406.2 -407.3 1834.1 1669.6 8544.2
 a IRR coefficient represents the exponentialized version of the coefficient.
 b Variables lagged.
 ** p < .01  * p < .05  † p < .10
Controls - Quality
Model 1
Controls - Prominence
Model 3 Model 5
Prominence - All
Firm Reputation
Model 2
Product Quality
Model 4
Prominence - WSJ
  118 
Table 7.  Mediation Analysis 
  
Preacher & Hayes Multiple Regression (Bootstrap: 5,000 Iterations)
Indep. Variable Mediating Variable Dependent Variable a coeff b coeff
Indirect 
Effect
Direct 
Effect c coeff
Bootstrap 
Coeff. Low High Mediation
Promotion Focus
1year lag
New Model Intro Prominence - WSJ 2.706 -0.627 ** -1.696 0.169 -1.527 -1.696 -3.938 -0.030 Full
Prominence - All 2.706 -13.994 ** -37.872 -145.471 -183.343 † -37.872 -99.505 12.882
Diversity Prominence - WSJ 0.017 † 87.770 ** 1.527 -3.054 -1.527 1.527 -0.171 4.344
Prominence - All 0.017 † -853.52 -14.852 -168.492 -183.343 † -14.852 -55.558 9.513
Deviation Prominence - WSJ 0.000 3800.1 ** -0.476 -1.051 -1.527 -0.476 -1.639 0.859
Prominence - All 0.000 81270.6 † -10.180 -173.164 -183.343 † -10.180 -38.592 20.414
Prevention Focus
1year lag
Recalls - All Product Quality -32.405 * -0.003 ** 0.082 0.278 * 0.360 ** 0.082 0.020 0.174 Partial
95% Conf. Interval
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Table 8.  Summary of Hypotheses 
    
Support 
(Primary Analysis in Bold) 
Hypotheses Dep. Variable Predictor 
Predicted 
Direction 
 
1 Year 
Lag 
 
2 Year 
Lag 
 
3 Year 
Lag 
Hypothesis 1 New Model Count CEO Promotion Focus + Yes No No 
Hypothesis 2 New Model Count CEO Prevention Focus - Yes No No 
Hypothesis 3 Product Intro. Diversity CEO Promotion Focus + No No No 
Hypothesis 4 Product Intro. Diversity CEO Prevention Focus - No No No 
Hypotheses 5 Product Intro. Deviation from 
Norms 
CEO Promotion Focus + No No Yes 
Hypothesis 6 Product Intro. Deviation from 
Norms 
CEO Prevention Focus - No No No 
Hypothesis 7 Total Product Recalls CEO Prevention Focus - Yes Yes No 
Hypothesis 8a Prominence - WSJ  CEO Promotion Focus + No Yes No 
 Prominence - All Media  CEO Promotion Focus + No No No 
Hypothesis 8b Prominence - WSJ  
Mediator 
New Product Introductions 
CEO Promotion Focus + Yes No No 
 Prominence - All Media  
Mediator 
New Product Introductions 
CEO Promotion Focus + No No No 
Hypothesis 9a Product Quality CEO Prevention Focus + No No No 
Hypothesis 9b Product Quality 
Mediator 
Product Recalls 
CEO Prevention Focus + Yes Yes No 
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Table 9.  Summary of Sensitivity Analysis 
 
  
DV Model Type
New Product Introductions 1 year lag 2 year lag 3 year lag 1 year lag 2 year lag 3 year lag
New Model Count Poisson - IRR 1.191 (p <.01)
increase
.943 (n.s.) .981 (n.s.) .641 (p <.01)
decrease
1.508 (n.s.) .676 (n.s.)
New Model 
Diversity
Poisson - IRR .988 (n.s.) .953 (p<.05)
decrease
1.009 (n.s.) 1.014 (n.s.) 1.013 (n.s.) .931 (n.s.)
New Model Intro. 
Deviation from 
Norms
Poisson - IRR .661 (p<.10)
decrease
1.726 (n.s.) 1.570 (n.s.) 1.590 (n.s.) 1.206 (n.s.) 2.318 (n.s.)
Recalls - Counts
All Recalls Poisson - IRR .966 (n.s.) .984 (n.s.) .978 (n.s.) .783 (p<.05)
decrease
.773 (p<.05)
decrease
.826 (n.s.)
Direct Relationship Between Regulatory Focus & Reputation
1 year lag 2 year lag 3 year lag 1 year lag 2 year lag 3 year lag
Product Quality Linear .004 (n.s.) -.008 (n.s.) .002 (n.s.) -.043 (n.s.) -.041 (n.s.) -.047 (n.s.)
Prominence - WSJ Poisson - IRR 1.074 (n.s.) 1.170 (p<.05)
increase
1.069 (n.s.) 1.596 (p<.05)
increase
.643 (p<.05)
decrease
.757 (n.s.)
Prominence - All US 
Media
Poisson - IRR 1.075 (p<.10) 1.049 (p<.10)
increase
.995 (n.s.) 1.517 (p<.01)
increase
.924 (n.s.) .930 (n.s.)
Note: Reputation regressions incorporate 1-year lags of reputation DV.
Promotion Focus Prevention Focus
Promotion Focus Prevention Focus
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Table 9.  Summary of Sensitivity Analysis, continued 
 
 
Mediation Testing - 5000 iterations Indir. Effect
Bootstrap
Independent Variable Mediating Variable Dependent Variable Coeff. Low High c coeff Mediation
Promotion Focus - 2year lag New Model Intro Prominence - WSJ 1.4245 -0.8904 4.3824 4.4047 No
Prominence - All 36.7916 -25.0675 124.5931 -70.7294 No
Diversity Prominence - WSJ 1.2304 -0.0276 4.2777 4.4047 No
Prominence - All -27.5391 -79.9778 4.9969 -70.7294 No
Deviation Prominence - WSJ 1.3983 -0.1060 5.0984 4.4047 No
Prominence - All 28.0249 -4.7775 109.4399 -70.7294 No
Promotion Focus - 3year lag New Model Intro Prominence - WSJ 1.5331 -1.2954 4.6245 3.0482 No
Prominence - All 35.3568 -28.4888 113.1324 -112.4430 No
Diversity Prominence - WSJ 1.4151 -0.1800 4.6113 3.0482 No
Prominence - All -33.6089 -89.9432 6.9390 -112.4430 No
Deviation Prominence - WSJ 0.5668 -1.5066 2.1079 3.0482 No
Prominence - All 17.0435 -42.4671 63.6794 -112.4430 No
Prevention Focus - 2year lag Recalls - All Product Quality 0.0547 0.0069 0.1377 0.2795 * Partial
Prevention Focus - 3year lag Recalls - All Product Quality 0.0110 -0.0150 0.0578 0.2293 † No
95% Conf. Int.
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